

Essays in this volume offer fresh insights into Jain principles of *Ahimsā* and *Anekānta* by examining their meaning and historical significance, and demonstrate their relevance and role in addressing contemporary issues of intolerance, conflict, violence and war. Contributors to this book bring perspectives from the disciplines of philosophy, religious studies, history and art history.

“These essays contain piercing and prescriptive approaches to grappling, according to Jain tradition, with current geopolitics, particularly in the wake of terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In addressing a host of tantalizing Jain clues to human salvation and the global amelioration of suffering, the contributors to this impressive volume have unearthed a continual appeal that has worked for the Jains for millennia and could work for others.”

From *Foreword* by MICHAEL TOBIAS

**AHIṂSĀ, ANEKĀNTA  
AND  
JAINISM**

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**VOLUME XXI**

# AHIMŚĀ, ANEKĀNTA AND JAINISM

*Edited by*  
TARA SETHIA

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS  
PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI



*First Edition Delhi, 2004*

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ISBN 81-208-2091-2 (Cloth)

ISBN 81-208-2096-3 (Paper)

## MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

41 U A Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007  
8 Mahalaxmi Chamber, 22 Bhulabhai Desai Road, Mumbai 400 026  
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8 Camac Street, Kolkata 700 017  
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004  
Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

*Printed in India*

BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS,  
A-45 NARAINA, PHASE-I, NEW DELHI 110 028  
AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR  
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED,  
BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI 110 007

## About the Cover

*Kamatha born as a beast attacks Pārśva in a former life, detail of a mural at the Jaina matha, Shravana Belgola, Karnataka, ca 1825-50 Photo Del Bontà*

The image on the cover portrays *ahimsā* in its most compelling form. Rather than illustrate *ahimsā* as avoiding to do harm—killing creatures for food or simply treading on them—here Pārśva allows the beast to actually eat him. Pārśva's *ahimsā* is not the act of deciding not to fight back, but rather it transcends the violence with complete absence of fear. The inevitability of Pārśva's inaction is due to the state of his great soul. The peaceful landscape with its innocent animals scattered about underscores Pārśva's *ahimsā* by offering an effective foil to the act of killing him.

In Pārśva's ten incarnations the soul who we call Kamatha' saw himself as Pārśva's rival and killed him four times. Kamatha also tried to kill him numerous other times, including during Pārśva's final life. The murals of the *matha* tell the stories of these births, concentrating primarily on the first and the last. A few births seem to be represented by single telling moments of the specific life. Here the naked Pārśva sits in quiet mediation under a tree while Kamatha born as a wild beast, depicted as the mythical *śārdūla*, attacks him. Pārśva's quiescence is staggering, and is truly sublime.

The Jaina *matha* at Shravana Belgola was probably built in the 15<sup>th</sup> or 16<sup>th</sup> centuries long after the bulk of architectural activity at the site and served as a residence for the *bhattaraka*, the Digambara religious head there. During the reign of Mummadi Krishnaraja Wodeyar (1794-1868), who was restored to the throne after Tipu Sultan's death, the arts of Mysore enjoyed an important renaissance. The murals of the Jaina *matha* at Shravana Belgola are some of the finest examples of the period.

Robert J. Del Bontà

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## Foreword

### SERIES EDITOR

I consider it a privilege to write a Foreword to the book entitled *Ahimsā, Anekānta and Jainism* edited by Tara Sethia, which is a collection of articles written by eminent and illustrious scholars of Jainism. The book has three sections as the title suggests. In section one, the views on and nature of *ahimsā* are emphasised and it is stated that *ahimsā* is the backbone of the progress of the civilised world. Though the world is inundated with terrorism, tyranny, malevolent activities, horror and holocaust, the basic finer qualities of human beings, such as, compassion, kindness, forgiveness, sympathy and non-violence are always crowned with success. Mahāvīra, some 2600 years ago, realised this doctrine and preached throughout his whole life the doctrine of *ahimsā* (non-violence) which is the best religion in the world along with *tapah* (penance) and *samyama* (restraint) — *dhammo mangalam ukkiṭṭham ahimsā samjamo tavo* (*Daśavaikāṭikasūtra* I.1 1). All the four articles written by eminent persons point out this aspect of *ahimsā* to a great extent.

In the second section, the philosophy of *anekānta*, one of the greatest arguments of human mind, is focused

*Ahimsā, Anekānta and Jainism*

by six learned scholars and have shown how *anekānta* is very much relevant in judging the validity of a substance (*dravya*) even in the present-day context. The basic idea of *anekāntavāda* is to judge a thing from its positive and negative aspects. It is to be scaled from many (*aneka*) angles, so that we can get the real nature of a thing

In the third section, Jainism in history text-books and in Arts and Epigraphy is elucidated. This section describes the excessive melancholy state of affairs in the text-books of Indian History prepared for the undergraduate courses in the United States. This section states that the coverage of Jainism in most of the text-books is jejune and significantly inadequate.

On the whole, this book will definitely help the readers to form and frame an idea on *ahimsā* and *anekānta* in a succinct manner. I, therefore, thank Mr. N. P. Jain, Director of Motilal Banarsidass, for including this book in the series for the benefit of the scholars. I believe that the book-shelves of every learned scholar of Jainism will be adorned with this book.

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The 15th of January 2004  
Calcutta

## Foreword

MICHAEL TOBIAS

**F**or all of our inventive elegance, remarkable dreams and undying capacity to share, to love, to learn from our mistakes, we humans continue to rain down upon one another and the earth at large a colossal burden which, tragically, is often the very sum of our existence

This onus emerges in the very guises of much that is characterized by progress and development, not least of which are the consumption of fossil fuels, the desiccation of coral reefs, our collective decimation of tropical and temperate forests, and the cruel obliteration of 45 to 50 billion farm animals per year worldwide. At the same time, our species has consigned to oblivion an accelerating circle of victims, be they the tens-of-thousands of plant, animal and insect species we are driving extinct, the 800 million humans who are hungry, or the other two billion people who are below the poverty line

Politically, we have witnessed countless forms of tyranny, prejudice, and the use of malevolent force against indigenous peoples, women, children, ethnic minorities, and whole nations. Since the time of the European Renaissance, it is estimated that some 250



million people have been murdered Civil wars continue to erupt And the recent terrorism and grievous hostilities in the Persian Gulf merely reflect long-time trends in the name of "Just War" which must connote, surely, the most ambivalent of recommendations for our species

Yet, there are other norms, deep-seated behavioral and spiritual paradigms which cry out for altogether different interpretations and conclusions, and which go to the heart of the human potential One such tradition is Jainism, whose most recent sage, Mahāvira, died in c 527 B C E, leaving a seminal legacy of *ahimsa* and *anekanta*

That legacy is the subject of this remarkable collection of thirteen essays beautifully edited by Dr Tara Sethia These essays contain piercing and prescriptive approaches to grappling, according to Jain tradition, with current geopolitics, particularly in the wake of terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 How can traditions of nonviolence, in any ethical community, find pathways that are likely to make a difference, soften human callousness, inspire an awareness of the spectacular possibilities of reconciliation, grace under pressure, and unconditional love? Countering seemingly impossible odds, what fonts of practical wisdom and spiritual ballast--what emotional anchors--might be gleaned from the limelight of nonviolence and tolerance that are at the core of perennial Jain emphasis?

In addressing a host of tantalizing Jain clues to human salvation and the global amelioration of suffering, the contributors to this impressive volume have unearthed a continual appeal that has worked for the Jains for millennia and could work for others Presenting from Sonya Quintanilla's insights into the early *Ardhaphalaka*

## Foreword

sect of Jains, a community that appears to have embraced all religious traditions and assimilated the best they had to offer, to Satish Kumar's important message to politicians "Wars start in our minds and in our speeches," to Christopher Chapple's reminder that Jains have long emphasized personal responsibility for other species and the environment, this is a groundbreaking volume that should be required reading for every course in political science, comparative religions, peace and nonviolence, and environmental studies

Jain tradition never compromised with respect to its monks and nuns (approximately 7,000 today)--they wander from village to village, speaking the gospel of nonviolence, refraining from all thoughts and actions that might carry even the slightest possibility of violence. Strict vegetarians, these mendicants obtain their food by passive begging. Possession-less, their goal is nothing more than a humble, personal contribution to a peace-loving world, the awakening in others of Jainism's most universal calling, to use P. S. Jaini's translation, "I ask pardon of all creatures, may all of them pardon me. May I have friendship with all beings and enmity with none."

Meanwhile, the millions of lay followers of these mendicants are not expected to give up everything. Rather, they are exhorted--by gentle example--to set the daily pace of societal change, as Mahatma Gandhi did (he was greatly influenced by several Jains throughout his life). The transformation in the secular world involves the limiting of one's possessions (*parigraha-parimāṇa*), the stunting of occupational violence (*ārambhaja-himsā*), and the adoption of vows (*vrata*) that would embrace the universal truth, starting one person at a time, of a Jain

antidote, exquisitely expressed by the ancient Ācārya Umāsvatī, which holds that “nonviolence is unlimited, tolerance unconditional, and reverence for life supreme” (*Tattvartha Sutra*). Moreover, this emblematic context for all of Jainism is further underscored by its ecological anthem, a message that resonates today like never before, namely, “*parasparopagraho jīvanām*,” suggesting ecological interdependence among all living beings.

These are extraordinary challenges to life in modern times. But they are exactly what we need if all life is to survive in a sea of stormy volition and skewed evolution. This book is a most welcome addition to the literature of life-support that can make a difference.

## Acknowledgements

This book evolved from the proceedings of an international conference, "Lessons of *Ahimsa* and *Anekanta* for Contemporary Life," held at Pomona in January 2002. The conference was sponsored by several institutions and individuals (listed in Appendix). I greatly appreciate their kind support which made the conference possible. Special thanks to Dr Sukh S Mehta, Professor Christopher Key Chapple, and Dr Bharti Jain for their enthusiasm and diligence in the planning and organizing of the conference. Also helpful were Mrs Sunila Daga, Mr Sumati Jain, Dr Narendra Parson, and Mr Amar Salgia. I am thankful to Dr Nitin Shah, Mr Sailes Jain, Mr Roop Jain, and Mr Ramesh Jain for their various kinds of assistance, and to Dr Rajiv Dhabuwala for his kindness and gracious contribution in video taping the conference.

I am grateful to my Dean, Dr Barbara Way and to the History Department for their continuing support which enabled me to edit and prepare the book for publication. I wish to thank Professor Padmanabh S. Jaini at the University of California at Berkeley for generously giving his time in answering my numerous questions, and for his constant encouragement.

*Alumsa, Anekanta and Jainism*

I am thankful to Dr Michael Tobias for writing a thoughtful Foreword to the book, and to Dr Robert J Del Bontà for contributing a photograph for use on the cover of the book along with an insightful description of the message it conveys

I appreciate the cooperation I received from the contributing authors in facilitating the timely completion of the book. I also want to thank all speakers and panel chairs for their respective contributions at the conference (Appendix)

I wish to thank Mr Narendra Prakash Jain and the editorial team at Motilal Banarsidass for their promptness in reviewing the manuscript and providing comments

Finally, as always, I am deeply indebted to my husband and campus colleague, Dr Nirmal Sethia, for his helpfulness and critical inputs throughout this project

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# Introduction

TARA SETHIA

The year 2001-2002 marked the twenty-sixth birth centenary year of Vardhamāna Mahāvīra (c 599-527 BCE), the twenty-fourth *Tīrthankara* and propagator of Jainism as we know today<sup>1</sup>. Many places in India and around the world celebrated the year as the “*āhimsa* year” to commemorate Mahāvīra’s total adherence to *ahimsa* (nonviolence). Such celebrations of *ahimsa* could not have been more timely.

Today, people are becoming increasingly conscious of their distinctive identity not only in terms of race and ethnicity but also in terms of cultural traditions and religious beliefs. While such consciousness of one’s heritage and a sense of pride in it serves as a positive force at the personal level, it also frequently leads to schisms and strife at the social level. The make-up of families, communities, cities and nations reflects unprecedented

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<sup>1</sup> The Jain tradition holds that every *Tīrthankara* “reanimates this ever present imperishable tradition.” See Padmanabh S Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 2.

diversity today, and this diversity when not accompanied by a strong spirit of mutual understanding and appreciation, is prone to fuel tensions that result in a variety of violent behaviors. Tragic examples of violence range from mass genocides to school shootings, and from civilians killed in the war zones to spectators dying in game fields. In the very first year of this century, we witnessed the unimaginable destruction of life on September 11, which in turn resulted in retaliation, war and loss of more lives. Violence continues to lead to more violence.

Under such circumstances, Mahāvira's teachings, and in particular two of its core elements, the principle of *ahimsa* and the philosophy of *anekanta*, appear to have increasing universal relevance as well as great practical significance. *Ahimsa* and *Anekanta* were the focal themes of an international conference, "Celebrating Mahāvira's Teachings: The Lessons of *Ahimsa* and *Anekanta* for Contemporary Life," held on January 19-20, 2002 at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. This volume presents twelve scholarly papers from that conference.

The papers are grouped in the following thematic sections: *Ahimsa* in Jainism and its significance today, *Anekantavada* in Jainism and in contemporary context, Jainism in History textbooks and in art and epigraphy.

Although the principle of *ahimsa* is common to many religious and philosophical traditions, the extent of its explication and the depth of its understanding are very unique to Jainism. Yet, the Jain contribution to the origin and evolution of this principle remains under-represented.

## Introduction

in the scholarly literature, which makes only occasional reference to the Jain sources <sup>2</sup>

The Jains regard *ahimsa* as the virtue of all virtues, "*ahimsa parmo dharmah*." A precondition to the proper practice of *ahimsa* is the knowledge of the existing life forms. Here Mahavira's contribution is unique as it broadens our understanding of life and the living through his explication of six main categories of life forms: earth (*prthvi*), water (*apa*), fire (*tejas*), wind (*vayu*), vegetation (*vanaspati*), and mobile beings with two or senses (*trasa*). *Ahimsa*, as Ācārya Mahaprajña points out, is possible only with the knowledge of all such living forms, and the understanding that all living beings irrespective of their forms are equal and experience pleasure and pain. This sense of our being same as other beings is at the core of the practice of *ahimsa* <sup>3</sup>. While understanding of *ahimsa* is essential for its practice, it is not enough. As explained by Ganādhīpati Ācārya Tulsī, *ahimsa* is a strength and power that grows with practice, and self-control or restraint (*samyama*) <sup>4</sup>.

The first group of papers examine the meaning and significance of *ahimsa* and its role in addressing contemp-

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<sup>2</sup> Christopher Key Chapple, *Nonviolence to Animals, Earth, and Self in Asian Traditions* (New York: SUNY Press, 1993), p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> For a further discussion of this aspect in the Jain Scriptures, and Mahavira's unique contribution in this context, see Ācārya Mahaprajña, *Astitva aur Ahimsa* (Ladnun, India: Jain Vishva Bharti, 1994), pp. 9-14, 216-17.

<sup>4</sup> Sadhvi Pramukha Kanakprabha (ed.), *Samasya Ka Sagar, Ahimsa Ki Nauka* by Ganādhīpati Ācārya Tulsī (New Delhi: Adarsh Sahitya Sangh, 2003), pp. 166-167.



orary problems of violence, terrorism, and the question of "just war" Drawing upon scholarly works on Jainism as well as the current practices of the Jain community, Kristi Wiley discusses the inter-connectedness of the related concepts of *ahimsa*, compassion and *samyaktva* in Jainism Wiley suggests that Jain view of *ahimsa* is based on the proper view of reality (*samyag darśana*) which regards any kind of violence to other living beings as violence to self and, therefore, injurious to one's spiritual progress and pursuit of *moksa* Nonetheless, the rational expression of this principle, she points out, also results in compassion or "social fellow feeling" Such compassion has prompted the Jains to speak in favor of vegetarianism, and against certain practices including animal sacrifice and Vedic rituals

How can Jainism with its commitment to *ahimsa* help one to respond to acts of terrorism and defend oneself and fellow beings against acts of violence and aggression? Is there a justification for war in Jainism? According to John Cort, "while there is a Jain theory of just war, we certainly see no Jain equivalent to a theory of a holy war"<sup>5</sup> However, as Nathmal Tatia has pointed out, according to Umasvati, the author of *Tattvartha Sutra*, 'nonviolence is unlimited, tolerance unconditional, and reverence for life supreme There is no question of "just war"'<sup>6</sup> Both Kim

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<sup>5</sup> See John Cort, "Intellectual *Ahimsa*" Revisited Jain Tolerance and Intolerance of Others,' *Philosophy East and West* (Vol 50, No 3, July 2000) 324-347, p 337

<sup>6</sup> "Translator's Introduction" to Umasvati's *Tattvartha Sutra* in Nathmal Tatia (ed), *That Which Is* (San Francisco and London Harper Collins, 1994), p xxi

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Skoog and Padmanabh S. Jaini address this and related issues in their papers.

Skoog formulates a Jain response to terrorism based on Jain philosophy and principles. He contends that although there is no theory of "just war" in Jainism, the Jain discussion of war comes close to it. Lay Jains who may participate in the war must do so only as a last resort, must be aware of its harmful impact, must not act with passion or emotion, and must strive to remain detached. Such emphasis on calm and detachment, concludes Skoog, can lead to care in the military activity and avoidance of destruction of innocent lives.

Jaini examines the question of "just war" in the context of the principle of *ahimsa* in Jainism. Violence of any kind results from lack of compassion. However, as Jaini points out, in Jain tradition, compassion toward others is possible only when we recognize the value of the self, "the source of all spiritual wisdom." Therefore, *ahimsa* is regarded necessary for one's spiritual progress leading to *moksa*. Drawing from insightful stories in the Jain scriptures, Jaini explains that although survival and occupation related violence is an option for lay Jains (unlike the mendicants who must observe total nonviolence), they must fully understand that "nothing short of hell or animal rebirth awaits those who kill or die while entertaining thoughts of violence." This is quite in contrast to the belief that death on battlefield is equal to martyrdom, or death in a holy war is a gateway to heaven, and even to the "just war" ideology. The Jain dedication to *ahimsa* and amity with all living beings, concludes Jaini, is the highest aspiration a Jain wishes to achieve.

### *Ahimsa, Anekānta and Jainism*

Satish Kumar believes that the foundations for his continuing work toward nonviolence and peace in the world were laid when he was a Jain *muni* (monk). For him, one of the greatest contributions of Jainism to world peace is its emphasis on human ability to practice silence, and to learn "when to speak, what to speak, and how to speak." Wars, he suggests, start in human minds and with human speech. Jainism teaches us that nonviolence begins with the self, in one's thoughts and language, and one's own actions. A peaceful world based on respect and care for all living beings is possible only when we extend this personal nonviolence to socio-political and ecological domains, and translate the nonviolence for the self into nonviolence for all.

The roots of *ahimsa* are in the philosophy of *anekānta*, an epistemological tool for understanding the nature of reality. In the Indic context, epistemology (theory of knowledge) is usually connected with ontology (theory of existence) within a given tradition. The Jains not only evolved their own theory of knowledge, including *anekantavada* (with twin aspects of *nayavada* and *syadvada*) in the context of their metaphysics and ontology, but more importantly, were also concerned about questions such as, what constitutes valid knowledge and how such knowledge is acquired? Therefore, the value of Jain epistemology is two-fold. First, it serves as the basis for understanding what constitutes the knowledge of ultimate reality, and second, it serves (separate from the first) as the basis for intelligible day-to-day dialog and

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discussion on matters of common concern.<sup>7</sup> Knowledge of ultimate reality within the Jain tradition is believed to be infinite (*kevalajñāna*), and can only be attained by a liberated soul, the direct seer or knower. In contrast, ordinary human beings can have only limited knowledge in their day-to-day life conditioned by certain perspectives.

The second group of papers in this volume explore both functions of Jain epistemology, explaining (1) the nature of ultimate reality in terms of ontological categories of *jīva* and *ajīva* (soul and matter) in their infinite forms and modes, and (2) the basis of logic and valid knowledge in the context of dialog and discourse in the everyday life. The papers in this section also demonstrate the significance of *anekānta* within the Jain tradition, in the history of religious rivalry, and in the context of problems of violence and intolerance in the contemporary world.

Samani Charitrapragya addresses questions such as, How did *anekantavada* originate? How is it connected with Mahāvīra and Jainism? Why is it significant within the Jain tradition? She points out that the word *anekānta* was not used by Mahāvīra, but suggests that its origin can be traced to Mahāvīra's responses to the questions of his disciples as recorded in the Jain text, *Bhagavati Sūtra*. Being omniscient, Mahāvīra was the seer of truth. Yet, he could not express truth in its totality due to the limitations of language, and therefore used the language of *naya*. It was in the millennium following Mahāvīra that the Jain *acāryas* constructed new terminology to explain the significance of

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<sup>7</sup> Jayandra Soni, "Basic Jaina Epistemology," *Philosophy East and West*, (Vol 50, No 3, July 2000) 367-377, p 370

the *nayas* leading to the formulation and evolution of *anekantavada*. Its application in the context of the present world, she concludes, can help us understand multiple dimensions of truth, reconcile opposing views, and make us tolerant of others' views.

John Koller advances a logical argument demonstrating the significance of *anekantavada*, especially for addressing the problem of growing violence in our society. He argues that violence is rooted in "dogmatic but mistaken knowledge claims that fail to recognize other legitimate perspectives." *Anekantavada*, Koller suggests, provides us with an alternative epistemology to support dialog among people of diverse viewpoints. Such an epistemology allows us to respect the views of others. Epistemological respect for the views of others, Koller cautions, should not be confused with relativism. It does not mean conceding that all views are equal. It does suggest, however, that logic and evidence determine the validity of a given view.<sup>8</sup> *Anekantavada*, explains Koller, allowed the Jain thinkers to maintain the validity of Jain view of reality, and to respectfully criticize the views of others, and their own views in terms of weaknesses. Such epistemological respect for the views of others, Koller concludes, "has a great potential to eliminate violent

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<sup>8</sup> Javandra Soni points out that the Jain epistemology includes a provision to explain error in human cognition, and also the reason for such error. He quotes from Manikyanandin's *Pariksamukhasutra* and Hemcandra's *Pramanamimamsa* to support this line of argumentation. See "Basic Jaina Epistemology," *op cit*, p. 370.

## Introduction

argument between ideological opponents by methodically both disarming and persuading them "

Epistemological tool of *anekanta*, argues Anne Vallely, allows us to accept a pluralistic approach to reality without falling into the trap of "extreme moral relativism or religious exclusivism" In demonstrating this she draws from her own experiment with *anekantavada* while she served as a "teacher of Christianity" for the *samanis* at Jain Vishva Bharati Institute in India There her research and the many dialogs with the *sadhvis* and *samanis* over a period of more than one year convinced her that being open-minded to others' beliefs does not require a break from one's own Thus, Vallely suggests that *anekanta* is a resolution to the problem underlying the debate on pluralism versus exclusivism

Reflecting on the "multi-dimensional significance" of *anekantavada* for day-to-day life, Kamla Jain relates *anekanta* to the functioning of a secular state or a system, which underscores the neutrality and respect toward all religions, to the working of modern jurisprudence which takes into account all perspectives to arrive at a judgment to the effective functioning of a business organization which succeeds only with the co-existence of various departments, and even to post-modernism and post-structuralism

While in principle *anekantavada* may appear as a system recognizing multiple worldviews, in reality it served, according to Paul Dundas, as a way which could establish the superiority of the Jain worldview over other models of reality Based on the critical examination of medieval Jain texts and their authors, Dundas demonstrates the tensions and divisions that existed

within the Svetambara Jain community where even superiority of a sect became an issue. Taking the example of Yaśovijayaḥ, he draws attention to a Jain argument which goes beyond *anekāntavāda*. This is the position of being *madhyastha* (meaning standing in the middle), a position from which it is possible to praise qualities in individuals who may be non-Jains and may even belong to a "false" religious path. However, such inclusive and tolerant approach, Dundas points out, did not mean that the non-Jains were considered equal to the Jains. This approach allowed Jains to be tolerant of non-Jains without abandoning the superiority of Jainism over other paths.

Christopher Key Chapple argues that *anekāntavāda* allowed Jains to survive during some of the most hostile and unfavorable moments in history. The stories of violence associated with Ācārya Haribhadra serve only to demonstrate the religious rivalry that prevailed at a given period in Indian history. Juxtaposing stories of violence attributed to ācārya Haribhadra, the great author and philosopher, with the actual passages drawn from Haribhadra's writings, Chapple contends that there is no evidence supporting the validity of such stories. The evidence that we do have in the form of Haribhadra's own writings strongly attests to his exemplary tolerance and respect for the views of others and his uncompromising commitment to *ahimsa* and *anekāntavāda*. Nonetheless, Chapple suggests that the story of violence attributed to Haribhadra, though without evidence, and the philosophy of tolerance that in fact characterizes the corpus of his writings, offer two different models to solve the problem of violence in our world today. The first offers violence as a solution to violence, and the second, more in tune with

## Introduction

the overall orientation of the Jain philosophy, offers compassion, tolerance and forgiveness as a solution to violence

The last section includes two papers that deal with the representation of Jainism and Mahāvira in history textbooks, and of *ahimsa* and *anekanta* in art and epigraphy respectively. My paper examines the problems underlying the portrayal of Jainism and Mahāvira in Indian history textbooks. A critical review of eight textbooks of Indian history used for undergraduate courses in the US suggests that the coverage of Mahāvira and Jainism in majority of these books is inadequate. The information they provide is sketchy and, at times, confusing. Often the key concepts and teachings of Mahāvira in these books are misrepresented to the extent that their real essence and wisdom are lost. The emphasis in some of these textbooks on outward appearances of certain religious rituals and practices without due regard for the principles and values such appearances embody undermines the educational purpose textbooks are expected to serve.

Using art historical and epigraphical evidence, Sonya Quintanilla demonstrates that the *ardhaphalaka* Jain monks of early Mathura practiced *ahimsa* and *anekanta* in an exemplary manner. Their adherence to *ahimsa* and *anekanta* helped them create a tolerant, open and inclusive environment in early Mathura. Such an environment facilitated the rise of Mathura as a cosmopolitan cultural center where members of diverse religions peacefully co-existed. The *ardhaphalaka* Jain monks and their followers were, thus, instrumental to the rise of key religious movements and iconographic developments in Mathura.



affecting the course of Indian history, the future of Jainism and Jain art in significant ways

The essays in this volume advance the discussion of *ahimsa* and *anekanta* in Jainism, point out their historical significance and their potential relevance for addressing contemporary problems, make us aware of the gap between these principles and their practice, and underscore the need for appropriate representation of Jainism and teachings of Mahavira in the history textbooks

Contributions in this volume should provide a lasting impetus for the study of Mahavira's teachings, and should also serve as a catalyst for understanding the power of *ahimsa* and *anekanta* in his teachings as pathways to enduring peace

# I

## **Ahiṃsā in Jainism and its Significance Today**

## Views on Ahimsa, Compassion and Samyaktva in Jainism

KRISTI L WILEY

In characterizing the teachings of Mahavira, a central theme would certainly be *ahimsa*, which has remained the cornerstone of Jain ethics to this day. As Padmanabh S. Jaini has observed, there is a "preoccupation with *ahimsa*" within Jainism, for no other religious tradition "has carried it [*ahimsa*] to the extreme of the Jainas. For them it is not simply the first among virtues but the virtue." <sup>1</sup> In most other religious traditions violence usually is associated with causing harm to other living beings. In Jainism, however, "it [*himsa*] refers primarily to injuring oneself – to behavior which inhibits the soul's ability to attain *moksa*." <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Padmanabh S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> Jaini, *op cit*, p. 167. The reasoning is that intentional harm to other living beings is motivated by passions (*kasayas*), which cause the binding of unwholesome varieties (*papa prakrtis*) of *karmic* matter to one's own soul. These *karmas* cause rebirth in undesirable states of existence that are characterized by a

This focus on one's own spiritual progress as an important motivating factor for observing *ahimsa* has been mentioned by other authors as well. For example, Ronald Huntington, the late professor of religion and the co-director of Albert Schweitzer Institute at Chapman University, has written that Jainism "expands Albert Schweitzer's famous concept of reverence for life into reverence for the entire universe" and that it "has affinities with Gandhi's non-violent campaigns of *satyagraha* (truth-force)" and with the writings of St Francis of Assisi. He concludes that "it would be entirely wrong, however, to see *ahimsa* in any sentimental light. The Jain doctrine of non-injury is based on rational consciousness, not emotional compassion, on individual responsibility, not on a social fellow-feeling. The motive in Jainism is self-centered and entirely for the purpose of individual *kaivalya*. And yet, though the emphasis is on personal liberation, the Jain ethic makes that goal attainable only through consideration for others."<sup>3</sup>

In other writings, however, a different view of *ahimsa* and compassion in Jainism has been expressed. For instance, in an essay entitled "Environmental Wisdom in

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preponderance of suffering and prolong the soul's journey in *samsara*

<sup>3</sup> See R. Huntington, "Jainism and Ethics," (December 15, 2001) at [www.chapman.edu/schweitzer/huntington.html](http://www.chapman.edu/schweitzer/huntington.html). The essay was intended to be a chapter in a textbook of world religions that he was preparing at the time of his death. It appears on the Albert Schweitzer Institute's website via a link called "Readings on Reverence for Life."

## *Ahimsa, Compassion and Samyaktva*

Ancient India," L.M. Singhvi describes the "ecological philosophy of Jainism" as being "virtually synonymous with the principle of *ahimsa*" He states

Compassion and reverence for life are the sheet-anchor of the Jain quest for peace, harmony, and rectitude, based on spiritual and physical symbiosis and a sense of responsibility and restraint. The term *ahimsa* is stated in the negative (a = non, *himsa* = violence), but it is rooted in a host of positive aims and actions which have great relevance to contemporary environmental concerns. It is a principle of compassion and responsibility. Compassion and non-violence are the basis of the ancient Jain scriptural aphorism *Parasparopagraho jivanam* (all life is bound together by the mutual support of interdependence) <sup>4</sup>

A similar view of *ahimsa* and compassion is found on a web page of Jain pilgrimages "Jainism has become synonymous with *ahimsa*. *Ahimsa* (non-violence) occupies the supreme place in Jainism. Compassion (*daya*) is the guiding force of non-violence. It is the positive way of life. It has been assigned an equally high place in Jainism- '*daya dharma ka mula hai*' (Compassion is the basis of religion)" <sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> L. M. Singhvi, "Environmental Wisdom in Ancient India," <http://www.ecomall.com/greenshopping/eastgreen.htm>

<sup>5</sup><http://www.jainpilgrimages.com/general/mahavir.htm>  
(December 15, 2001)

In writing about Jain views of ecology in the West, Anne Vallely has observed that "in the [Jain] diaspora community asceticism is being de-emphasized so that teachings of compassion and non-violence are no longer anchored to a renunciatory worldview Jain teachings are being redefined according to a different ethical charter altogether—one in which active engagement in the world is encouraged"<sup>6</sup> Is this diversity of opinion indicative of a shift in thought regarding compassion itself? In this regard, it would be instructive to examine views regarding compassion in some classical Jain texts that emphasize renunciation and asceticism.

First, let us examine passages in the *Tattvarthasutra* (TS), a text accepted by both Śvetambaras and Digambaras although with different commentarial traditions In TS 6 12, compassion (*anukampa*) is listed as one of the causes of the influx of *sata-vedantiya karma* (the *karma* that causes pleasant bodily feelings), along with giving (*dana*), asceticism with attachment (*saraga-samyama*), equanimity (*ksanti*), concentration (*yoga*), and purity or freedom from greed (*sauca*)<sup>7</sup> Here, and in other passages related to compassion, the commentators gloss *anukampa* as "*daya*" or

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<sup>6</sup> Anne Vallely, "From Liberation to Ecology Ethical Discourses among Orthodox and Diaspora Jains," in Christopher Key Chapple (ed.), *Jainism and Ecology* (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 2002), pp 193-216

<sup>7</sup> Compare this passage with Muni Śrī Mishrimal Maharaj (trans.), *Karmagrantha* of Devendrasūri, 6 vols (Beawar, Rajasthan Śrī Marudharakesari Sahitya Prakashana Samiti, 1974-1976) 1 55 Here compassion is associated with the binding of *sata-vedantiya karma*

## *Ahimsa, Compassion and Samyaktva*

"*ghṛṇa*," "compassion, pity, sympathy, or tenderness towards others" Compassion is "*maitrī*," or "friendliness towards others" A compassionate person is one whose heart is full of the feeling of kindness for the afflictions (*pīḍa*) of others, as if this suffering were one's own. Another interpretation of compassion, that of giving to others, is offered by the Śvetāmbara commentator Siddhasenagani "When one gives food, water, clothing, utensils, shelter, and so forth to the afflicted, the poor, and beggars who have not renounced the household life, and to mendicants as well, there are fruits in the form of disassociation of various types of *karmic* matter This brings about knowledge, faith, and conduct. Or, giving is showing compassion It is viewing the suffering of others as if it were one's own *Dana* is giving away with the intent or wish of showing kindness or giving assistance to others"<sup>8</sup>

Compassion is discussed by the commentators in association with TS 1 2, where *samyak-darśana* is defined as "belief in substances as they really are" Four indicative signs of *samyak-darsana* are listed as *praśama* (calmness), *samvṛga* (uneasiness with worldly existence), *anukampa* (compassion), and *astikya* (belief in the existents such as the soul, non-soul, and so forth) Since compassion is associated with a proper view of reality (*samyaktva*), it is not surprising that *karunya* is listed among the contemplations (*bhāvanas*) that strengthen all five vows (TS 7 6 = SS 7 11) This *sūtra* reads "Friendliness (*maitrī*)

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<sup>8</sup> See Umasvati, *Tattvartha Sūtra* with *Svopayā-bhāṣya*, and commentary by Siddhasenagani, 2 vols., (Devachanda Lalbhai Jain Pustakodddhar Fund, Series nos 67 and 76, 1926-30) 6 13

towards all living beings, delight (*pramoda*) in the distinction and honor of others, compassion (*karunya*) for the afflicted (*kliśyamana*), and equanimity (*madhyasthya*) towards the ill-mannered [should be contemplated]" Here, in the *Sarvarthasiddhi* (SS), the Digambara commentator Pūjyapāda defines *karunya* as "a disposition (*bhava*) to render assistance (*anugraha*) to the afflicted or those who suffer pain or anguish due to the rise of *asatavedantiya karma* He concludes that "He who conducts himself in this manner is able to practice non-violence and other vows to perfection"<sup>9</sup>

Thus, according to these commentators on the *Tattvarthasātra*, compassion may be expressed either passively or actively by viewing the suffering of others as if it were one's own or by rendering assistance to those who are afflicted The definitions for compassion in these commentaries are similar to those in the *Oxford English Dictionary* (1) Compassion is suffering together with another, participation in others' suffering, fellow-feeling, sympathy (2) It is the feeling or emotion, when a person is moved by the suffering or distress of another and by the desire to relieve it, pity that inclines to spare or to succour<sup>10</sup>

Compassion is discussed in a variety of texts in the context of appropriate mendicant and lay conduct Regarding mendicant conduct, *Ācarāṅga-sātra* 11 6 5 2

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<sup>9</sup> See S A Jain (trans.), Pūjyapāda's *Sarvarthasiddhi* (Madras Jwalamalini Trust, 1960, reprint 1992), p 195

<sup>10</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary* (Clarendon Press, second edition, 1989)



states "A saint, with right intuition (*samyak-darśana*) who cherishes compassion for the world, in the east, west, south, and north, should preach, spread, and praise (the faith), knowing the sacred lore"<sup>11</sup> *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* 21 13 says that "A monk should have compassion (*dayanukampa*) on all beings, should be of a forbearing character, should be restrained and chaste, and abstaining from everything sinful, he should live with his senses under control"<sup>12</sup> In the Digambara *Ātmanuśāsana*, unlimited compassion (*karunāpara*) is listed among the fruits of practicing severe austerities<sup>13</sup> Here, one is urged to follow the path of compassion, self-control, renunciation and equanimity<sup>14</sup> "When the shore of the ocean of the cycle of existence is close by, the fortunate man has aversion to sense-gratifications, has renounced all possessions, subjugates the passions, has tranquility, vows, self-control, practice of self-contemplation, pursuit of austerities, duly ordained mental activity, devotion to the Jinas, and compassion (*dayaluta*)"<sup>15</sup> And in discussing religious virtues in the *Prasamaratiprakarana*, Umasvati states, "Compassion is the root of sacred doctrine (*dharma*).

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<sup>11</sup> Herman Jacobi (trans ), *Jaina Satras*, part 1 Translation of the *Ācārāṅga-sūtra* and *Kalpa Sūtra* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1884, reprint Delhi Motilal Banarsidass, 1989), p 60

<sup>12</sup> Herman Jacobi (trans ), *Jaina Satras*, part 2 Translation of the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* and *Sātrakṛtāṅga Sūtra* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1895, reprint Delhi Motilal Banarsidass, 1989), p 109

<sup>13</sup> *Ātmanuśāsana*, 68

<sup>14</sup> *Ātmanuśāsana* , 107

<sup>15</sup> *Ātmanuśāsana*, 224

A person who is devoid of patience (*aksamavan*) does not show compassion. Therefore, one who is devoted to patience attains the highest *dharma*.”<sup>16</sup>

In some of the Śrāvaka-cāra texts, which detail appropriate conduct for laity, compassion is listed as one of the qualities of an observant layperson (*śrāvaka-guṇa*), specifically in the context of *saṃyaktva* and in observing various lay vows.<sup>17</sup> For example, Samantabhadra defines abstention from eating after sunset (*ratrī-bhojana*) as abandoning food by night out of compassion for living beings (*jīva-daya*).<sup>18</sup> The Digambara author Āśadhara, in his *Sagara-dharmamṛta*, declares that “compassion is the root of the whole sacred doctrine.”<sup>19</sup>

It is clear from examining selected passages in these classical Jain texts that compassion is associated with appropriate conduct for both mendicants and laity. Is it possible, then, for actions undertaken by those who lack *saṃyak-darsana*, in other words, by those who hold a false view of reality (*mithyadrsti*), to be informed by compassion, as it is understood in these textual sources? This question is addressed by the Digambara author Vidyānanda in his commentary on TS 1.2. He writes that the qualities of

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<sup>16</sup>Yajñeshwar S. Shastri (trans.), Umāsvatī's *Prasamarati-prakarana* L. D. Series, 107 (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1969), 168.

<sup>17</sup>“This *guṇa* is of the very essence of Jainism and needs no comment.” See R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga: A Survey of Mediaeval Śrāvaka-cāras* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 269.

<sup>18</sup>*Ratna-karanda-śrāvaka-cāra* - v 21, as cited in Williams, *op cit*, p. 108.

<sup>19</sup>*Sagara-dharmamṛta* 1.4, as cited in Williams, *op cit*, p. 42.

*samvega* and *anukampa* are not possible for those who have the wrong views or *mithyadrsti*. Although I have been unable to locate a similar statement on this matter in the Śvetāmbara commentaries, there is a passage in the Śvetāmbara *Daśavaikalika-sūtra* that reflects a similar point of view "First knowledge, then compassion, those who observe total restraint [i.e., mendicants] live thus."<sup>20</sup> Therefore, according to these sources, humans, heavenly beings, and five-sensed rational animals who have attained a proper view of reality can have, and do have, compassion for others, as understood in Jainism.

The Jain doctrine of *ahimsa* is based on rational consciousness or a proper view of reality (*samyaktva*), and compassion is an appropriate expression of this spiritual progress. While it is true that spiritual progress entails individual responsibility, this does not preclude a "social fellow-feeling" of compassion. The objects of one's compassion, or the ways of expressing compassion, undoubtedly have changed over the centuries in accordance with social conditions of the times. But whether acts of compassion are manifested in speaking out against animal sacrifice in Vedic ritual practices of ancient times, or in persuading others to refrain from killing animals for food or sport, or in activities associated with animal welfare and the environment in modern times, this ethical value has been an aspect of *ahimsa* throughout the history of Jainism. One of the best expressions of this

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<sup>20</sup>Kastur Chand Lalwani (trans.), *Daśavaikalika Sūtra* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), p. 10.

sentiment is in the practice of *samayika*—the attainment of equanimity—which a Jain aspires to achieve

Friendship towards all beings,  
Delight in the qualities of virtuous ones,  
Utmost compassion for afflicted beings,  
Equanimity towards those who are not well-  
disposed towards me,  
May my soul have such dispositions as these forever <sup>21</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> As translated in Jaini, *op cit*, p 224

# **The Jaina Response to Terrorism**

KIM SKOOG

**H**istory can be portrayed as a temporal line punctuated by key events, such as wars, that shape our lives. World War I served to shape my grandfather's life, World War II and the Korean War impacted my father's life, and the Cold War and Vietnam War influenced my own life. The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent reactions will no doubt directly influence my son's life. Normally, we learn to come to terms with these momentous events in our lives by approaching these from social, political, moral, and spiritual perspectives, and by often seeking guidance from established traditions. In this paper, I will focus on formulating a possible Jaina response to the terrorist acts such as those of September 11. In order to do this we must first understand what is meant by terrorism, and how terrorist acts are justified.

## **Understanding Terrorism and its Justification**

As the term "terrorism" connotes, the key tool of trade for the terrorist is terror. This comes in the form of physical violence or psychological fear. Creating this terror is politically or religiously motivated and relies on

publicity to bring about the desired effect (e.g., not only political change, consciousness-raising, an end of oppression, but also genocide, disruption of life, and so on). Terrorism arises out of a need either to respond to perceived oppression and injustice, or to establish a new regime based on a political, economic, or religious ideology. For the terrorist, such acts are the only means to compete and fight against an economically and militarily superior foe.<sup>1</sup>

There are two major arguments in justifying terrorism. The first argument is the *Utilitarian Terrorist Argument*. Accordingly, terrorism is seen as a means to maximize utility, i.e., gaining greater good (happiness) over the collateral harm (unhappiness) it may inflict on some. Some terrorists may even be empathetic to those who they kill or harm, but see it as necessary for the cause they believe in, yet other terrorists argue that civilian casualties are not really *innocent* as they give implicit consent to their government's "oppressive" policies and benefit from them.

The second argument in defense of terrorism is called a *Relativist Argument Terrorist vs Freedom Fighter*. It is sometimes argued that all nations at one time or another in their history have conducted "terrorist" attacks and tactics in pursuing their nationalistic goals. According to

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<sup>1</sup> For a recent compilation on current thinking on the nature and causes of terrorism in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, see Rex A. Hudson et al., *The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?* (Washington D.C. Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1999).

## Jama Response to Terrorism

the victors, individuals who bring about terrorist acts are seen as heroes and martyrs, while according to the vanquished, they are seen as evil villains and cowards who are despised and hated. Consider the Allied attitude toward the 1944 bomb plot against Hitler. To the Allies, it was seen as a great effort of heroic status and even today most would recognize its "positive" epoch-changing status should it have been successful—save 6 million Jews and hundreds of thousands of soldiers by the death of one person, Adolph Hitler, the leader of the Third Reich. However, the Third Reich and Hitler himself, viewed it negatively as an act of terrorism and treason.

### Responses to Terrorism

There are three major defensive responses to terrorism: All-out-aggression, Just War, and Pacificism. The all-out-aggression response is based on an "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" mentality and employs a quick in-kind retaliation against a terrorist aggressor. Such a response is intended to demonstrate to the terrorists that the cost of their acts is too high to continue them. This expression of aggression, like terrorism itself, does not follow Just-War guidelines, but instead embraces the *Political Realist* stand.<sup>2</sup> Retaliation is immediate, and

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<sup>2</sup> The *Realist* position on war and international conflict presupposes the view that there are no binding moral obligations among nations (or a nation to a terrorist organization), rather, there are only relations of power between them, unconstrained by moral rules. Often associated with Thomas Hobbes, it identifies *war* as a state of affairs when humanity is operating outside the realm of social order, where innate human aggression takes over. While a government is

intensity of aggression is same or even higher as "pay-back" for terrorist acts

The Just War response, in contrast, attempts to follow accepted protocol in a dedicated military campaign. Such a protocol is usually based on three major criteria: the principles of self defense, proportionality, and discrimination.<sup>3</sup> Others employ a "looser" interpretation of Just War by focusing on the *doctrine of double effect*, i.e., allowing for some "bad effects" when striving for an overall good.<sup>4</sup>

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required to uphold its own internal law, there is no overarching international law that it must uphold, hence, war is an instrument of foreign policy and it is restricted only by prudential concerns, not justice

<sup>3</sup> The three Just War criteria can be defined as follows: (1) *The Principle of Self-defense* implies that any act of war must have its origins in a self-defensive reaction to an aggressor, a preemptive strike against an anticipated aggressor is also permissible, (2) *The Principle of Proportionality* requires that the level of force employed must be in proportion to the good that the action is intended to achieve, and, (3) *The Principle of Discrimination* requires that force should be used in a way that respects the distinction between combatants and non-combatants—one can use force against the combatant but not the non-combatant.

<sup>4</sup> This doctrine of double effect has several restrictions: (1) the good but not the bad effect is intended, (2) the good effect is commensurate with the bad effect, (3) the bad effect is not the means to the good effect, (4) the end must bring about a great good or eradicate a great evil, (5) the act itself (apart from its bad effect) is not impermissible and must not be self-defeating or escalate out of control, (6) terrorism or "Total War" which involves the deliberate harming of the innocent, can only be the act of last



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Pacifism acknowledges the aggression but does not respond in-kind, rather it seeks a non-aggressive and a nonviolent response. The pacifist response is not exactly the same as "no response" such as denial of aggression, uncontested acquiescence to aggressor, "cowardly" fleeing from danger. Pacifism can arise on a personal or institutional level, and can be applied universally or only to specific cases. However, all expressions of pacifism are driven by a spiritual and/or moral commitment and the character of such reply is always nonviolent response: diplomatic measures, non-cooperation, demonstration, etc.

### Jaina Response to Terrorism

The central question of this paper is: What would be a likely Jaina response to an unjust and vicious social phenomena such as terrorism? There are two ways that one can go about constructing a Jaina response to terrorism. One can model a response based on historical episodes where an aggressor has threatened a Jaina community and observe how the clergy and/or lay Jaina

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resort. As noted in this section, differences abound within those who support this approach or justification to war, not only in regards to the principle of discrimination, but the very purpose of a Just War. For example, Thomas Aquinas contends that a just conflict is not a war of self-defense, but a war to redress wrongs committed by another state; its purpose is to inflict punishment for wrongs committed by a state that inflicted damage on another state and refused to admit or compensate for the transgression. Perhaps the only principle that avoids scrutiny and disagreement is the Principle of Proportionality within the "Just War" camp.

people sought a solution Or, one can formulate a "theoretical" response based on Jaina philosophical and religious tenets. In this paper, I will focus on the latter approach, giving only brief references to historical facts when helpful

Emphasis on the principle of *ahimsa* in the Jaina tradition is well known However, Jainas (mendicants and lay followers alike) realize that it is impossible to live a life totally in accordance with the principle of nonviolence Historically, the Jaina community cannot be identified as pacifist proper<sup>5</sup> There were a number of famous Jaina generals and soldiers, none of whom was condemned by Jaina leaders or followers<sup>6</sup> Overall, it can be noted that there does not seem to be clear, well established guidelines on how lay Jaina followers are expected to respond to war and terrorism Though nonviolence is encouraged, it is not an absolute, there are perceivable exceptions It is this flexibility that presents uncertain choices as to how one ought to respond individually

Of the three responses to aggression and terrorism identified above, the lay Jaina position might appear to

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<sup>5</sup> See Paul Dundas, *The Jains* (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp 102-103, 193, Padmanabh S Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp 280-281, 313

<sup>6</sup> One needs to distinguish between Jaina mendicants and Jaina lay followers The former are never to engage in any form of violence, let alone warfare, the latter, however, are given much more latitude to make their own decisions regarding warfare and are not condemned for war, and in fact can be praised for valor in a just war. For example, the great image of Bahubali at Shravana-Belagola was commissioned by the greatly adored Jaina General Camundaraya in 948 C E

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align mainly with the Just War approach, with its emphasis on restraint and self-defense. Only a few texts (e.g., *Sagaradharmamṛtatika*, *Yasastilakacampā*, *Nitivakyamṛta*) make reference to war. According to these texts, one may engage only in a defensive campaign, where one acquires only a less dangerous variety of *karmic* matter generated from *virodhi-himsa* or opposing/hindering-based violence.<sup>7</sup> However, the intent is not to encourage such activity but acknowledge its inevitability in a layperson's life, yet, if possible, one is to avoid it.<sup>8</sup> The Jaina texts, in general, regard acts of slaying—even in the spirit of self defense—to be de-meritorious, as such acts inevitably lead to the accumulation of *papa* or bad *karmic* matter.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The goal of life, according to Jainism, is to reach liberation (*moksa*) from rebirth and suffering (*samsara*). Accumulation of *karmic* matter in association with one's soul (*jiva*) "weighs down" the soul and causes it to be reborn. As pointed out here, certain types of violence, while still resulting in the accumulation of binding karma, results in karma that is easier to remove, less of an impediment to one's ultimate goal.

<sup>8</sup> For a detailed description of allowance for war, especially for the warrior/king caste (*ksatriya*), see Jainu, *op cit*, pp 170ff. Jainu correctly points out that much of the discussion on *virodhi-himsa* and views on warfare appears in much later works and not in earliest canonical Jaina texts. Perhaps as social difficulties and the inevitable clashes with Hindus and Muslims arose over the centuries, Jaina authors felt compelled to address how one might deal with the need to engage in limited combat when the need arose to defend oneself from an unjust oppressor—particularly when the Jaina tradition was under attack.

<sup>9</sup> *Satrakṛtanga*, II 11 5-8. "The first kind of committing sin is prompted by a motive. This is the case when a man for his own

Initially, then, we can see a marked difference in western and Jaina discussions of warfare and retaliatory violence. Just War discussions in the West focus on the social justification of warfare and take into consideration the impact of violence on society. In contrast, Jaina discussions focus on the effects of engaging in warfare on an individual's spiritual progress and pursuit of *moksa*. Yet, ironically, the choice to engage in a justifiable war such as against a terrorist, will take one away from this ultimate goal.

Though Jaina lay-followers have engaged in warfare, there has never been any doubt that they were still responsible for their acts, i.e., take rebirth in hell.<sup>10</sup> *Prima facie*, one must question the sanity of the (Jaina) soldier who voluntarily takes on a vocation that not only can likely bring about his untimely death, but also result in

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sake does injury to movable or immovable beings, or has it done by another, or consents to another's doing it. Thereby the bad Karma accrues to him. We now treat of the third kind of committing sins, called slaying. This is the case when a man thinking that someone has hurt, hurts, or will hurt him, or one of his people kills movable or immovable beings, has them killed by another, or consents to another's killing them. Thereby the bad Karma accrues to him." See Hermann Jacobi trans., *Jaina Sūtras*, Part II, in *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. 45 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964), pp. 357-358.

<sup>10</sup> Compare with Jaini's work again (p. 314) where he contrasts the Jaina *Ramayana* hero Lakṣmana who righteously slays the evil Ravana, yet both end up in the same hell after death, while Yudhiṣṭhira and Duryodhana in the Hindu *Mahabharata* go to heaven after engaging in war and slaying others in battle.

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an immediate rebirth in hell. Clearly there must be reasons that would prompt one to do such an ultimate expression of self-sacrifice (or self-destruction), e.g., defending loved ones, family, community, tradition, religion. Nevertheless, in such an event, the individual strives to "minimize the harm."

The way to "optimum violence"<sup>11</sup> whether engaging in war or responding to terrorism is by observing the following: (i) do not kill for the sake of oneself, (ii) do not act with passion or emotion, and (iii) renounce the act or disassociate oneself from it as much as possible. These directives are based on the Jaina explanation of the mechanics of *kārmic* bondage. More intense the passions (*kaṣayas*) one undergoes, the more intense are the vibrations (*yoga*) in the mind that bring about the influx (*āsrava*) of *karmas* that bind (*bandha*) to the soul. Take for instance the following passage that can serve to guide a Jaina in such situations:

Taking life away out of passion is violence  
(*Tattvartha-sūtra*, 7.8)

One may deprive a creature of his life and not be  
touched by the act [if] one has been following

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<sup>11</sup> What is meant here by "optimum" is that if one has to engage in violence, one must take into considerations prudential interests—do that course of action that has the *minimum* negative effect both on one's own spiritual progress and on the surrounding living beings affected by one's actions, one should particularly direct one's attentions to avoid harming "innocent" beings that are not the cause of any threat or harm to another.

the moral code and meticulously observing the religious norm (*Siddhasenadvatrimśika*, 3 16)

A person under the sway of passion kills himself at the outset even though another creature might or might not have been killed as a consequence (*Pravacanasara*, 3 16)<sup>12</sup>

Hence, according to Jainism, it is not only *what* actions we do but also *how* we do them that ultimately determines the nature of *karmas* we incur. Accordingly, acting too selfishly, boastfully, or out of self-defense in the course of warfare further stirs one's emotions so as to intensify this influx of *karma* as well as attract a firmer-binding kind of *karma* that is harder to remove.

In addition to optimizing one's violent activities done during the war or response to terrorism, one must also strive to shed the accumulated *papa* through good activities leading to *nirjara* (removal of *karmic* matter through austerities) and *samvara* (repelling or stopping the inward flow of *karma*). Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to think that all of this "debt" could be removed in one's lifetime. Good deeds and austerities serve to remove some of the bad *karma* associated with one's soul due to violence and may, therefore, decrease one's length in hell, but one cannot avoid altogether the rebirth in hell that awaits one as a result of killing in war or terrorist actions. Textual passages within the Jaina literature

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<sup>12</sup> These three passages are taken from Umasvati's *Tattvārtha Sūtra* and summary of commentaries presented in Nathmal Tatia (trans) *That Which Is* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1994), pp 173-174.

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express this ability to lessen the final debt without avoiding responsibility for demerit in a number of ways:

Sinners cannot annihilate their works by new works, the pious annihilate their works by abstinence (*Satrakrtanga* I xv 15)<sup>13</sup>

As a tortoise draws its limbs into its own body, so a wise man should cover, as it were, his sins with his own meditation (*Satrakrtanga* I viii 16)<sup>14</sup>

From the discussion above, it is apparent that the Jaina view of life stresses care and amity in the interaction with all living beings. Jainism, in principle, naturally espouses nonviolence and, therefore, some form of pacifism. Yet, as with all traditions, it has to wrestle with the difficulty of what to do with injustice and violence toward others as found in acts such as terrorism. Do we stick firmly to our non-violent principles and simply sit back and watch others suffer unjustly without lending a helping-hand to them?

The Jaina tradition, as is apparent from the following analysis by a contemporary Jaina teacher Muni Shri Nyayavijayaji, has chosen to tip the scales in favor of the need to act with compassion when it comes to preservation of social order and the lives of the innocent. In his work, *Jaina Darśana*, he attempts to give convincing justification as to why one *must* help those in need, for not to do so, is itself an act of violence.

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<sup>13</sup> H. Jacobi (trans.), *Jaina Sūtras*, op cit, Part II, p. 318

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p. 299

One commits violence by not contributing to the efforts of stopping violence or by simply remaining indifferent to violence, just as one commits violence by indulging in positive violent activity. If one who knows swimming does not rescue a drowning man and simply watches him drowning, it is an act of violence. Not to give food to the hungry in spite of one's ability to give them food is also a case of violence. Violence of such type is a result of callous carelessness of the form "What concern have I? Why should I invite trouble? I cannot afford to give food, etc., to others". Hard-heartedness is opposed to religion and religious practice. Universal love is the foundation of religion. To remain indifferent to other's happiness, comforts, and benefits for the sake of one's own is also a case of violence.<sup>15</sup>

In the above passage, Nyāyavijayaṇī is bringing to our attention the fact that acts of *omission* (avoiding the stoppage of violence) are just as deadly and impious as acts of *commission* (to do violence). One can be viewed as complicit in the violence itself, if one does nothing to stop it. Continuing with the same passage, we see this contemporary exponent of Jainism integrate the Gandhian tactic of passive resistance (*satyagraha*) as a means to stop violence.

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<sup>15</sup> Muni Śrī Nyāyavijayaṇī (trans. by Nagin J. Shah), *Jaina Philosophy and Religion* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), pp. 112-113.



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Nonviolence is a spiritual power. Noble bravery or heroism demands self-sacrifice. To sacrifice one's self-interests and even one's life—if need be—while resisting violence and supporting and fostering non-violence is the bravery of high order. In spite of having his courage and strength to fight, a person who controls his passion and excitement on the passion-rousing and exciting occasions and does not yield to violence is the true practitioner of nonviolence. It is the *ksatriyas* (members of the warrior class/caste) who have taught nonviolence, and those who follow their teachings are the brave men of heroic character. Where there is weakness and feeling of fear, the practice of non-violence is utterly impossible.<sup>16</sup>

In this moving passage we see expressed the kind of intense self-sacrifice that could explain why a Jaina layperson would jeopardize his/her own immediate spiritual advancement so as to protect and serve those in distress. It is hard to envision a nobler act of courage and compassion, reflecting the same kind of unswerving love that leads a *Bodhisattva* to postpone his final liberation (*nirvāṇa*) till all other sentient beings are brought to salvation. Truly this is the fullest expression of the Jaina ideal of *ahimsa*, where one respects and cares for other living beings so much that one is willing to delay one's own spiritual liberation in an effort to protect others from harm.

Although Nyayavijayaji does not advocate violence in the above passage, his reference to the *ksatriya* caste is

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid* p 112

important as all the Tirthankaras were drawn from the *ksatriya* (warrior) caste. The Jaina tradition, therefore, could hardly deny this obligation of the individual to defend society from aggression and helps explain the "ease" with which a tradition founded on the practice of extreme nonviolence could allow participation in military campaigns. However, as is well noted in Jaina scholarship,<sup>17</sup> there was a concerted effort as time progressed to "internalize" the elements of soldiering from a "fight" against warriors on a battlefield, to a "fight" against ignorance and passions that impede liberation and cause bondage. The valor, courage, dedication, strength, bravery, forcefulness, hardships, and pain that once characterized the great "warrior" *ksatriya*, now denotes the praised "mendicant" *ksatriya* who conquers the causes of suffering and transmigration through great fortitude, misery, and adversity on the part of the "spiritual warrior". Consider the following passages which typify this shift in focus from the mundane and violent to the sublime and tranquil.

A man who conquers nobody but himself is the greater victor than one who conquers thousands and thousands of valiant enemies.<sup>18</sup>

Fight with your own self, why fight with external enemies? He who conquers himself through himself attains happiness.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> See Dundas, *The Jains*, *op cit*, p 102, Jaini, *The Jaina Path*, *op cit*, p 67ff, Nyayavijayaji, *Jaina Philosophy*, *op cit*, p 239

<sup>18</sup> *Uttaradhyayanastotra*, IX 35 in Nyayavijayaji (trans), p 436

<sup>19</sup> *Ācarangasūtra*, II iii 77 in Nyayavijayaji (trans), p 437

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These passages emphasize not only that there has been a shift in the object of conquest for the warrior, but that the new way is significantly better and more praiseworthy, providing a better "spoils" of the victory. One need only consider that Sanskrit verb root of the most revered and central Jaina title "*Jina*," is "*ji*" (to conquer), to see the deep link between the former role of the *ksatriya* and the new purpose and direction it has taken within Jainism, i.e., "victor over attachment, passions, etc."

Jaina thinkers did not articulate a Just War theory as is found within the western tradition. However, many of the elements found in these western accounts are implicitly contained within Jaina thought in terms of general directives about war. As noted above, when war is to be engaged in, Jaina soldiers are never to be the aggressor and are to respond reactively in a self-defense, and to protect innocent life, the Jaina teachings, and the Jaina way of life. Jaina tradition also prohibits violence against non-combatants, because one's primary goal in life is to avoid doing harm to all living beings; only those viewed as evil and destructive (combatants) could be the recipients of violence. Anticipating the "doctrine of double effect," Jainism distinguishes between intentional, premeditated violence (*samkalpaja-himsa*) and unintentional, occupational violence (*arambhaja-himsa*), thereby recognizing that some unintentional violence may occur in the process of carrying out one's daily activities, presumably including warfare if necessitated to do so. However, some of the stipulations of the western "looser" interpretation of double effect might not be palatable to the Jaina sensibilities i.e., the allowance of terrorism or total war and the allowance of "minor infractions" to non-

combatants to bring about a greater good and eradicate a great evil

Looking at the overarching Jain directive to avoid violence if at all possible, one could presume that Jains would support the western principle of proportionality as they advocate the least possible violence to ward off a terrorist threat. Going one point further, perhaps the *real* distinctive Jain contribution to the philosophical dialogue over warfare and prevention against terrorism is the Jain emphasis on the "internal" dimension of war. Under such circumstances where a Jain must engage in war, he is required to remain calm and detached. This emphasis on a cool head will lead to more care to others and improved effectiveness in the military activity. This is due to the fact that a Jain combatant possesses a heightened sensitivity to when and where violence is warranted and when and where it can be avoided (hence, minimizing the use of violence). Such a use of "optimum violence" produces general reduction in the psychological and spiritual damage that the violence of war accrues to the combatant.

It goes without saying that "ideally" a member of the Jain community would prefer to resolve any conflict, including terrorism in a peaceful nonviolent fashion, exhibiting a nonviolence to all—even the terrorists themselves. Such an approach may incorporate the type of passive resistance methods employed by Gandhi and embraced by Muni Nyāyavijayaṇi who is quoted earlier in the paper. However, in confronting with a megalomaniac, pathological serial killer like Adolph Hitler of Nazi Germany, Osama bin Laden of al-Qaida, Shoko Asahara of Aum Shinrikyo, or Prabhakaran of the Liberation Tigers,

the Jainas may seriously wonder if there is any nonviolent means to arrest such violent and destructive propensity

### **Terrorist Arguments and Jaina Response: Conclusion**

This paper initially offered two arguments—utilitarian and relativist—intended to give moral and rational grounds for terrorist acts. We are now in a position to provide a probable response to these lines of argumentation. An analysis of Utilitarian argument from the Jaina perspective would result in finding fault with this line of thinking. Fundamentally, the Jaina would say that an injustice or wrong *cannot* be “fixed” by resorting to the killing of a large number of people, especially innocent non-combatants who are the usual recipient of terrorist attacks. A Jaina position would question whether violence is the only means to reverse injustices and oppression, especially given such world-wide global “overseers” as the United Nations that can be called upon to remedy a bad situation. Clearly, the slaying of thousands (if not millions) of innocent beings can never be the *means* to an end, regardless of what good it is perceived to bring about. Further, in the long history of terrorism it has seldom, if ever, brought about the ends that it was employed to achieve. The Utilitarian attempt to stack up the lives of sentient beings in some sort of mathematical equation is the most atrocious perversion imaginable against the basic sanctity of life. The scale of violence and suffering in terrorism is such an *immense evil* that no good consequence can outweigh it. Even if one were to generate a cost-benefit analysis, it is hard to see how the alleged benefits to the perceived “oppressed people” on the side of the terrorist activities, can carry more weight than the

resulting suffering in rest of world. The collective misery, fear, costs, loss of general well-being and happiness of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people directly or indirectly victimized, outweighs the intended "newly gained" happiness of the "oppressed people." This sort of analysis fails to recognize the inherent value in each and every life, whereby no one life or group of lives can negate the value and sanctity of another life, let alone *justify* the deaths of thousands of innocent persons.

In response to the Relativist argument, a Jaina analysis would focus not on which side is right or wrong, who is hero or villain, but rather on the character, purpose, means, and goal of both the undertaker of violence (*himsaka*) and the act of violence itself (*himsa*). If the act intentionally brings about the suffering and/or death of one or more innocent (non-combatant) persons, then it is wrong regardless of the nationality or identity of the agent and the purpose and means used to bring about the action. As noted above, it is not obvious that previous acts of terror have exhausted all other means to resolve the "alleged injustice or oppression" before unleashing their heinous acts of mass destruction. If one has properly subdued one's passions and emotions, then a Jaina mediator could objectively determine what injustices (if any at all) have been committed or continue to be committed and propose appropriate remedies to resolve the tensions and return society back to a stable condition. If violent activities persist, then a Jaina position would require that a policy of "optimum violence" be adopted so as to reduce the threat posed by the irrational aggressor.

While the Jaina lay population felt the need to occasionally engage in war to defend themselves and their

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fellow citizens, the monks were totally forbidden from such acts. The Jaina monk is instructed to remain passive even when under attack, to make no effort to fight back or later retaliate — instead to remain calm and detached. Take for instance the following passage from *Ācāranga Sutra* which shows a clam and totally nonviolent Mahavira under extremely violent circumstances

In his resting place crawling or flying animals attacked him, bad people or lance bearers attacked him, foul smells and sounds always well controlled, he bore the different sorts of feelings, persevered in his meditations, free from resentment <sup>20</sup>

As a living model of total compassion and nonviolence Mahavira preached the same to his followers as is clear from the following passages

As I feel every pain and agony from death down to the pulling of my hair, in the same way, be sure of this, all kinds of living beings feel the same pain and agony. For this reason all sorts of living beings should not be beaten, nor treated with violence, nor abused, nor tormented, nor deprived of life <sup>21</sup>

All creatures who commit sins will suffer and tremble. Considering this, a wise monk who has ceased to sin should abstain from violence

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<sup>20</sup> Hermann Jacobi (trans.), *Jaina Sūtras*, op cit, Part I viii pp 83-85

<sup>21</sup> *Satrakrtanga* II : 48 Hermann Jacobi (trans.), *Jaina Sūtra* Part II, p 351

with regard to moveable and immovable beings <sup>22</sup>

And yet the Jaina lay people cannot follow this total nonviolence. This apparent contradiction between mendicant and lay Jaina approach to terrorism and violence has generated some criticism among scholars. As a postscript to this paper, I wish to address such criticism. At the outset let us be clear that the lay Jaina followers do not complain about this difference. Nor do they see themselves as "used" by the mendicants as the "first line of defense" so that the monks can avoid accumulating bad *karma* or risk dying on the battlefield.

As a starting place, let us note that the world by definition is a world of suffering and there is little chance that one—in and of oneself—can bring an end to this terrible state of affairs. Second, by reaching liberation or climbing closer to it, one *does* make a significant improvement in the overall "spiritual atmosphere" around oneself. According to Jainism, being in the presence of a *Jina* (spiritual conqueror) is said to have an extremely positive influence on a person in terms of their overall attitudes, emotions, and preoccupations in life—hence reducing one's stress, anger, and hostility toward others in the world. Third, once one has taken the great vows of a mendicant (*mahavratas*) he or she is placed in a special role in the Jaina community, that is, one of great reverence and support because this person has taken on a life of total renunciation (*sarvavirati*). This is an extremely difficult life

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<sup>22</sup> *Satrakrtanga* I vii 20 Hermann Jacobi (trans.), *Jaina Satras*, Part II, p. 295



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of severe austerity and discipline, denying all the wants and desires that plague ordinary persons. The members of the Jaina community take it upon themselves freely to support this most precious undertaking even if it, at times, exerts demands on their own lives. Fourth, all laypersons believe that eventually they will enter upon this path (either later in this or a future lifetime), hence, they can hope that just as they support the monks now, later the Jaina community will support them when they have taken on the great vows.

So we see that in the Jaina community, the mendicants take on a special status that removes them from worldly obligations and duties so that they may dedicate themselves fully to the spiritual quest. It may be noted that this is not a unique phenomenon to the Jaina community as most, if not all, societies have recognized and supported certain individuals who have taken upon themselves to seek final truth or a reclusive lifestyle. To expect that such individuals violate some of their vows and highly restrictive principles for a momentary threat or problem posed against a local community would be to break the trust between the lay and mendicant members of the community as well as undermine the greater good that is expected to be generated from the monks' efforts toward liberation.

Mahavira taught *ahimsa* to all. As more people reach the state of true vision (*samyak-darśana*) and move to higher *gunasthanas* (stages of spiritual awakening), the chances of greater world peace will increase and overall sentiments of aggression and suffering will decrease. Some within the tradition might postulate that the mendicants work on a different, more fundamental levels

in dealing with aggression as expressed in terrorism. To reduce terrorism in the world, they operate at the spiritual levels, such as, purifying the general atmosphere, calming aggressive passions and changing selfish attitudes.

Finally, it should be noted as a point of clarification that Jaina mendicants are not oblivious to problems in the world nor do they turn their back on the changing needs of the lay community that supports them. The only real difference is that they cannot and will not intentionally hurt another living being, regardless of how evil and despicable a terrorist may be. Nevertheless, there is nothing that can prevent the mendicant from participating in nonviolent, passive-resistant demonstrations against tyranny or injustice, but, ultimately they have to stop just short of the option of violence in stopping aggression.

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PADMANABH S JAINI

The image of the Jainas throughout their long history has been associated with the doctrine of *ahimsa*, and the Jainas themselves have ardently adhered to the observance of the practice in their day-to-day life. The fact that even in contemporary society where material culture is all-pervasive, Jaina mendicants, who scrupulously adhere to their vow of nonviolence, still number over 2000 monks and 5,000 nuns--a large number indeed considering the very small size of the Jaina community--testifies to their continued total dedication to the ideal of *ahimsa*. Lay Jainas as well abjure all forms of intentional violence and reduce the necessary amount of violence associated with their occupations to the absolute minimum. Without such dedication, *ahimsa* itself would remain either a fond memory of a lost golden age or an unachievable future goal.

Fundamental to the Jaina principle of *ahimsa* is the belief that each living being possesses an individual soul. This soul is characterized by consciousness, undergoes continuous changes between various grades of purity and impurity, ignorance and omniscience. Jainas conceive that

a soul takes up a new body after the death of its present body according to its volitional activities. This is accomplished by the soul drawing toward itself a subtle kind of matter (*karma*), which then envelops it and defines for the soul the new kind of body it will receive. The volitional force driving the soul is what determines the state in which the soul finds itself. If the soul becomes subject to attachment and aversion, it gets tainted by *himsa* and thus becomes harmful to itself and others. If the soul maintains detachment and compassion, it is characterized by *ahimsa* and thus becomes non-injurious to others around itself.<sup>1</sup>

The orientation of the Jaina discussion on *ahimsa*, therefore, proceeds from the perspective of one's own soul and not so much from the standpoint of the protection of other beings or the welfare of humanity as a whole. The Jainas rightly claim that compassion toward other living beings is not possible without realizing the value of self, the source of all spiritual wisdom. That is why the Jainas uphold the maxim, "First knowledge then compassion. Thus does one remain in full control. How can an ignorant person be compassionate when he cannot distinguish the good from the evil?"<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*apradurbhāvah khalu ragadīnam bhavaty ahimseti/*

*tesam evotpattih himseti jinagamasya samksepah//* (Assuredly the non-appearance of attachment and other passions is *ahimsa*, and their appearance is *himsa*. This is a brief summary of the Jaina doctrine.) See *Purusarthasiddhyupaya* of Amrtacandra Suri, v 44. Sanskrit Text and English translation by Ajit Prasada (Lucknow 1933).

<sup>2</sup>*padhamam nanam tao daya, evam citthai savvasamjae*. See *Dasavaikalika Sutra*, iv.

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Jainas seem to be unique in believing that even animals, like humans, possess mind and the five senses, and are capable of spiritual sensibilities. A beautiful story about an elephant narrated in the Jaina scriptures illustrates the awareness and moral capacity ascribed to animals by the Jainas.

This is the tale of an elephant, who was the leader of a large herd that was caught in a huge forest fire. All the animals of the forest ran from their haunts and gathered around a lake so that the entire area was jammed with beings, both large and small. After standing there for quite some time, the elephant lifted his leg to scratch himself, and immediately a small hare ran to occupy the spot vacated by his raised foot. Rather than trampling the helpless animal, however, the elephant's mind was filled with great compassion for the plight of his fellow creature, indeed his concern for the hare's welfare was so intense that he is said to have cut off forever his associations with future animal destinies. The elephant stood with one leg raised for more than three days until the fire abated and the hare was able to leave. By then, however, the elephant's whole leg had gone numb and, unable to set down his foot, he toppled over. While maintaining the purity of his mind, he finally died and was reborn as Prince Megha, son of King Śrenika, the ruler of Magadha. Subsequently, he became an eminent Jaina monk under Mahāvira.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> S. Bhanilla (ed.), *Jñatadharmakathah*, Prakrit Text (Pathardi, 1964), chapter 1, pp 180-187.

This story is a perfect example of the choice that one may make in understanding a good or evil act. The elephant had the option of simply trampling the hare but refused to do so, preferring to act as would a morally and non-violently inclined human. Such non-violent behavior was crucial to the spiritual progress of the elephant's soul in its subsequent life.

In Jainism the awareness of *ahimsa* is a constant concern for the individual, involving total mindfulness in mental, oral and physical activities. *Ahimsa*, therefore, is a creed in its own right, identified with its own spiritual impulses and informing all of one's activities. It may truly be called a way of personal discipline.

This discipline is followed to varying extents by the members of the Jaina community as expressed by two explicit schemes of vows and restraints called major vows (*mahavrata*) and minor vows (*anuvrata*) applicable to the mendicants and the lay people respectively.<sup>4</sup> The commitment of Jaina mendicants to the principle of *ahimsa* is absolute since they are required to renounce their social involvement and rely for their legitimate needs on the voluntary support of the laity. The mendicants thus became embodiment of *ahimsa* and the exemplars of that ideal for the lay people who accept a great many grades of nonviolence allowing them to gradually progress toward the state achieved by the mendicants. However, there are certain basic expectations of them. In order to be

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<sup>4</sup> For a detailed description of the Jaina vows, see P. S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 157-185.

considered as Jaina, they must refrain from *samkalpaja himsa*, that is engaging in intentionally planned and carried out violence or injury, such as the intention with which a hunter might stalk his prey, uphold their commitment to vegetarianism;<sup>5</sup> and adopt a proper means of livelihood so as to restrict the extent of *himsa*. The Jaina lawgivers drew up a long list of professions that were unsuitable for a Jaina lay person<sup>6</sup>. Certain Jaina texts forbade, for example, animal husbandry and trade in alcohol or animal byproducts, leaving only such professions as commerce, arts and crafts, clerical and administrative occupations. In all these activities, some degree of violence was inevitable. Jainas could engage in such activities provided they behaved with scrupulous honesty and utmost heedfulness. Injury done while engaged in such activities was considered *arambhaja-himsa* (occupational violence), which could be minimized by choosing a profession like business that was reasonably free from causing harm, as indeed, Jainas have

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<sup>5</sup> Jainas extended their dietary restrictions to various types of vegetable life as well. In their attempts to categorize those types of plants that could be consumed with relatively less harm, Jainas developed a whole science of botany that was unique in Indian religious history. For a list of plants and substances forbidden to devout Jainas, see R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga: A survey of Medieval Śrāvaka-cāraṇa* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 110-116.

<sup>6</sup> For a list of occupations forbidden to Jaina layman, see R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga: A Survey of Medieval Śrāvaka-cāraṇa*, op. cit., pp. 117-122.

traditionally done. Military service, for example, was not generally expected of Jaina laymen, a fact that allowed them to observe their precept of *ahimsa* and follow it within the narrow sphere as laid down in their religious law.

It is apparent that Jaina lawgivers defined the meaning of intentional *himsa* with great care and expressly forbade it to all Jaina believers but gave Jaina laymen dispensation with regard to certain types of violence associated with their legitimate occupations. There remained, however, a certain grey area that could not be so explicitly characterized as either expressly evil or provisionally acceptable. This grey area may include the "just war" or violence in defense of one's property, honor, family, community or nation. In this matter, the individual had to take into account not only the duties to himself but to society as a whole. The duty of a Jaina mendicant in this case was quite clear: he must not retaliate in any way and must be willing to sacrifice his own life in order to keep his vow of total nonviolence. For a Jaina lay person, however, appropriate conduct is not so clear cut. There were always situations in which violence would be a last resort in guiding the interests of himself and his community. The Jaina lawgivers of medieval times accorded with customary Hindu law in these matters. Somadeva (c. tenth century), for example, stipulated that "a king should strike down only those enemies of his kingdom who appear on the battlefield bearing arms, but



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never those people who are downtrodden, weak, or who are friends"<sup>7</sup>

For a religion that expected so much from its followers in terms of keeping the vows of *ahimsa*, such perfunctory advice on the legitimacy of Jaina participation in warfare must be considered a serious oversight. Nevertheless, there are indications both in canonical scriptures (some portions of which may go back to 500 B.C.E.) and in much later narrative literature that the Jaina lawgivers were concerned about this problem and recognized the contradictions inherent in the expression, "just war."

One attempt to resolve this problem is indicated by the term *virodhi-himsa* that is, countering violence with violence. Jainas allowed that such violence could be justified, albeit as a final resort, for the Jaina layman whose conscience demanded that he defend his rights or for one who was called upon to fight by his king. However, as the following narrative will show, the Jainas neither glorified the bravery involved in such violence nor held forth the prospect of birth in heaven to the protagonists, whether winner or loser.

Take, for instance, the tale of Bahubali, who is placed by the Jainas at the beginning of the present time-cycle, which ushered in human civilization.<sup>8</sup> During this

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<sup>7</sup> *Yasastilaka-campa* (Bombay: Nirnayagara Press, 1903), pp. 11, 97.

<sup>8</sup> For accounts of Bahubali and Bharata, see Pannalal Jain, ed. *Ādipurāṇa* of Jinasena (Varanasi, 1963) chapter 36; Helen M. Johnson trans., *Trisastīśalakapurusacaritra* (*The Lives of Sixty-three*

golden age, Rsabha, the first of the twenty-four Tirthankaras, had just appeared in the world and introduced both the secular laws legislating the conduct of society as well as the monastic laws governing the pursuit of salvation. When Rsabha renounced the world to become the first Jaina mendicant of this age, his eldest son, Bharata, claimed kingship over his entire domain. But the younger son, Bahubali, claimed title to a share of the kingdom and refused to submit to the rule of his elder brother. Disregarding the principle of *ahimsa*, he challenged his brother to face him and his army on the battlefield. Bharata recognized that his duty as a king compelled him to force the submission of his insubordinate brother, and war seemed unavoidable.

The king's advisors, alarmed at the prospect of mass carnage, proposed single combat between the two brothers as a means of settling the dispute. The brothers agreed. In a wrestling combat that followed, Bahubali defeated his brother Bharata and attained a decisive victory. At this point, one would have expected that Bahubali would cap his triumph by proclaiming himself king. But the Jaina texts maintain instead that he was overcome by great remorse for having humiliated his brother and instantly awakened to both futility of sovereignty and bonds of possessions, which had blinded him to the true nature of the soul. To the great astonishment of the spectators and the defeated king, Bahubali discarded his royal insignia and renounced the

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*Illustrious Persons*) by Hemacandra, vol. I (Baroda Oriental Institute, 1962)

## Ahimsa and "Just War" in Jainism

world and declared himself a Jaina monk. The storytellers relate that Bahubali stood steadfast in meditation at that very spot for so long that creepers grew over his body and anthills formed at his feet. Bahubali thus became omniscient and continues to be revered by the Jaina community as the first man of this age to have attained emancipation from the cycle of birth and death. Colossal images of him in meditational posture are worshipped to this day.

Jainas drew several morals from this story that are relevant in guiding Jaina laymen in determining their proper duty when confronted by an adversary in battle. First, it was maintained that valor was preferable to cowardice. Bahubali was right in standing up for his familial rights to a share of the domain, but Bharata was also correct in attempting to maintain the territorial integrity of his realm. The king's ministers were also right to reduce the necessary violence to an absolute minimum by proposing single combat between the two brothers rather than involving both armies in the dispute. But the Jainas ultimately maintained that the victory of Bahubali would not have truly settled anything for, had he succeeded to kingship as he was entitled, a new cycle of violence would certainly have ensued on the part of the loyalists of the vanquished monarch. This would have proved the truth of the Jaina maxim that all possessions are evil, for true nonviolence cannot be practiced either by an individual or by a society that craves possessions and must therefore fight to acquire, augment, and protect its wealth. Total nonviolence is possible when possessions are relinquished, as was so admirably demonstrated by

Bāhubali's renunciation of the world after his victory. Thus, again is upheld the Jaina belief that only the valiant and the self-denying can pursue nonviolence to its fullest extent, not the cowardly or the covetous.

For the layman who was unable to forsake all possessions but was nevertheless keen to minimize his *himsa*, the Jainas introduced a precept called *parigraha-parimāna* (voluntarily setting a limit on one's possessions) and included it as the last of the five *anuvratas* (minor vows). A Jaina layman wishing to take this vow was asked by a mendicant to set specific limits on his possession of such temporal items as gold and silver, real estate, grain, and furniture, and to vow not to acquire amounts in excess of this limit. He was further encouraged to lower these limits by a certain amount each year in emulation of total non-possession (*aparigraha*) of the mendicant. In demanding that an advocate of *ahimsa* should renounce all properties in excess of one's legitimate needs, the Jainas were showing great insight into the possibility of building a society that practiced minimal *himsa*. It must still be said, however, that the Jainas lacked either the vision or the organization to translate this precept into a general social philosophy. It is much to the credit of Mahatma Gandhi, who was undoubtedly influenced by several devout Jainas,<sup>9</sup> that he espoused a philosophy founded upon *ahimsa* and *aparigraha*.

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<sup>9</sup> See correspondence between Mahatma Gandhi and a revered Jaina saint Śrīmad Rājacandra as given in the *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (Government of India Publications 1958-75), Vol 32, pp 601-602.

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Another memorable story appears in the canonical *Bhagavati-sūtra*, which purports to preserve the words of the last Jaina *Tirthankara*, Mahavira. There Mahavira was asked about a war between Konika, the emperor of Magadha during Mahavira's time, and a federation of eighteen independent kings that had reportedly left 840,000 men dead. Mahavira's disciple specifically wanted to know whether it was true that all those men would be reborn in heaven because they had perished on the battlefield. In answer to this question, Mahavira declared that only one man out of this large army was reborn in heaven, and only one reborn as a man, all the rest ended up in hell or in the animal realms.

Contrary to the widely held belief that death on the battlefield is almost equal to holy martyrdom, the Jaina answer as put in the mouth of Mahavira shows extraordinary courage of their conviction that death accompanied by hatred and violence can never be salutary and must therefore lead to unwholesome rebirths. Mahavira's answer to this question is truly memorable and departs drastically from the traditional belief of Hindus, as recorded in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, where Kṛṣṇa, the incarnation of Viṣṇu, tells Arjuna, who was hesitant to participate in the war, that death in battle leads to heaven:

hato va prāpsyāṣi svargam, jitva va bhokṣyase  
mahīm/ tasmad uttatha Kaunteya, yuddhaya  
kṛtaniścayah//<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *Bhagavad Gītā*, 11, 37

(Slain, you will attain heaven, conquering you  
will enjoy earth Therefore, rise, Oh Arjuna,  
resolved to do battle )

To return to our narrative, Mahāvira then proceeds to tell the story of two fortunate soldiers.<sup>11</sup> The man who ended up in heaven was a Jaina named Varuna, who had taken the *anuvratas* as a Jaina layman before he was drafted by his king and sent to the front. Prior to his departure, however, Varuna vowed that he would never be the first one to strike anyone, he would always wait until he was struck first before attacking. Armed with bow and arrow, he took his chariot into battle and came face to face with his adversary. Varuna declared that he would not take the first shot and called on his opponent to shoot. Only after his opponent's arrow was already on its deadly flight did he let fly his own arrow. His enemy was killed instantly, but Varuna himself lay mortally wounded. Realizing that his death was imminent, Varuna took his chariot off the battlefield and sat on the ground. Holding his hands together in veneration to his teacher, Mahāvira, he said

Salutations to Mahāvira, wherever he may be,  
who administered to me the layman's precepts  
Now the time has come for me to face my death  
Making Jina Mahāvira my witness, I undertake  
the total renunciation of all forms of violence,  
both gross and subtle. May I remain steadfast in

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<sup>11</sup> See *Bhagavati-sūtra* (*Vijayapannatti*), VII, 9 (#302 ff) Summary by Jozef Deleu, Tempelhof (Rijks University of Gent), 1970.

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maintaining absolute detachment from this body<sup>12</sup>

Saying thus, he pulled out the arrow and, his mind at peace, died instantly and was reborn in heaven. The second man, a friend of Varuna, was himself severely wounded in the battle. Even so he followed Varuna in order to help him in his resolve and witnessed his peaceful death. He died soon afterwards in the same fashion and was reborn as a human being.

Thus, the Jainas are clear in their belief that a wholesome rebirth is assured only to those who die a peaceful death and who renounce all hostility and violence. Without achieving these qualities, no amount of valor on the battlefield guarantees even true temporal victory, let alone improvement in one's spiritual life. This does not mean that the Jaina lay adherent is a total pacifist. A layperson, as we saw above, however, is given the option of countering an armed adversary in kind, with the reminder that it is proper for a Jaina not to be the first to strike. The combatant would also be asked to bear in mind the Jaina doctrine of *anekantavada* (multiple perspectives), which allows a Jaina to recognize the validity of his adversary's point of view as well. By enabling him to recognize an area of common ground between himself and his opponent, a Jainā would, therefore, be able to avoid confrontation and try reconciliation, and resort to warfare only out of dire necessity. The Jainas thus appear to have

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<sup>12</sup>*Bhagavatsutra*, VII,9, #302 ff. (*Suttagama*, ed by Puppabhikkha, Gudgaon-Delhi, 1953)

outlined a path of nonviolence that would allow a lay adherent to conduct his daily life with human dignity while permitting him to cope with the unavoidable reality of the world in which violence is all-pervasive

The Jainas would be the first to admit in accordance with their own doctrine of *syadvada* (qualified assertions) that other religions too might discuss some of these same issues. But what distinguishes the Jain conception of nonviolence from that found in other world religions is that it is truly a personal way of religious discipline. It forbids the taking of all life, however, that might be justified or excused in other religions and warns that nothing short of hell or animal rebirth awaits those who kill or who die while entertaining thoughts of violence. Killing, even in self defense or for the "right cause" would lead to rebirth in hell. For example, in the Jain *Ramayana*, the "good brother" Laksamana goes to the very same hell as does the wicked Ravana, whom he "justifiably" destroyed in an heroic manner.<sup>13</sup>

This perspective on nonviolence, however, does allow a Jain to sacrifice his own life in order to guard and nurture his soul. This is technically known as *sallekhana*, literally meaning "thinning one's own body and passions." Such an act is governed by several conditions, the most important of which are that it can be undertaken only by a public declaration, never in private, and only through the gradual withdrawal from taking all forms of food and water. The basic justification for *sallekhana* is that a person who has conscientiously led a holy life has earned the right to die in peace and in full possession of his faculties,

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p 314, fn 62



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without any attachment to worldly bonds, including attachment to his own body. The person allows his life to ebb away at its own natural pace, neither desiring to prolong his life artificially nor anticipating unduly his demise. In this way, the soul may remain unaffected by the injuries (*himsa*) inflicted upon it by attachment and aversion and may meet its corporeal death in perfect peace with itself and the world <sup>14</sup>

The Jaina commitment to *ahimsa* and a desire for a peaceful world may be measured by the following lines from the religion's most solemn prayer which every Jaina hopes to uphold while breathing his or her last moments of life

khamemi savva-jive, savve jiva khamantu me/  
metti me savva-bhūesu, veram majjha na  
kenavi//<sup>15</sup>

(I ask pardon of all creatures, may all of them  
pardon me. May I have friendship with all  
beings and enmity with none)\*

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<sup>14</sup> For further discussion about *sallekhana*, see P. S. Jau, *The Jaina Path of Purification*, op cit., pp 227-233

<sup>15</sup> Quoted from *Pratikramana sūtra*, 49, in R. Williams, *Jaina Yoga* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), p 207

\*The above is excerpted from "Ahimsa: A Jaina Way of Spiritual Discipline," published in *Collected Papers on Jaina Studies* by P. S. Jau (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000)

# Nonviolence for All

SATISH KUMAR

**W**hen I was an eighteen year old Jain monk, I read the autobiography of Mahatma Gandhi. I felt that as a monk I was concerned with personal nonviolence. But Gandhi had made personal nonviolence go a bit further and extended it into social, political and ecological nonviolence. Of course, the roots of all these different modes of nonviolence are there in the Jain concept of *ahimsa*. But in practice we Jains have become too centered on personal nonviolence. Influenced by Gandhi, I wanted to extend nonviolence in to social, political and ecological spheres. So I remain a Jain, although no longer a monk, and I continue my quest on the path of holistic nonviolence. I do so because I believe that the Jain philosophy is dynamic rather than static dogma.

My life as a monk was only a beginning, not the end of the journey. For example, you put a small seedling in a little container because a small seedling cannot withstand the cold weather, the wind, and the storm outside in the fields. So as a good gardener you put the seedling in a small pot. When the seedling becomes a big

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and strong plant then you need to put the plant in the field to become a tree. If you always keep the plant in the pot, it will never become a full tree. Maybe it will remain as a bonsai tree but if you want a dynamic and natural tree you have to put the seedling out in the field.

I am deeply grateful to my Guru and teacher, Ācārya Tulsī. The foundation of my life was laid out by him under a protective and secure environment. From him I learned the basic principles of Jainism, including *ahimsa*, the reverence for all life. But then an urge came into my heart and I felt it was time to go in the wilderness—go out in the field and out of that beautiful, secure, loving, caring and protective environment of the monastic order.

A Jain monk is called a "*muni*." The word "*muni*" means a person who keeps *maunam* or silence. It is believed that when Mahāvīra gave his first sermon sitting under the tree, he sat in silence. Animals, birds, angels and humans – all came for this great event, and they all understood the message of Mahāvīra in their own language. Mahāvīra was not using any word since he was the "*mahamuni*." So *munis* keep silence and teach or communicate their message through living and through setting example. The lay people, in Jain tradition, are called *śrāvaka* (male) and *śrāvika* (female). The words *śrāvaka* and *śrāvika* literally mean people who listen. Isn't this a wonderful situation the teacher is silent and the student is listening. So, when we go for *darsana* of our *guru*, we don't have to talk to him, we just go to see him. *Darsana* means seeing – not merely through the two eyes which see things superficially but seeing through the eye of the heart, the eye of imagination, which we call the

"third eye " We go to the temple for *daršana* and sit there in the presence of the sacred image This is one of the finest examples of nonviolence where even words are unnecessary, because there is risk that the words could be misunderstood or may hurt someone

As a *muni* you keep a *mukhapattika* (a cloth strip covering the mouth - a practice among most of the Svetāmbara Jain mendicants) This is to remind you that you need to speak only when you must, speak as little as you can, and think three times what you want to say and speak only if it is appropriate Or your words may fall on a barren ground You do this because you want to avoid violence, and the worst kind of violence is the violence of speech The language of politicians is often violent Such language causes wars Wars start in our minds and in our speech Only later we send the big bombers to the battlefields So politicians should learn to practice silence, and they should learn what to speak, how to speak and when to speak This is a great contribution of Jain religion to the world

I am reminded of a story One day the Mughal emperor Akbar asked his prime minister, Birbal, "What is the sweetest thing in the world?" Birbal replied: "My lord, words are the sweetest and the words are the bitterest " Akbar did not believe this How can words be sweet or bitter, he thought and dismissed the idea. A few days later, to prove his point, Birbal invited the empress for dinner at his house When she was leaving his house, after a sumptuous dinner, Birbal instructed his servants to clean off after the queen, using swear words and inappropriate language The empress overheard the words of insult and was shocked to learn that Birbal thought of

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her in such a negative way. She felt deeply wounded. When she returned to her palace she complained to the emperor about the abusive incident. This was very hard for the emperor to believe. The next day, he summoned the prime minister. When Birbal arrived, Akbar asked him, "How dare you insult my wife using swear words?" Birbal replied, "My lord, you said words are neither sweet nor bitter, so how can they cause harm or discomfort? How can words hurt the empress?"

Nonviolence begins in our minds. The words are the first external expression of our thoughts. When we write books and articles we are told that we should be honest and critical. We should say what we think of other people and their works. But in the Jain tradition we think otherwise. We put nonviolence of thought and speech on top of our practice. If you want to practice nonviolence in your family, with your colleagues or business associates then making the use of appropriate language would be a good start. Imagine the violence language can cause. The breakups of marriages leading to bitter court cases always start with violent language. If we examine carefully, we will find that all quarrels are rooted in the breakdown of communication and/or use of abusive language. Therefore, if we can practice nonviolence of speech, then many of our family quarrels, disputes among nations and conflicts among parties and religious sects will be considerably reduced, if not disappear altogether. So let us practice nonviolence in our speech. Speak less, think what we are going to say, and how we are going to say it. This may be the first step toward a nonviolent world order.

I speak about nonviolence because I personally witnessed the events of September 11, 2001. That evening I was due to give a public lecture in New York Open Center. I was staying close to the twin towers of the World Trade Center in Greenwich Village. That morning I was woken up by the loud noise of emergency vehicles. We could not figure out what was going on. Then we got a call from my friend's wife asking us to put the television on, which we did. We could not believe what we saw on the television screen. So we went outside. We were only a 10-15 blocks from the location. As we stood there on the Seventh Avenue, we saw a plane come over the second tower, went around the tower and then pierced through it. We were shocked. Lots of people gathered on the street. The traffic stopped. We were all speechless. People were hugging each other. We saw people jumping off from the windows of the twin towers. A few minutes later, we saw the two towers collapse. I went to the Open Center that afternoon. Of course the meeting was cancelled. We decided to put a notice outside as a gesture of nonviolence. The notice invited those who needed help or counseling. About 25 people came and we talked.

I tell you this story in the context of nonviolence as a Jain, who has dedicated his whole life to nonviolence, first as a monk, and later going around the world for peace, walking like a Jain monk from India to America without a penny – totally without money. Just going from door to door and village to village and depending on the goodwill and hospitality of the people. I walked, along with a friend, about 8000 miles to promote the principles of nonviolence. Then witnessing the criminal violence of September 11 was devastating. You can imagine my

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situation. My entire body was saturated with feelings of nonviolence. Seeing such catastrophe made nonviolence even more urgent. I feel that September 11 has changed or should change our lives. The question is, In what ways are we going to change? Are we going to create a culture of nonviolence where violence, attack, wars and killings become a taboo, and where we are never prepared to take the route of violence?

If we analyze history, we will recognize the fact that events are never isolated. September 11 did not happen out of the blue, without any cause or reason. Why this happened here? Are there seeds of this event in the Gulf war or in some other war? America is the most powerful country in the world. It is now the only Super Power. America is strong not just militarily but also financially. America is also blessed with intelligence and cultures, with science and technology, with literature and poetry. There is so much wisdom in this country. America is also blessed with tremendous landscape forests, deserts, animals, flowers, rivers and mountains. What a wonderful country it is. Can this country show a new way? Can America show the way of nonviolence? Remember, nonviolence is the way of the brave and the strong, not of the cowards and the weak.

America cannot stand alone. We have to move from "I" to "Us" and "Me" to "We." We live in the same one world, on the same planet Earth - our home. If ever there was an urgent message it is the message of one earth. If Americans were to stand together with the world, then we can create a beautiful world, a world without violence.

We must recognize that hunger is also violence, starvation is also violence. If people are dying of

starvation, the world cannot be at peace. In Jain tradition we say there are 84 million species (*jiva yoni*). We humans on this earth are only one of the 84 million species. This is the humility of the Jains. The 84 million species minus the humans live and die, and they never try to wage wars. Therefore, we have to thank them. We humans wage wars, not they. Elephants, snakes, tigers or any of the other 84 million species except humans, have never produced the nuclear bomb. So we must be humble. We must try not to be too clever. Our cleverness may be our weakness. Our humility may be our strength.

Jain tradition is a non-dualistic tradition. We are all connected and we stand together in relation to one another. We cannot exist by ourselves. So America and rest of the world cannot stay separate. "The West and the Rest" has been the slogan of some western thinkers, business leaders and politicians. The superior West and the inferior rest. They are trying to globalize western values: everyone must drink Coca Cola, eat MacDonald's, wear blue jeans, watch Hollywood films showing naked bodies in the bed with sex scenes and then tell a Muslim that this is the culture of liberty which you should be adopting. This is not the globalization we want. What we do want is the globalization of love, of nonviolence, of peace.

The title of my new book is "You are therefore I am." This is in contrast to Rene Descartes, the French philosopher, who said "I think, therefore, I am." "I" not "We." I think in my head in isolation and therefore I am. So America stands alone. My family stands alone. I stand alone. This is the cult of individualism. It is this cult which gives birth to consumerism and selfishness.



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In nonviolence we all live together and depend on each other. When we are violent to others, we are violent to ourselves. When we are attacking others, we are attacking ourselves. Nonviolence is not a matter of convenience. I will talk to my friend – but can I talk to my enemy? Can I listen to people who are in disagreement with me? Can I ask them, Why are you so angry? What have I done to you, my brothers and sisters, that you are ready to kill yourself? Have I damaged you in anyway? Have I offended you? It is very easy for a strong country like the United States to go and bomb a weak country. But talking to an enemy requires real strength and courage.

In the Jain tradition we have a figure of Mahabahubali, who is regarded a great symbol of power and strength. He was fighting with his brother Bharata with a sword. So angry was he that he lifted his arm with the naked sword to kill Bharata. Then he paused and asked himself, What am I doing? Is this my real strength? What satisfaction will this give me? Then and there he stopped. He killed his ego and anger instead of killing his brother. He removed hair from his head and renounced the world. The event transformed his life. Near Bangalore there is a big statue of Bahubali. We should celebrate his legacy of great courage not to kill but to overcome ego and anger.

Mahavira is a super example of nonviolence. He grew up as a prince. He had all the power, wealth and comfort. But he decided to leave these behind and go with a begging bowl. There is a great message in this renunciation of power and affluence for us and for the world. Modern democracies encourage us to seek power.

It is believed that only through acquisition of political power we can help others. Therefore, individuals and parties spend millions of dollars to gain power. But Mahāvira was born to rule. He was given the opportunity to do good by governing and controlling others. Yet, he renounced power, wealth and the material world. Goodness, virtues, service, compassion and peace cannot be imposed from top down. These qualities have to grow from the bottom of our hearts, everyone's heart. So Mahāvira advocated spiritual democracy. He worked for social change through personal purification and transformation of the soul. By renouncing political power he gained spiritual power. There is a powerful lesson here for modern democracies which have become power hungry and corrupt. So much is their concern for power that it must be maintained at any cost and defended with weapons of mass destruction and other violent means. Mahāvira teaches us to serve rather than to rule.

Now the Jains need to wake up. We have been sleeping for too long and keeping nonviolence to ourselves as if it is too precious, so keep it confined. We need to communicate the message of nonviolence actively in political, social, ecological domains. In Jain tradition, *ahimsa* and *anekanta* go together, like two legs of a human being. There is no one truth but many truths. It is like the great garden of Eden, the humanity and the world are diverse—we have the black people, the white people, the yellow people, the dancing people, the singing people, the tall people, and the small people. Similarly, there are other living beings who walk, crawl, swim or fly. This is biodiversity. Twenty six centuries ago, Mahāvira celebrated the diversity of life, diversity of truths and

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diversity of philosophy We must not narrow it down in some kind of dogmatic ideology

Let us move forward Let us see how *ahimsa* and *anekanta* can be the guiding principles for the twenty-first century, not just a luxury for the few, but guiding principles for all

## **II**

### **Anekāntavāda in Jainism and Contemporary Context**

# Mahavira, Anekantavada and the World Today

SAMANI CHARITRAPRAGYA

The canonical literature (*Āgama*) of the Jains is the primary source for the teachings and philosophy of Mahavira following his attainment of *kevalajñāna* (infinite knowledge). One of the forms in which Mahavira's teachings and philosophical insights are presented in the *Āgama* is his response to the questions frequently posed to him by his disciples, mendicants and householders. A series of such questions and responses appearing in the *Bhagavati Sūtra* later on became the basis for the evolution of what has come to be known as *anekantavada* (the Jain doctrine of many-sided reality)<sup>1</sup>. Take, for instance, Mahavira's responses to the following questions posed by Indrabhūti Gautama, one of the twelve *Ganadharas* and the principal disciple of Mahavira, Jayanti, a devoted and

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<sup>1</sup> The word "*Anekanta*" was not used by Mahavira and does not appear in the *Āgamas*. Siddhasena Divakara may have been the first Jain *acārya* to use this word. See *Ācārya Mahaprajña, Anekanta Reflections and Clarifications* (Ladnun Jain Vishva Bharti Institute, 2001), p. 9.

inquisitive *śrāvika* and sister of King Śatanika, and Somila, a dedicated and learned *śrāvaka*

**Gautama** Is the soul permanent or impermanent?

**Mahavira:** The soul is permanent as well as impermanent. It is permanent with respect to its substance (*dravya*), which is eternal. It is impermanent with respect to its modes (*paryaya*) or forms which originate and vanish.<sup>2</sup>

**Jayanti:** Of the states of slumber and awakening, which is desirable or better?

**Mahavira:** For some souls the state of slumber is better, for others the state of awakening. Slumber is better for those who are constantly engaged in sinful activities, and awakening or consciousness for those who are engaged in meritorious deeds.<sup>3</sup>

**Somila:** Are you one or many?

**Mahavira:** I am one, two as well as many. I am one in respect of substance. However in respect of knowledge and intuition, I am two. I am many in respect of ever-changing states of consciousness.<sup>4</sup>

Several thousand questions were asked of Mahavira. Questions pertained not only to the nature of soul (*jīva*), but also to the nature of matter (*ajīva*). Take for instance the following

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<sup>2</sup> *Bhagavati Sūtra* (Ladnun Jain Vishva Bharati Institute, 1994) 7/58, 59

<sup>3</sup> *Bhagavati Sūtra*, op cit, 12/53, 54

<sup>4</sup> *Bhagavati Sūtra*, op cit, 14/4/3

## Mahavira, Anekantavada, and the World Today

**Gautama:** Is the nature of matter eternal or changing?

**Mahavira:** It is eternal as well as changing. From the perspective of substance, it is unchanging and eternal. From the perspective of its attributes and modes it is constantly changing as manifested by the different colors, smells, tastes, etc.<sup>5</sup>

**Gautama:** Does being change into being? Does non-being change into non-being?

**Mahavira:** Exactly so.

**Gautama:** Does such a change occur owing to some effort or spontaneously?

**Mahavira:** It is effected by effort and also occurs spontaneously.<sup>6</sup>

What do we learn from the above conversations, especially from Mahavira's responses to the various questions? Mahavira's responses suggest the complex and multiple aspects of reality. A definitive or a simple response of choosing the "either" "or" would not have allowed him to explain the complex nature of reality with many sides to its existence. As an omniscient being, with infinite knowledge at his disposal, Mahavira recognized that truth or reality can be experienced but cannot be expressed in its entirety through the medium of language. Moreover, it is important to note that Mahavira did not

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<sup>5</sup> *Bhagavati Sutra*, op cit, 19/219, 220

<sup>6</sup> *Bhagavati Sutra*, op cit, quoted from Ācārya Mahaprajña, *Anekanta Views and Issues* (Ladnun Jain Vishva Bharti Institute, 2001), p. 21

propound the truth. Rather, he was interpreting it through his infinite knowledge and omniscience. Even the omniscient is constraint to express in words the reality in its myriad dimensions due to the limits of language. Elsewhere Mahavira underscored this fact, "Where there is truth, from there language returns, neither intellect, nor thoughts nor even the mind goes there"<sup>7</sup> For example, we can experience the sweetness of sugar, but we cannot totally express the sweetness through language.

While operating within the limits of language and seeing the complex nature of reality with its multiple aspects, Mahavira used the language of *naya*. *Naya* (partial expression of truth) enables us to comprehend the reality part by part. There are two kinds of *naya*—*niscaya naya* and *vyavahara naya*. *niscaya naya* enables us to understand the reality from the viewpoint of the substance without denying the existence of modes. *vyavahara naya* allows us to comprehend the reality from the perspective of its attributes and modes but doesn't deny the existence of substance. Take for instance a gold necklace. From the perspective of *niscaya naya*, it is matter in the form of gold. From the perspective of *vyavahara naya*, it is a necklace. Both statements are true because relative to the necklace, gold is the substance and necklace is its mode. However, from the perspective of substance the gold necklace is matter and gold is its mode. Therefore, to have an overall view of reality it is essential

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<sup>7</sup>*savve sara niyattanti' lakka jatha na vijjayi' mayi tattha na gahiya' Ayaro Satra* (Ladnun Jain Vishva Bharti Institute, 1981) 5/123-125



## Mahāvīra, Anekantavada, and the World Today

to understand the co-existence of both the *nayas*. In other words, to recognize the many facets of reality we must consider it both in terms of the eternal and unchanging substance and in terms of modes which are infinite, transient and changing. Thus, reality is both permanent and changing.

The millennium following Mahāvīra was known as the age of canonical texts and literature. This was followed by a period of philosophical writings during which the Jain ācāryas felt a serious need to construct new terminology for explaining the significance of the *nayas* to contemporary world. In large part such an initiative was inspired by the necessities of the time, which was characterized by the ongoing philosophical and logical debates about the nature of reality often giving rise to competition and engendering conflicts among debaters. In such an environment, major Indic traditions attempted to explain the efficacy and validity of their own points of views about the nature of reality. For example, Vedantins accepted that Brahman is absolutely unchangeable and eternal whereas *māya* is unreal and changing. According to Buddhists, whatever is real is momentary, just as the cloud. Nothing is permanent. So according to the Vedantins, the Buddhists were wrong, and *vice versa*.

During the first century of the Common Era, Ācārya Umasvāti (also known as Umāsvāmī) undertook the task of defining reality in the *Tattvartha Sūtra* (*That Which Is*) on the basis of Mahāvīra's teachings. He articulated three levels for the understanding of reality: permanence,

origination, and cessation<sup>8</sup> Advancing on this idea further, Ācārya Siddhasena Divakara came up with the new terminology, *anekanta*, to help reconcile the apparently opposing perspectives on the nature of truth and reality He connected this with Mahavira's conversations with his disciples in the *Bhagavati Sutra* His major works on the explanation of *anekanta* and *naya*, which continue to inspire Jain practitioners and scholars today, are *Sanmati Tarka* and *Nyāyāvatara* In these magnificent treatises, he provides a critical assessment of several systems of thought with references to different *nayas* He observed, "I bow to Anekantavada because without this we cannot understand the reality"<sup>9</sup>

The term *anekanta* consists of two words "*aneka*" (more than one) and "*anta*" (qualities, attribute or ends) When we say that an object has infinite attributes, we are actually saying that an object is capable of undergoing infinite modifications *Anekanta* signifies the interdependence of substance and modes<sup>10</sup> It is not possible to have the existence of only substance or only mode Reality is made up of both substance and mode, permanence and change Therefore, every mode is as much a part of reality as substance is Thus substance and modes cannot be separated from one another In fact, the two cannot exist without one another<sup>11</sup> Modes and qualities reside in substance and we recognize the

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<sup>8</sup>"*utpada-vyaya-dhiraivvyayuktam sat*" See *Tattvartha Sutra* 5/29 (Gujarat Sri Jain Sahitya Samiti, 1977)

<sup>9</sup> *Sanmati Tarka*, 3/69 (Bhartiya Gyan Peeth, 1971)

<sup>10</sup> *Sanmati Tarka*, 1/14, *op cit*

<sup>11</sup> *Sanmati Tarka*, 1/12, *op cit*

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substance because of its qualities and modes *Anekantavada* allows us to overcome the apparent internal contradictions between eternal and non-eternal, substance and mode and helps us recognize their dependence on one another for existence Ācārya Umāsvāmī, Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra and Akalanka were some of the pioneers in the application of the *nayas* to the different philosophical problems of their time Subsequently, this process was carried further by many ācāryas, including Vidyānandin, Haribhadra, Maṇikyanandin, Vādideva Śārī and Hemacandra

The application of *anekantavada* to our day-to-day life can allow us to reconcile the multiple views of reality At any given point of time, it is not possible to explain or express the infinite attributes and modes that an existent (*sat*) has Following Mahavira, the Jain ācāryas used the language of “*syāt*” The word “*syāt*” is not an expression of doubt or skepticism Rather, it stands for multiplicity or multiple possibilities<sup>12</sup> It allows us to logically express or determine the nature of modes from different perspectives That is why the term *syadvada* includes the manifestation of the substance and modes in conditional dialectic form The format of conditional dialectic is three-dimensional existence, non-existence, and inexpressibility For example, X is X from the perspective of its own existence X is not Y from the perspective of Y’s existence Y’s existence shows X’s non-existence Now if we have to talk about X’s existence and non-existence simultaneously, then we have to use the expression “inexpressible” It

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<sup>12</sup> See Akalanka, *Tattvartharajavartika*, 4/42 (Bhartiya Gyan Peeth, 1999)

shows that existence and non-existence are both real but it is not possible to express them together. Ācārya Akalanka held that an affirmation of one's own nature and the denial of alien nature are very essential to recognize and understand every individual's existence. Such an approach helps us to recognize the other individual from the point of his or her nature. This perspective is central to *anekanta* which enables us to understand reality in a deeper sense--the same person has his/her own existence and non-existence on behalf of his/her multitude qualities. For instance, a person who is a good teacher is also a good piano player. When he is teaching the class he is a teacher not a musician but when he plays his piano he is a musician but not a teacher. A person has many qualities but it is not possible to identify and express all the qualities at the same time. At any given time, one specific quality becomes primary and rest are considered secondary. Therefore, existence (being) and non-existence (not being) are often comprehended in terms of their varying and changing qualities.

According to the Jain philosophy no new substance will originate and no substance will terminate completely. In the beginningless and endless time, there are infinite substances undergoing infinite modes. Substances go through constant change. What we see with the naked eye are multi-facets of modes that a substance undergoes. Therefore, reality cannot be expressed in just one way (*ekanta*) there are multiple aspects to it. The application of the philosophy of *anekanta* enables us to understand the various dimensions of truth, to reconcile sometimes seemingly contradictory views, and facilitates an attitude of respect for other peoples' points of view.

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Today we live in a world which is highly diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, culture and language. Similarly, peoples' approaches to understanding reality are very varied. The approach aided by *anekanta* allows us to be more understanding and tolerant of other peoples' views. Understanding, however, does not always mean agreeing or compromising with one's own values and beliefs. Therefore, an *anekantika* (a person who recognizes multiple aspects of reality) is by nature more tolerant than *ekantika* (a person who understands reality from only one perspective and sees things in an absolutist way). Individual and is able to maintain his or her values. Imagine the impact of the philosophy of *anekanta* on the world we live in today. If all people begin to show tolerance for other people's views (even if they do not agree with them), the possibility of conflicts will reduce, tensions will not occur, and wars may be avoided.

The very recognition of and respect for others will help us envision and create a nonviolent world order. To conclude with the view of Ācārya Mahāprajña, *anekanta* is not only a philosophy but also a manual for good life.<sup>13</sup> Such an approach to reality encourages us to keep our minds open, and discourages us from adopting an absolutist thinking. This in turn helps us in overcoming the egotistic thoughts which usually originate in an environment where one considers one's view superior to those of others. An approach imbued with *anekantavada* spawns tolerance. Thus, in this sense, *anekanta* is also an essential precondition of *ahimsa*. The application of the

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<sup>13</sup> Ācārya Mahāprajña, *Anekanta The Third Eye* (Ladnun Jain Vishva Bharti Institute, 2001)

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philosophy of *anekanta* to the larger world will help us advance toward a peaceful, harmonious, and nonviolent world order. Such attitude will certainly decrease enmity towards others and promote increasing degree of amity among human beings.

## Why is Anekāntavāda Important?

JOHN M KOLLER

As the events of September 11, 2001 so tragically attest, we live at a time in global history when violence threatens to destroy all life on our planet. If we are to prevent violence from destroying ourselves and our whole world, it is imperative that we seek nonviolent solutions to our problems. From a Jain perspective, the threat to life that we face arises from a faulty epistemology and metaphysics as much as from faulty ethics. The moral failure to respect the life of others, including life forms other than human, is rooted in dogmatic but mistaken knowledge claims that fail to recognize other legitimate perspectives. Such one-sided perspectives result in destructive actions and violent behaviors. Because existence itself is complex, subtle and many-sided, unless the knowledge on which our actions are based reflects this many-sidedness of reality it will produce actions that are destructive of existence. As Umasvati noted, "A person with a deluded worldview is like an insane person who follows arbitrary whims and cannot distinguish true from false"<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Umasvati, *Tattvartha Sutra*, 1.33. See Nathmal Tatia (ed. & trans.), *That Which Is* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 23.

The most important underlying philosophical question about preventing violence, according to Jainism, is How are we to avoid the destructive violence that results from courses of action based on one-sided ideological dogmatism? The ideological dogmatism underlying violence is grounded in knowledge claims that, though limited and only partially true, are mistaken for absolute truth. Therefore, to avoid violence, one key step is to find an alternative theory of knowledge, an epistemology, that can support dialogue and negotiation among people of diverse perspectives and claims. Such an epistemology, that includes the truths of multiple perspectives, is made possible by the Jain philosophy of *anekantavada* (non-absolutism) <sup>2</sup>

Recognizing that everything can be known from variety of perspectives leads naturally to a more balanced and less dogmatic understanding of reality. This understanding encompasses the insight that other beings are not "other" to themselves, that they are themselves just as much as we are ourselves. It is this insight that enables us to see the "other" on its own terms, from its own side, rather than as merely the "other," that is opposed to us. And this ability to see the other person as no longer the "other," but as identical to our own self, underlies the capacity for empathy and sympathy with the

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<sup>2</sup> For a fuller discussion of ecological applications of Jain metaphysical and epistemological view, see John M. Koller, "Jain Ecological Perspectives," in Christopher Key Chapple (ed.), *Jainism and Ecology: Nonviolence in the Web of Life*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 19-34.



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other that operationalizes *ahimsa*. Because one-sided, fanatical views, especially when joined to political ideologies, lead to terrible violence, commitment to *ahimsa* requires epistemological respect for all points of view. This respect, based on the *anekantika* nature of reality itself, allows dialogue and reconciliation in the quest for truth, a quest that makes it possible for holders of false views to see for themselves the falsity of their views. Perhaps, this is why Umasvati introduces his classic work explaining Jain philosophy with the words "The enlightened world-view, enlightened knowledge, and enlightened conduct are the path to liberation."<sup>3</sup>

Because enlightened conduct is the way of nonviolence or *ahimsa* and because the latter is implied by *anekantavada*, it is important to first discuss briefly the principle of *ahimsa*. The term *ahimsa* is negative, but the principle is entirely positive. *Ahimsa* embodies the realization that all life belongs to the same global family and that to hurt others is to destroy the community of life, the basis of all sacredness. Thus, *ahimsa* requires not only that we avoid hurting other living beings, but that we must endeavor to help each other.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, Umasvati defines the purpose of life-forms as helping each other "Souls exist to provide service to each other."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Umasvati, *Tattvartha Sutra*, 1.1, *op cit.*, p. 5

<sup>4</sup> John M. Koller, *Asian Philosophies* (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2002), pp. 39-40. For detailed discussion of the Jain view of life see John M. Koller, *The Indian Way* (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 108-132.

<sup>5</sup> Umasvati, *Tattvartha Sutra*, 5.21 *op cit.*, p. 131

Jainism embraces a very strict and far-reaching concept of *ahimsa*. Unlike others who claim that unless a person intended the violence which follows an act the person is not guilty of performing a violent act, the Jains claim that if an act produces violence, then that person is guilty of committing a violent act even if the violence was not intended. For example, if a monk unknowingly offers poisoned food to his brethren and they die from the poisoned food, in the Jain view the monk would be guilty of performing a violent act, but in the Buddhist view the monk would not be guilty. The crucial difference between the two views is that the Buddhist view excuses the act, categorizing it as non-intentional because the monk did not know that the food was poisoned, whereas the Jain view regards the act as intentional because the monk is responsible for his ignorance, and, therefore, for any act that follows from this ignorance. Thus, according to Jainism the moral imperative to practice *ahimsa* includes the requirement to remove the ignorance that prevents a person from seeing the violence embodied in his or her actions.

From a metaphysical perspective, Jainism can be viewed as transforming the principle of *ahimsa* embodied in the respect for the life of others, into epistemological respect for the views of others, thereby establishing a basis for reconciling conflicting ideological claims. To see what "epistemological respect for the views of others" means we must first understand that *anekantavada* is essentially an ontological principle. It was developed to maintain the Jain view that substance-*Jiva*(soul) and *Ajiva*(matter)-are both

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eternal and changing.<sup>6</sup> As a principle of non-dogmatism, *anekantavada* rejects both the view that existence is only inherently enduring, and the view that it is only constantly changing, because each of these views is *ekantika* or one-sided, and, therefore, only partially true. However, *anekantavada* respects the partial truth in each view, and recognizes that when seen as partial truths, these views can be combined so that the point of view from which each is true is preserved.

- "Epistemological respect for the views of others," however, is not relativism.<sup>7</sup> It does not mean conceding that all arguments and all views are equal. It means that logic and evidence determine which views are true in what respect and to what extent. It does not mean that Jain thinkers who were committed to the truth of the Jain view could not, as scholars, be committed to explaining and defending their view by means of argument. In fact, it allows Jain thinkers to maintain the correctness of their own view, to recognize the inferiority of other views, and to criticize both their own views and other views in terms of their weaknesses, but to do so respectfully, recognizing their partial correctness. This is a middle way between

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<sup>6</sup> This can be shown, at least in part, by tracing the development of *anekantavada* out of the earlier method of analysis and resolution called *vibhajyavada*, as I have done in a paper entitled "*Avyakata* and *Vibhajya* in Early Buddhism and Jainism," forthcoming in the Lund University Conference Volume on "Early Buddhism and Jainism."

<sup>7</sup> Jayendra Soni, "Philosophical Significance of the Jaina Theory of Manifolddness," in *Studien Zur Interkulturellen Philosophie*, Vol 7, p 285

absolutism and relativism, allowing Jain thinkers, in the words of Christopher Chapple, to maintain an "outlook toward the ideas of others [that] combines tolerance with a certainty in and commitment to Jaina cosmological and ethical views"<sup>8</sup> For example, Haribhadra showed "remarkable willingness to evaluate rival intellectual systems on the basis of their logical coherence alone"<sup>9</sup>

How is epistemological respect for the views of other established in Jainism? Most fundamentally it is through the use of the epistemological theory of view points (*nayavada*) and the sevenfold scheme (*saptabhangi*) of qualified predication (*syadvada*) *Nayavada* recognizes that ordinary, non-omniscient, knowledge claims are always limited by the particular standpoint on which they are based Consequently, claims from one perspective must always be balanced and complemented by claims from other perspectives *Syadvada* recognizes that all knowledge claims need to be qualified in various ways because of the many-sidedness of reality and the limitations of any given standpoint of knowledge

Let us first turn to the following questions What are the *nayas*? How do they contribute to the reconciliation of opposing viewpoints in the search for truth? The *nayas* or standpoints may be thought of as different points of view taken by someone searching for the truth According to Akalanka, in the *Sanmati Tarka*, the standpoints are the presuppositions of inquirers, embodying the points of

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<sup>8</sup> Christopher Key Chapple, *Nonviolence to Animals, Earth, and Self in Asian Traditions* (New York State University of New York Press, 1993), p 85

<sup>9</sup> Paul Dundas, *The Jains* (London Routledge, 1992), p 196

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view from which they are investigating the thing in question<sup>10</sup> In ordinary cognition, as opposed to the stage of omniscient cognition, the knower necessarily sees the thing from a particular point of view Consequently, the nature of the thing that is revealed to him is necessarily conditioned and limited by this particular point of view, enabling him to have only partial, incomplete knowledge of it As Siddhasena says "Since a thing has manifold character, it is [fully] comprehended [only] by the omniscient But a thing becomes the subject matter of a *naya*, when it is conceived from one particular standpoint"<sup>11</sup> Thus, the *nyayas* serve to categorize the different points of view from which reality might be investigated *Nyaya*vada also encourages investigators to assume other perspectives, including the important perspective of the other as a persisting, but constantly changing, entity entitled to the same respect for life and happiness as oneself For example, when one assumes the perspectives of other life-forms, such as animals or plants, it is possible to see and feel their connectedness to us and to feel their suffering when they are injured Knowing how much like us they are and knowing that they are as dependent on their environment as we are, we have incentive not to injure them and to not destroy them or their environment

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<sup>10</sup> Akalanka, *Sanmati Tarka*, 3 47 Edited by S Sanhhavi and B Doshi Ahmedabad Gujarat Paratattva Mandira Granthavali, 1924-31

<sup>11</sup> Siddhasena, *Nyayaavatara*, 29 Edited by A N Upadhye Bombay Jaina Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1971

While theoretically there are unlimited number of standpoints from which something may be investigated, two opposing standpoints are regarded fundamental. From one standpoint, things can be viewed in terms of their substantial being, emphasizing their self-identity, permanence and essential nature. This standpoint regards *sameness* as fundamental. As an extreme view, it is exemplified by the *Advaita* teaching that Brahman alone is truly real. From another standpoint, things can be viewed in terms of process, emphasizing the changes that they undergo. This standpoint emphasizes *difference*. In its extreme form it is exemplified by the Buddhist teaching of interdependent co-arising (*pratityasamutpada*) as the nature of existence, a teaching that insists that everything is selfless (*anatman*) and impermanent (*anitya*).

When the differences within each of the two fundamental standpoints of sameness and difference are taken into account we get the standard set of seven standpoints, namely the ordinary, or undifferentiated, the general, the practical, the clearly manifest, the verbal, the subtle, and the "thus-happened". The first three, the undifferentiated, the general, and the practical, are standpoints from which to investigate the thing itself, as a substance, whereas the remaining four are standpoints from which to investigate the modifications that things undergo.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For a detailed discussion of the seven *nayas*, see John M. Koller, "Syadvada as the Epistemological Key to the Jaina Middle Way Metaphysics of Anekantavada," in *Philosophy East and West* (Volume 50, Number 3, July 2000) 400-407, pp. 401-403.

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Thus, we see that each *naya* or standpoint allows the investigator only a partial and, therefore, limited view of the object in question. The principal value of recognizing that a *naya* affords only a partial view of the object is that it enables one to distinguish between the limited view that results from a *naya* and the genuine knowledge that a valid means of knowledge, a *pramana*, provides. This distinction, in turn, makes it possible to recognize when knowledge claims are excessive or one-sided (*ekantika*) because they confuse a *naya* with a *pramana*. As one perceives the object from a combination of standpoints one comes closer to seeing the object as it really is. But only by seeing it from all standpoints would one actually attain the kind of valid cognition that *pramanas* alone can provide.

Let us now turn to the question, What is meant by *Syadvada*? *Syadvada* is so named because it embodies a theory about how the logical operator "*syat*" is used in all the seven varieties of a particular predication. To understand the philosophical use of *syat* we must distinguish between its ordinary use and its logical function in Jain epistemology. In ordinary Sanskrit, "*syat*" is often used to mean "maybe," as an alternative lying between "yes" and "no," both of which are rejected as an appropriate answer to a question. Thus, in its ordinary usage, "*syat*" transforms a categorical statement into a conditional statement. But the Jains used this particle in a very special epistemological sense to indicate the many-sided nature of a proposition. The uniqueness of the Jain approach to an epistemological middle way lies in its use of the "*syat*" particle in predication. Indeed, this uniqueness is why the seven-fold predication is called

*syadvada* Its epistemological use transforms an unqualified categorical statement not into a conditional statement, but into a qualified categorical statement. Thus, "*syat*" encapsulates the appropriate conditions that qualify a given statement, enabling the categorical statement thus qualified to have a truth value determined in accord with its correspondence with what is actually the case.

Since becoming is the negation, the "is-not" of being, and since being is the negation, the "is-not" of becoming, Jain logic insisted on the middle ground between the extremes of "is" and "is not" in order to predicate both being and becoming of the same existent. Maintaining this middle ground led to the Jain development of *syadvada*, a theory of predication that recognizes not only the predicates "is," and "is not," but also the predicate "inexpressible," a predicate that combines "is" and "is not."

Combining the theory of standpoints or *nayas* with the above three predicates leads to the famous seven-fold template for expressing important claims. These seven forms of predication as qualified by the expression "*syat*" are also referred to as the *saptabhangi*, explicitly identifying *syadvada* with the seven-fold formula of qualified predication. Although Umasvati and other early thinkers do not refer to this point, the later Jain philosophers agreed that all important philosophical statements should be expressed in this seven-fold way in order to remove the danger of dogmatism (*ekantavada*) in philosophy.

Of the seven-fold predication, we see that the four basic forms of predication are those of affirmation, denial, joint but successive affirmation and denial, and joint and simultaneous affirmation and denial. The third form of



### Why is Anekantavada Important?

predication allows statements about things that change, for before something arises it does not exist, but after it has arisen it does exist, and after it has decayed it will again not exist. But this third form is not really a unique form of predication, for it merely first predicates "is," and then, later, predicates "is not," thus simply successively affirming and denying the same predicate. The fourth form of predication is called "inexpressible," because there is no way that language can adequately express simultaneous affirmation and negation. But because the fourth form is neither affirmation nor denial it constitutes a distinctly third kind of predicate, different from either affirmation or denial.

From these three primary predicates, affirmation, denial and inexpressible, the seven-fold formula of predication is easily reached by using each of these three predicate units either by itself, or in combination with one of the others, or in combination with both of the others.<sup>13</sup> Taking the example of a pot the seven kinds of predication may be applied as follows:

- 1 Seen under certain conditions, the pot exists
- 2 Seen under certain conditions, the pot does not exist
- 3 Seen under certain conditions, the pot exists but seen under certain (other) conditions, the pot does not exist
- 4 Seen under certain conditions, the pot is inexpressible

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<sup>13</sup> For a detailed discussion of the seven-fold predication, see Koller, "*Syadvada* as the Epistemological Key to the Jaina Middle Way," *op cit*, pp 403-406

- 5 Seen under certain conditions, the pot both exists and is inexpressible
- 6 Seen under certain conditions, the pot both does not exist and is inexpressible
- 7 Seen under certain conditions, the pot exists, does not exist, and is also inexpressible

As we have noted, the first two kinds of predication in the above formula, affirmation and denial, are unproblematic conditions of being able to describe things in ways that differentiate between them. The third kind, successive affirmation and denial, enables us to explain change in the sense of attributing contrary predicates, such as arising and decay to the same thing but at successive times.

The fourth kind of predication, the inexpressible, is both more problematic, and from the Jain perspective, more important. It is intended to reconcile what might appear to be exclusive, or contradictory, opposites, but which are, from the Jain perspective, merely partial, one-sided statements that from a higher perspective are actually complementary. For example, the Advaitins deny the reality of change, giving it merely the status of *maya*, while affirming only the reality of the unchanging *brahman/atman*. On the other hand, the Buddhists deny the reality of the unchanging, declaring the unreality of *atman* (*anatman*) and affirm only the changing as real. From the Jain perspective, if there were no unchanging substance to undergo the modifications that involve arising, endurance, and decay, there could be no change. But since we experience change it cannot be denied that substances actually undergo change. Thus, in some way, both the Buddhists and the Advaitins must be right. Within the Advaitin's conceptual scheme, however, the Buddhists

### Why is Anekantavada Important?

cannot be right because their contradictory claims are excluded by the claimed truth of the unchanging as the real. Similarly, from within the Buddhist conceptual scheme, the Advaitins cannot be right for their contradictory claims are excluded by the claimed truth of the changing as the real. Indeed, if taken at the same level and from the same perspective, even the Jains would see the Advaitin and Buddhist claims as contradictory and mutually exclusive. However, from the perspective of a higher, inclusive, level made possible by the ontology and epistemology of *anekantavada* and *syadvada*, their claims can be seen as *ekāntika*, or partially true, and therefore not mutually exclusive contradictory claims.

In conclusion, *Nayavada* supports the metaphysical doctrine of *anekantavada* as a way of thinking about existence as simultaneously both being and becoming. It demonstrates how opposing views are one-sided and limited because they are based on only one, or a limited number of, standpoints. In this way the use of *nayas* helps us in avoiding the one-sided errors of identifying existence with either the permanence and sameness of being on the one hand, or with the ever-changing process of becoming on the other. *Syadvada* grounds and supports *anekantavada* in the sense that it explains how a statement about something that is permanent, remaining identical with itself over time, and that is simultaneously impermanent, becoming something else, can be true. *Syadvada* is essentially a theory of predication.

Thus, relying on the principles of *nayavada* and *syadvada*, *anekantavada* has the great potential to eliminate violent argument between ideological opponents by methodically both disarming and persuading them. Here

we see the importance of *anekantavada* in fostering a sense of nonviolence or attempting to reduce violence. It is neither a thesis about skepticism or uncertainty nor a formulation of probability, but a thesis about non-exclusive predication based on the recognition that a given thing includes a potentially unlimited number of characteristics. It is, thus, a method of reconciling opposites, and making it attractive for persons holding opposing views to enter into dialogue and negotiate their differences, thus avoiding violent confrontation.

# **Anekanta, Ahimsa and the Question of Pluralism**

ANNE VALLELY

Jainism embraces the philosophy of *anekanta* as staunchly as it espouses the righteousness of *ahimsa*. *Anekanta* and *ahimsa* are customarily discussed in terms of how each presupposes the other. The acceptance of the partiality of knowledge is an expression of nonviolence, and a commitment to nonviolence necessitates a pluralistic outlook.<sup>1</sup> The two are seen essentially as different aspects of the same ethical orientation. But can we treat *ahimsa* as a normative ethical ideal, and accept as morally just the view (and practice) of others who repudiate it? It has been argued that a truly pluralist approach is a logical impossibility—that some criteria of truth are essential to all worldviews. Pluralism, therefore, becomes either a form

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<sup>1</sup> Jainism shares with India's other religious traditions a commitment to pluralism. Harold Coward writes, "India is probably the world's oldest and most interesting 'living laboratory' of religious pluralism." See H.G. Coward (ed.), *Modern Indian Responses to Religious Pluralism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. xi.

of moral relativism, or another form of religious exclusivism<sup>2</sup> In this paper, I suggest the possibility that *anekanta* is a way out of this epistemological quagmire, and that a genuine pluralist view is possible without lapsing into extreme moral relativism or exclusivity

### **An Experiment with Jain Pluralism**

As I entered the western gates of the Jain Vishva Bharati Institute (JVBI), the spiritual base of the Terapanthi Jains in India, there was a large signpost indicating the rules of conduct that must be observed while in the JVBI. Although these rules include matters of decorum (e.g., proper attire, no smoking), they are essentially guidelines for *ahimsa*. For instance, the consumption of meat and alcohol are strictly forbidden. These are not timid recommendations, they are unapologetic and uncompromising edicts rooted in a bold moral charter that upholds nonviolence as the highest ideal. And yet, despite this unambiguous ethical stance, I was immediately struck by the recognition given to other paths: placards with words of wisdom from other, non-Jain traditions are prominently displayed throughout the JVBI. For instance, next to the guest house where I stayed was a placard with a saying attributed to Jesus, emphasising the importance of humility in the context of charity. It read: "The left hand should not know what the right hand has given."

Can one be a strong defender of one's own beliefs and also accept as true other-ways-of-being, especially those that may be diametrically opposed? Critics of

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<sup>2</sup> Gavin D' Costa, "The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions," *Religious Studies*, 32 (June 1996): 223-232, pp. 225-26.

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pluralism argue that such a thing is a logical impossibility, that to be consistently relativistic about knowledge claims would require one to be a relativist about one's relativism, which rapidly leads to an epistemological dead end. Thus, critics assert, whether or not we want to accept it, we are all essentially exclusivists, we cannot help but judge others by some criteria arising from our own worldview.<sup>3</sup>

The Jain doctrine of *anekanta* may, however, offer an alternative. It grants that epistemological neutrality is an impossibility for ordinary humans, but the doctrine does not require it. *Anekanta* does not predicate its pluralism on epistemological neutrality. Instead, it asserts that the holding of even an uncompromising position on truth (as Mahavira did with respect to nonviolence) can coexist with a celebration of conceptual, philosophical and moral diversity.

### The Raising of Lazarus: The Fall of Anekanta?

Soon after I arrived at the JVBI, for what would be a year's sojourn, Ganadhīpati Gurudeva Tulsī (the ninth *acarya* of the Terāpanthī order) assigned me the job of "Teacher of Christianity" for the *samanīs* (nuns-in-training). He explained that the *samanīs* pursue studies in other branches of Indian philosophy at the JVBI, but that they know little of non-Indian faiths. He considered it important that they take this opportunity to learn. And so began our experiment with *anekantavada*. A small group of *samanīs* and I began to meet thrice a week for our lesson.

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<sup>3</sup> See G. D'Costa, "The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions," *op cit*, and Nicholas Rescher, *Rationality* (London: Oxford University Press, 1988).

The first few weeks went smoothly I talked about those things I knew best, focusing on Jewish and Christian history The *samanis* were excellent students, eager to learn and curious about events with which they had little familiarity I enjoyed our inter-religious dialogues and putting into practice the principles and pleasures of *anekanta*

But soon the *samanis* grew weary of the focus on historical detail Familiar with the narrative form of religious learning, they wanted to hear moral stories about the life and teachings of Jesus It was here that I eventually came up against, what seemed at the time, intransigent hurdles to a pluralistic approach

My repertoire of the New Testament stories was sketchy However, I selected those stories that I thought best resonated with the Jain vision of things I told them about how Jesus helped the poor, the destitute, the outcasts I recounted the time when he chided his community for condemning a prostitute, declaring that "only he who has not sinned should cast the first stone" I interpreted this narrative as a lesson in human frailty and humility, as a message about seeing all human beings as equal in the eyes of God The *samanis* liked the story, and recounted parallel incidents of courage in the life of their leader They explained that when he, too, challenged many social conventions, he likewise encountered resistance because of his radically egalitarian beliefs

I continued with the story of Jesus' forty-day fast in the desert This was a fortuitous choice Even before I could suggest an interpretation, the *samanis* had formulated their own "*Tapas*" (austerities), they said assuredly While it was not quite the way a priest would



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explain it to his congregation, Jesus could also be considered an ascetic in that he had few possessions and was celibate. I felt a sense of accomplishment. My 'students' were learning stories of another tradition that were meaningful to them.

My success, however, was short-lived. The *samants* had heard bits and pieces of other stories and wanted to know their religious significance. In particular, two stories puzzled them. Of what religious significance were the stories of turning water into wine, and of raising a man from the dead? I considered these to be good questions. But other than the most obvious point of telling them that Jesus was special, that he was able to perform miracles, did the stories have spiritual significance?

"Well, let's start with the story of Lazarus," I said, "Lazarus was a beloved friend of Jesus who fell ill once when Jesus was away from his village. A message was sent for Jesus to return, but he received it too late. By the time he returned to the village, Lazarus had been dead for four days. Everyone in the village was distraught. Jesus went to the cave where Lazarus was buried, and called upon him to come out. To everyone's astonishment, he emerged! Jesus had raised him from the dead."

"But why? Why did Jesus bring him back to life?" a *samant* asked.

"Jesus wanted to help the family that was suffering," I answered.

"But everyone loses someone to death, why help *this* family," the *samant* duly persisted.

I had no profound answer for the *samants*, but maintained my teacherly stance. "I believe he tried to help whoever was in need. This was a

very tragic situation, and because he was able to help, he did "

"But we all must die This man, Lazarus, too must die, yes? So why help in a *physical* way? Why not help his soul? Or help his family to understand death?"

I had no answer This had always struck me as an odd miracle, and I could not expound on its theological import

"And the *wine* story?" another *samant* asked, hoping I might better explain this one

"Just as in the story of Lazarus, the most significant thing about the story is that it reveals Jesus to be unlike other men," I waffled, "He was able to perform miracles The fact that he could do these miraculous things is evidence, for Christians, of his divine status "

"But if he was god, *why* would he do *that* miracle? Why not something more important?" one of the *samants* asked

"And why just for one wedding party?" asked another

I knew immediately that I was on less than solid ground when I tried to explain that alcohol was not prohibited, irreligious or *himsa* from within the Judaeo-Christian tradition In fact, wine plays a significant role on special occasions in both Jewish and Christian celebrations Then, when I added my own Epicurean interpretation of the significance of a blissful life, I had all but lost my audience From a Jain point of view, the miraculously supplying of intoxicating beverages for a wedding party hardly seemed a pious narrative worthy of passing down

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from one generation to another for nearly two thousand years. In fact, the more we talked about it, the more ridiculous it appeared, and eventually we succumbed to a fit of laughter.

Rather than being an instrument for the glorification of *anekantavada*, I felt I was helping to undermine it. Rather than convincing the *samanis* that Christianity had a corner on truth (just like Jainism), I felt I was setting it up as an example of *mithyadarsana*, a deluded view of reality. I sat back, half bemused, and half frustrated with my inability to evoke some appreciation of the teachings of Christianity. It was not as though I expected the *samanis* to be rapturous over the Biblical stories, but I knew I was not doing the tradition justice. These stories meant so much to so many people, why was I so poor an emissary? I regrouped my thoughts and took a third stab at it.

"If you think about it," I began, "these are really stories about compassion and universal friendliness (*karuna* and *maitri*). This is the Golden Rule – to treat others as you would have them treat you." I continued, "Imagine the power of his actions – that a person capable of such greatness would concern himself with our mundane needs proves his boundless compassion."

The *samanis* considered my words. They were not greatly impressed with the explanation. But it was one that at least made sense to them. A form of compassion and friendship that focused on the material well-being appeared very crude and not very inspiring. They reckoned, however, that perhaps this 'blunt' compassion was what was most suitable for those on the low rungs of the *gunasthana* (stages of spiritual progress). "Perhaps this

was all the people could understand," one *samant* proposed. Another agreed by adding, "Later the people could be taught that true compassion is concerned with the soul, not the body." I was uneasy with their rendition, but felt that I did not have the tools or ability to convey an alternate, more 'profound' interpretation.

### **The Limits of Pluralism**

Back in my room that evening, with time to reflect, I became doubtful about the promise of pluralism. Had not today's exchange revealed its weakness? Rather than truly engage in a suspension of criticism, and an appreciation of the "other" on its own terms, we had sought to translate Christianity into a Jain idiom.<sup>4</sup> I had attempted to tailor Christianity to fit what I believed was my audience's worldview, and the *samants* accepted as significant only those aspects that did not deviate from their already held beliefs.

But could it be otherwise? Not according to Gavin D'Costa who argued that the idea of pluralism is misconceived and that, in essence, it is nothing more than a form of exclusivism. He wrote

[T]here is no such thing as pluralism because pluralists are committed to holding some form of truth criteria and by virtue of this, anything that falls foul of such criteria is excluded from

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<sup>4</sup> There are a number of scholars of religion, such as Cantwell Smith, Mircea Eliade, who prioritise the autonomous, interior, and generally inaccessible personal dimensions of religious experience at the expense of observable, comparative data, and who would, therefore, be suspicious of my hope to "appreciate the Other on its own terms."

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counting as truth (in doctrine and in practice) Thus, pluralism operates within the same logical structure of exclusivism and in this respect pluralism can never really affirm the genuine autonomous value of religious pluralism for, like exclusivism, it can only do so by tradition specific criteria for truth <sup>5</sup>

It is interesting to note that the philosopher Nicholas Rescher and the anthropologist Richard Shweder anticipated many of D'Costa's critiques of pluralism They argued, from their respective disciplines, that our celebrations of conceptual diversity fall short of true pluralism, that although most of us pay lip service to the idea of pluralism, we refuse to accept its logical outcome The pluralist platform states the following <sup>6</sup>

- 1 We the members of our group (religious or otherwise) are rationally justified in our conception of things
- 2 They, the members of some other group, have a different conception of things
- 3 They, the members of that other group, are rationally justified in their conception of things

And yet these points, inevitably, lead to a fourth and final proposition, that most people repudiate

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<sup>5</sup> G D' Costa, "The Impossibility of a Pluralist View of Religions," *op cit*, p 226

<sup>6</sup> This platform is paraphrased from R Shweder, *Thinking Through Cultures* (Cambridge & London Harvard University Press, 1991) See also Nicholas Rescher, *Rationality*, *op cit*

- 4 If others are rationally justified in their conception of things and that their conception is different from ours, then we cannot be rationally justified in our conception of things, and *vice versa*

An unwillingness to entertain this fourth proposition, however, -results in the incoherence of the entire platform. As a result of this, critics of pluralism assert that pluralists give an account of the 'other' against a backdrop of their own worldview - every bit as much as do exclusivists. If we accept that, epistemologically, pluralism is a no-man's-land, we are left - it would seem - with few options: either we must 'grow up' as some critics would have, and acknowledge our inherently exclusivist ways-of-knowing (i.e., accept that we cannot avoid imposing our own standards on others) or retreat to a position of philosophical and moral subjectivism, which claims the source of truth to reside within the individual subject alone.

Contemporary society is characterised by these opposing positions--we are simultaneously plagued by intolerance and ethnocentric smugness, and weakened by radical subjectivism and moral relativism. Ironically, the latter (moral relativism) is commonly seen as the progressive response to the former (ethnocentrism). In rejecting the view that all peoples should be judged by a single standard, many leap to the conclusion that standards, as such, do not exist at all. However, locating the criteria for truth within the thinking subject alone denies the social basis of knowledge as much as it denies

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the possibility of a transcendent reality<sup>7</sup> The Jain doctrine of *anekanta* suggests another possibility

### Anekantavada: A Way Out?

So basic is *anekanta* considered to be to a non-violent way-of-knowing, that it is considered an intrinsic element of the ethic of *ahimsa* Mahavira is attributed as saying

Those who praise their own faiths and ideologies and blame that of their opponents and thus distort the truth will remain confined to the cycle of birth and death<sup>8</sup>

*Anekantavada* asserts that no viewpoint is to be taken as the final, definitive viewpoint because reality itself (and not just our human perception of it) is many-sided Herein lies its strength and its divergence from other pluralist positions, which tend to focus on epistemology alone Although *anekantavada* does have an epistemological component – especially in its related

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<sup>7</sup> These questions lead us into the well-rehearsed debates over the nature and definition of "religion" Many contemporary critiques of "religion" as a reductionist, scholarly category advocate the *sui generis*, a temporal essence of religious acts, or the interiorised nature of religious experience For an excellent review of this debate, see Russell T McCutcheon, 'The Category of "Religion" in Recent Publications A Critical Survey,' *Numen* (42 4, 1995) 284-309

<sup>8</sup> This quote from Mahavira comes from the *Satrakrtanga*, 1 1 2 23, as quoted in J B Trapnell, "Indian Sources of a Pluralist View of Religions," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* (35 2, Spring 1998), p 219

principle of "*syadvada*" ("doctrine of maybe"), which states that truth is predicated on one's condition or context, its support of pluralism is bolstered by its metaphysical contention that reality itself is not singular

Padmanabh Jaini explains, "In its wholeness, any reality is the co-existence of contradictory elements, such as eternity and transience, or unity and multiplicity"<sup>9</sup> Different ways-of-being and of knowing are understood as "*nayas*", that is, as logically distinct viewpoints, each coherent and true to its context, but ultimately partial

Jainism, thus, recognises that no one tradition has a monopoly on truth and that, in fact, other *nayas* should be explored in the search for truth This is a different expression of pluralism than the one typically encountered (and critiqued) The standard pluralist position claims that various religious phenomena are culturally conditioned diverse responses to the Transcendent The Transcendent is singular, but manifests itself (or is differently constructed) according to different cultural traditions Therefore, the aim of pluralism and relativism is to give permission to diversity and difference, to see in others diverse signs of our 'divinity' *Anekantavada* goes beyond this It does not merely give 'permission' to diversity, it (ideally) mandates an encounter with it It is only through exposure to other ways of being, will a fuller picture of reality emerge

All the *nayas*, therefore, in their exclusively individual standpoints are absolutely faulty If,

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<sup>9</sup> P S Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1979), p 91



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however, they consider themselves as supplementary to each other, they are right in their viewpoints [I]f all the *nayas* arrange themselves in a proper way and supplement each other, then alone they are worthy of being termed as "the whole truth" or the right view in its entirety <sup>10</sup>

A re-visioning of our view of reality as *not* "one sided" might allow us to accept the four propositions of a pluralist platform, enumerated above. Unlike eliminative or nihilistic strains of relativism that assert there is no reality beyond appearances, *anekantavada* accepts an existent reality. Yet accepting the existence of reality does not mean it can be understood singularly, reality is understood to be 'many sided' and thus reveals itself in manifold ways simultaneously. Therefore, in opposition to both the 'equivocal pluralists' and the critics of pluralism, *anekantavada* does allow us to affirm the fourth proposition of the pluralist platform, namely that "If others are rationally justified in their conception of things and that conception is different from ours, *we too can be rationally justified in our conception of things, and vice versa*" If reality is accepted as manifold, this is no longer illogical.

*Anekantavada* can, perhaps, help redress the epistemological muddle in which we post-moderns find ourselves. The fact that there is no singular uniform standard of truth does not mean there are no standards or

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<sup>10</sup>Quoted from Siddhasena Divakara's *Sanmati Tarka* as cited in J B Trapnell, "Indian Sources of a Pluralist View of Religions," *op cit*, p. 220

no truths, because there is not a single uniform reality, does not mean that reality does not exist

### **Lazarus Revisited: Conclusion**

Putting the doctrine of *anekanta* into practice is a huge challenge. And in hindsight, I believe that my stumblings in Ladnun were not so much evidence of failure, as they were evidence of this challenge. I had made the pluralists' mistake of believing openness to the other required a break from one's own beliefs - a temporary suspension in epistemological limbo. This view is futile and full of inconsistencies. But Jain pluralism does not require it and therefore the possibility for an honest and creative acceptance of diversity can exist.

The Jain *śamantis* of Ladnun uncompromisingly maintained *ahimsā* to be an eternal and unchangeable moral law. Other views or practices that would contradict these beliefs would certainly be challenged, and ultimately rejected. But what is significant, I believe, is that both the retention and rejection of views is tempered by the belief that our perception conveys only a partial reality, that reality itself is manifold, and that to assume that one particular point of view is final is to hold a limited picture of reality.

The doctrine of *anekantavada* or many-sidedness comes close to obligating its adherents to become familiar with other ways-of-knowing. My appointment in Ladnun as "Teacher of Christianity" is a testament to that. And, in so doing, it goes a long way towards accomplishing the goal at the very core of pluralism, that is, recognition of autonomy and legitimacy of the very diversity of human existence.

## **Anekanta in Present Day Social Life**

KAMLA JAIN

**T**he problems of our society seem to multiply daily notwithstanding scientific and technological advancement and an excellent communication system. The world is getting smaller and smaller. Today, we think of the world as a 'global village' not only because of an advanced communication system, but also in the sense of inter-racial co-existence. We have vast networks of rapid surface communication and information systems but we have a very disappointing interaction system at the social and emotional levels. One often wonders whether our society will be able to solve these problems even if there is more growth and development in economic and technological spheres. Our society has become a curious mixture of advanced technology and backward psychology (mind-set). We are witnessing blind barbaric religious fundamentalism, a mad display of anti-secular forces, which reflect the disturbed mental state of people. There appears to be no limit to the extent of fanaticism. In the name of religion the creed of intolerance is pursued and nurtured. A fundamentalist group of Lashkare-Jabbar in

Kashmir promulgates its coercive diktat for the dress code of Kashmiri Muslim women. Young women were attacked with acid bulbs for appearing in public without covering their faces. In Pakistan a teen-ager expressed his anguish and frustration by hoisting an Indian flag. The police in Islamabad arrested him and implicated him on the charge of treason, which could amount to as high a punishment as death. Deepa Mehta's film 'Water' ran into troubled water in Varanasi, and the 'Miss World' beauty contest invited violence in the city. The creed of intolerance is mushrooming to such an extent that acceptance of the views of others has become rare and the pressures of obscurantist and communalist forces are getting stronger and stronger.

In this paper, I suggest that the Jaina tradition may offer a solution to such problems. The essence of Jaina philosophy may be captured in the following three terms: *ahimsa*, *anekanta* and *aparigraha*. Most significant of these is *anekanta* as it has the benefit of *samyak-darsana* (right attitude) and *samyag-jñāna* (right knowledge) which are pre-requisites to *samyag-cāritra* (right conduct). *Ahimsa* and *aparigraha* both rightly come in the category of *samyag-cāritra*. The three--*samyag-darsana*, *samyag-jñāna*, and *samyag-cāritra*--together are called *triratnas* (three jewels), and constitute the path of liberation as stated in the opening sutra of *Tattvartha Sutra* by Umasvati (*samyag-darsana-jñāna-cāritraṇīmoksamargah*).<sup>1</sup> Only with right

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<sup>1</sup> Umasvati, *Tattvartha Sutra*. Translated with an introduction by Nathmal Tatia (San Francisco and Manchester: Harper Collins, 1994) 1-1.

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attitude and right knowledge are we in a position to tread the path of supreme ethical principles of *ahimsa* and *aparigraha* in our life.

*Anekānta* emphasizes the basic attitude of mind in the understanding of reality or truth, which has infinite number of aspects. To explain such complex nature of reality, Mallisena used the phrase, *anantadharmatmakam vastu* "<sup>2</sup> Reality, therefore, can be seen from different points of view. One point of view reveals one aspect and another point of view reveals another aspect. The story of six blind men getting different images of an elephant and accordingly giving their own impressions explains this well. None of the pictures given is incorrect but it is not complete either. Therefore the predications about these pictures are not absolute but are only relative. *Anekānta* helps in comprehending a fuller picture, absorbing numerous aspects of reality. Thus, reality is "eternal" and "non-eternal". Neither of the two alternatives is true or false absolutely. An existent (*sat*) is real in relation to its four-fold qualities (*svabhava*) i.e. substance, place, time & nature (*dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava*), it is non-existent (*asat*) in relation to otherness (*parabhava*). In other words, *anekānta* is an attempt to overcome extreme views or one-sidedness. One can say, this is the operation of 'Rashomon effect' "<sup>3</sup> This expression conveys the idea that all facts and events are subject to multiple interpretations. Thus, the

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<sup>2</sup> Mallisena, *Syadvadana māñjari*

<sup>3</sup> The term is coined after a Japanese film, *Rashomon*. The film depicts a story of murder narrated differently by various eyewitnesses.

attitude of *anekanta* could work as the starting point of eliminating or, at least, reducing religious, social, political, familial conflicts, which often culminate in intolerance at all levels national and even international. In more general sense *anekanta* is the true spirit of *ahimsa*, which does not remain confined to the individual's code of conduct alone but reaches metaphysical and, more importantly, societal plane.

*Anekantavada* with its corollaries of *nayavada* and *syadvada* serves a complete and exhaustive philosophy of life.<sup>4</sup> *Anekantavada* is the metaphysical outlook of Jainas as it posits the multi-dimensional aspect of reality. However, it is essentially a social philosophy of relevance which can make our social existence meaningful and peaceful. Human existence could be truly enriching with an attitude of tolerance of others and their points of view. It would be contextually relevant to briefly touch upon the corollaries of *anekantavada*, that is *nayavada* and *syadvada*, which together reveal the functional dynamics of *anekantavada*. *Naya* refers to a process of understanding and analyzing an object or a reality in its varied aspects and forms. Jain texts give a list of seven *nayas* covering the possible ways of understanding reality.<sup>5</sup> These *nayas* are *Naigama naya*, *Sangraha naya*, *Vyavahara naya*, *Rjusutra naya*, *Śabda naya*, *Samabhirādha naya*, and lastly *Evambhāta naya*. *Naigama naya* refers to ways of understanding an object in its dual sense, that is, in both its general and specific sense.

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<sup>4</sup> Devendramuni Shastri, *A Source Book of Jaina Philosophy* Trans. By T. G. Kalghatgi (Udaipur: Sri Tarakguru Jain Granthalaya, 1983), pp. 239-40, 256.

<sup>5</sup> Umasvati, *Tattvartha Sutra* op. cit., 1-34, 35.

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*Sangraha naya* refers to the tendency to find unity in diversity *Vyavahara naya* deals with particularity and focuses on diversity, it is the empirical and practical approach *Rjusutra naya* aims at presenting the aspect of reality from the point of view of momentary present *Sabda naya* emphasizes the function of word and focuses on its meaning (as different words may mean the same object) *Samabhiradha naya* refers to the etymological meaning of a word and emphasizes that every word has some different meaning in accordance with its roots This *naya* throws light on differences amongst synonyms *Evambhuta naya* emphasizes on the specific situations and context in which a particular meaning is ascribed to a word (e.g. a servant is a servant only when he is serving) Thus, these *nayas* take note of different possibilities of analytic thought processes with reference to varied aspects and distinctions of the objects or of reality

The other significant corollary of *anekanta* is *syadvada* which takes note of these *nayas* or number of possibilities of thought and gives a logical and verbal expression to it in its predication form of *Saptabhangi* (seven-fold predication) incorporating affirmation, negation and also inexpressibility along with their combinations <sup>6</sup> These are (1) *syat-asti*, (2) *syat-nasti*, (3) *syat-asti-nasti*, (4) *syat-avyaktavyam*, (5) *syat-asti-avyaktavyam*, (6) *syat-nasti-avyaktavyam*, and (7) *syat-asti-nasti-avyaktavyam* All these predication forms show that from a particular point of view a thing is and from another point of view it is not and from a third point of view it is inexpressible and

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<sup>6</sup> Muni Phoolchandji 'Sraman,' *Nayavada* (Agra Sanmatigyan Peeth, 1958) pp. 37-46

so on. These predications are complementary because affirmation implies the negation of its opposite and negation implies the affirmation of its opposite. Further, there is also room for inexpressibility as all these predications relate only to finite or limited ability of expressions of those who are not omniscient. Thus, in common parlance, *syadvada* is an expression of thought in a cultured and civilized way that does not hurt those who hold a different point of view. *syadvada*, thus, promotes an outlook of a many-sided approach to the knowledge of reality. It is an anti-dogmatic approach respecting diverse points of view. Thus, from basic attitude to systematic thought and from thought to its logical verbal expression incorporating essential relativism, *anekanta* is the foundational principle of Jaina philosophy and logic.

It needs to be clarified that *syadvada* or seven-fold judgments are not figments of imagination, they are only expressions of many-faceted reality for its fullest comprehension. It should also be noted that *syadvada* should not be seen as a theory of doubt or that the term 'syat' means 'maybe' or 'perhaps' which would amount to a form of skepticism. A comprehensive description of varied nature of objects is not an expression of doubt or skepticism. Rather, it underscores a number of possibilities for understanding reality.

In modern social context there cannot be a better interpretation of *anekanta* than secularism. It is the modern social philosophical definition of *anekanta*. Secularism is generally characterized by (i) decline of religious belief, (ii) separation of church and state, and, (iii) respect for all religions. It is this last meaning which is most relevant in the Indian context. A secular state protects all religions.



## Anekanta in Present Day Social Life

equally and favors none at the expense of others. The state recognizes equal rights and privileges and duties as belonging to all citizens irrespective of their religion or caste. It does not mean indifference to religion nor does it mean opposition to religion. It only means that the state as such does not identify itself with any particular religion and not only tolerates but appreciates every religion. Under no circumstance does it mean rejection or irrelevance of religion or that it eulogizes irreligion. In simplest terms it means 'equal respect for all religions'. It does not mean abandoning spirituality from the life of people or even from the affairs of the state. It should only mean elimination of religion - based conflicts and confrontations that destroy the social fabric of our society and exhaustion of energies of nation. The talk of separation of religion from politics should be read as separation of communalism from politics. True religion is a part of life which is nothing but universal values. Jawaharlal Nehru once said that the use of the word 'secular' to describe Indian State was 'perhaps not a very happy one and that it was used for want of a better word'. However, insofar as it conveys the meaning it is intended to convey it should be fine. When we look at the modern urban society, an example of cultural pluralism, which characterizes a life style of "anonymity, mobility, pluralism, pragmatism and even profanity," to use Harvey Cox's words,<sup>7</sup> we find that such a meaning of secularism is more relevant to a society where individual's roots become weak and fragile giving

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<sup>7</sup> Harvey Cox, *The Secular City* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), pp. 38-42.

rise to increasing necessity for cultivating respect and tolerance among human beings operating in a rapidly changing world. A closer look would reveal that it is in essence nothing but *anekanta*.

This exhaustive philosophy is reflected not only in philosophical deliberations or religious catechism, it is reflected in so many facets of our social life. In our judicial system in which lies the core of human dignity in society, the greatest contribution to the cause of justice is the concept of natural justice, which is based on two fundamental principles: (i) No one should be his own judge for his own cause and that a judgment should be unbiased and impartial, (ii) Both sides of the case should be heard and that no one should be condemned unheard. On close analysis both these principles implicitly refer to the attitude of *anekanta*.<sup>8</sup> If, for example, a judge looks at the problem from one angle he would be labeled as prejudiced and biased or one holding *ekantika* views. Further, if he gives hearing to one party and leaves the other party unheard his approach would be *ekantika* again. Thus, *anekanta* is the essence of both these principles. A person accused of murder could be hanged, could be given life sentence and could also be acquitted, this underlines *anekantika* approach.

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<sup>8</sup> T U Mehta, "Syadvada and Judicial Process," in *Multi-dimensional Application of Anekantavada* (Varanasi: P V Research Institute, 1999), p. 154.

## Anekanta in Present Day Social Life

*Anekanta* can be 'useful in the management of business organization'<sup>9</sup> A multi-dimensional approach may allow a business executive to understand the challenges of his organization from the perspectives of its various departments. Even for personal management and growth, the *anekantika* way of thinking can produce better results by encouraging open and objective approach.

Today, medical practitioners have begun to rely on an integrated approach in medicine rather than rigidly adhering to their particular school of medicine. Allopathic practitioners have started to recommend well-tested *ayurvedic* medicines which they think are less prone to side-effects. This expresses a synthesis of diverse approaches on the basis of 'complementarity' principle. This again is a reflection of *anekantika* attitude.

*Anekantika* outlook is not only good for our day-to-day life, but it also has a great intellectual appeal. Post-modernism and its related theory of post-structuralism widely used in literary criticism are of very recent origin. Post-modernism suggests that every field of ideas is a field of contending forces.<sup>10</sup> Post-modernism emphasizes that no representation can capture the subject completely and that it is only a representation. There appears, in this thesis a striking similarity to Buddhist view of momentariness or *Rjusatra naya*, but it definitely throws light on differences.

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<sup>9</sup>Hasmukh Savlani, "Personal Management by Anekantavada," in *Multi-Dimensional Application of Anekantavada*, op cit, p 161

<sup>10</sup> Lawrence E. Cahoon (ed.), *Anekantavada: An Anthology* (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p 15

and tolerance of differences. As such, it echoes an *anekantika* approach.

Concept similar to *anekanta* can be seen in other religions and philosophies of the world. Take for instance the following. *Isavasya Upanisad* describes *atman* as a substance which moves and does not move, which is near and far and which is inside and outside. In spite of being absolutistic, *Vedanta* reflects relativism in its philosophy of explaining reality from three standpoints and in three stages viz *pratibhasika*, *vyavalambika* and *paramarthika*. *Mahabharata* exhorts people by saying, 'Regard all religious faiths with reverence and ponder their teachings but do not surrender your judgment'. Buddhist philosophy of *vibhajyavada* and *madhyama-marga* also reflects the tone of *anekanta*. Buddha himself believed in *vibhajyavada* and not in *ekantavada*. He rejected both '*asti*' and '*nasti*' and emphasized that he believed in the middle path. *Quran* suggests, 'to you your religion and to me mine'. This is truly the 'live and let live' philosophy of religion.

In conclusion, *anekantavada* may help us overcome the one-sided, narrow, dogmatic or fanatical approaches to life and reality, not only at metaphysical, but also at social and familial levels. As such, it can significantly reduce the intellectual chaos and social conflict in the present day life.

## Beyond Anekantavada: A Jain Approach to Religious Tolerance

PAUL DUNDAS

A popular modern symbol of Jainism includes a representation of the *loka*--the universe as envisaged in Jain teaching--and the motto "*parasparopagraho jīvānām*" (there should be mutual support between all living creatures). An alternative image representative of the ethical ideals of Jainism might equally well be the *samavasarana*, the assembly place magically created by the gods where, according to the Jain tradition, every *Jina*, after attaining enlightenment expounds the eternal teachings of nonviolence and compassion for the first time. The universal applicability of the Jain doctrine is demonstrated by the fact that this sermon is listened to by a gathering of humans, animals and gods gathered in concord within an extensive circular network of corridors encompassed by jewelled balustrades which surround the dais from where the *Jina* preaches.

Who is eligible to enter this religious amphitheatre and attend the great event? This question was raised in the *Senaprasna*, a collection of responses made by Vijayasena Sūri, chief ascetic of Śvetāmbara subsect, the Tapa Gaccha, in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, to a variety

of inquiries posed by lay and monastic members of his sect. Subsequently, these questions and answers were compiled by monk Śubhaviyaya Gaṇin.<sup>1</sup> More pertinent to the theme of this essay, however, is the following question posed to Vijayasena. Do the 363 types of heretic (*pakhandika*), traditionally established by the time of early medieval Jainism, physically stand outside the *śamavasarana* or remain within it? As a rule, replied Vijayasena, they remain outside but occasionally enter the *śamavasarana*.<sup>2</sup>

This slightly equivocal judgement appears to indicate a possible tension within Jainism to which I intend to draw attention. The questions central to my inquiry are: What is the status of those who are not formally members of the Jain religion? Can they be in some way accommodated by the Jains? If not, are they fated to stay outside the *śamavasarana*, noses metaphorically pressed against the soteriological window? In other words, to what extent is Jainism tolerant in its approach to other religious traditions?

Based on its philosophy of *anekantavada*, Jainism is frequently thought of having an innate sense of tolerance for other religious paths. Such a tolerance is regarded as a

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<sup>1</sup> In this, for example, Vijayasena Śūrī is represented to point out that while listening to the *Jina*'s sermon, female humans and divine beings stand and the male human and divine beings sit as a token of the traditional superiority of their gender. See, Vijayasena Śūrī's *Senaprasna* compiled by Śubhaviyaya Gaṇin (Bombay Devachand Lalabhai Series, 1919)-80a.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid* p. 61a.

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reflex of the religion's deep preoccupation with *ahimsa*. However, concentration on *anekāntavāda* as presenting non-Jain teachings as partial versions of the truth and thus constituting a type of inclusivist sectarian tolerance has tended to de-emphasize the extent to which Jainism has also consistently seen itself in exclusivist terms as the one true path. Recent scholarship has confirmed that *anekāntavāda* functioned in classical times as a technique which could promote the superiority of the Jain analysis of the world over other models of reality.<sup>3</sup> Jainism's apparent inclusivism and tolerance as supposedly resulting from *anekāntavāda* can in fact equally be interpreted as indices of its exclusivism. Indeed, the ancient scriptural evidence suggests that Jainism from the very beginning saw alternative religious paths as inadequate. For example, the *Uttarādhyāyana Sūtra* 23.63 states, "The heterodox and the heretics have all chosen a wrong path, the right path is that taught by the *Jinas*, it is the most excellent path."<sup>4</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the Jains in general never, until the ecumenical twentieth century, subscribed to the possibility of all religions being in some way equal. Indeed, the classical texts generally excoriate such apparent liberalism as a specific form of false belief (*mithyadrsti*) called *vainayika*, a general, indiscriminating reverence towards objects and personages of worship in

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<sup>3</sup> Paul Dundas, *The Jains* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp 229-33.

<sup>4</sup> Hermann Jacobi (trans.), *Jaina Sutras*, Part II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895), p 126.

other sects which has been rendered by one translator as "misguided egalitarianism"<sup>5</sup>

However, there is another strand of opinion in Jainism which can most clearly be located in the writings of Ācārya Haribhadra. The dating of this figure is problematic but for our purposes the writings attributed to him can be said to fall between the late 6th and the mid 8th centuries C E.<sup>6</sup> Haribhadra occasionally does not accept the possibility of any sort of approval of or accommodation with those who fail to conform to the ethical commands of the *Jinas*, even though they perform fierce austerities which, Jainism claims, are integral to genuine spiritual advancement.<sup>7</sup> He also denies that those who are outside the command of the *Jinas* can have any sort of religious restraint in the first place.<sup>8</sup> Elsewhere, however, Haribhadra allows for the possibility of other non-Jain sectarian leaders and teachings in conformity with Jainism.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, in his so-called yoga works, Haribhadra explicitly regards inner

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<sup>5</sup> Nathmal Tatia (trans.), Umasvāti's *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, *That Which Is* (San Francisco and London: HarperCollins 1994), pp 189-90

<sup>6</sup> See Paul Dundas, "Haribhadra on Giving," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 30, 2000, pp 8 and 30

<sup>7</sup> Haribhadra, *Pañcasaka* 11-39 Panniyas Śrī Padmavijayajī Mahārāja Gaṇivarva (ed.), *Pañcasakaprakaraṇa* (Hastinapur: Śrī Nirgrantha Sahitya Prakashan Sangha, 1999)

<sup>8</sup> Haribhadra, *Upadeśapada* v 810 (Bhuleshvar: Śrī Jinashasana Aradhana Trust, 1989)

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, v 639



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calm of any sort as a guarantor of a general orientation towards that one path which leads to moksa <sup>10</sup>

It must, however, be said that Haribhadra was no simple apologist for other faiths or tolerant irenicist. His writings appear as harbingers of the tensions which surfaced in an extended argument which preoccupied the Śvetāmbara Jain community during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Here, I will eschew any reference to *anekantavada* as it is not relevant to the question, whether there is any possibility of correct moral behavior on the part of those who do not follow the Jain path.

Perhaps, the best way to introduce this issue is by reference to a text which was written some time in the late 13th or early 14th century when the Śvetāmbara Jain community was fragmented into a variety of rival subjects seriously divided over issues relating to lineage, ritual and the sacred calendar. It is against this background that one Nayaprabha Ganin, a teacher of the subject known as the Tapa Gaccha produced the *Gurutattvapradīpa*. This work's alternative title, certainly the one by which it was known in the sixteenth century, was *Utsātrakandakuddala*, literally meaning, "A Spade to Dig Up the Roots of Heresy". The title clearly conveys the purpose of the text which, in fact, was the first Tapa Gaccha text to engage in serious intra-Śvetāmbara sectarian polemic.

In this text, the objects of the author's wrath range from opponents such as the Digambaras and the temple-dwelling monks since the beginning of the common era, to

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<sup>10</sup> Haribhadra, *Yogadrśtisamuccaya* v 128 in *Haribhadra-yogabharati* (Mumbai: Divyadarshan Trust, 1989)

sects which emerged after the eleventh century and are still in existence today, such as the Kharatara Gaccha and the Tristutikas. However, before categorising and denouncing these opponents, the author of *Gurutattvapradīpa* considers the typical standpoint from which a Jain should approach alternative intellectual positions, namely that of being *madhyastha*, literally meaning, "standing in the middle." According to the historian of religion, Peter van der Veer, there is no word in any Indian language corresponding exactly to the English word "tolerance," which has its origins in the European Enlightenment and the decline of the universal authority of the Catholic Church<sup>11</sup>. However, the term *madhyastha* might well be taken as indicative of the supposed basic Jain virtue of intellectual irenicism and respect for other religions which modern apologists have presented as being one of Jainism's main characteristics. But on further examination it appears to be slightly more nuanced than this would suggest.

Although the author asserts that his work, *Gurutattvapradīpa*, has been written in the spirit of *madhyasthya*—remaining between the two extremes of strong attachment (*raga*) and aversion (*dvesa*)—he goes on to argue that there are two types of this quality of "being in the middle," which are as different from each other as spiritual deliverance is from rebirth. The first type of *madhyastha* is an individual who has no attachment or

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<sup>11</sup> Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp 66-7

hatred when considering issues relating to divinity, teacher or doctrine and, crucially, evinces the quality of right view or faith (*samyagdrsti*). Consequently, he loses all possible doubt when he realises that the statements of the Jain scriptures and the direction of the path to liberation are one and the same<sup>12</sup>. The second type of *madhyastha*, however, cannot abandon attachment and dislike and lacks the ability to discriminate between good and bad positions on the grounds that he doubts whether in fact he is genuinely *madhyastha*. Such a person consequently goes along with every idea, statement and mode of practice and his supposed neutrality or "tolerance" is rather a lack of intellectual discrimination as a result of which he cannot distinguish between substance (*tattva*) and non-substance (*atattva*). As the *Gurutattvapradīpa* puts it, professional connoisseurs of jewels would not adopt a position of neutrality when forming their conclusion (*samanubandha*) in the case of judging both glass and a genuine precious stone<sup>13</sup>. Following such excoriation of any sort of mealy-mouthed tolerance, the author of the *Gurutattvapradīpa* embarks upon a lengthy exposure of all non-Tapa Gaccha types of Jainism as being *utsāra*, heretical and representations of false beliefs.

Few manuscripts of the *Gurutattvapradīpa* have survived. Like some other controversial Śvetāmbara Jain texts, it has had a slightly nebulous and marginal existence. Indeed, at the beginning of the seventeenth

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<sup>12</sup> *Gurutattvapradīpa*, vv 3-8 with autocommentary. Edited by Muni Labhasara (Kapadvamj Mithabhai Kalyānchand Pitha, 1961).

<sup>13</sup> *Gurutattvapradīpa*, *op cit*, v 11.

century the *Gurūtattvapradīpa* was publicly banned by the senior monastic leadership on the grounds that it was a source of factionalism. Its adoption by Dharma-sāgara<sup>14</sup> led to sectarian debates as well as polarization within the Tapa Gaccha. Dharma-sāgara's writings were an extension of the *Gurūtattvapradīpa*'s concerns. They represent a strongly and subtly argued supremacist perspective on Jainism and are fiercely exclusivist in their refusal to accept the validity of any religious path different from Dharma-sāgara's own sect, the Tapa Gaccha. Furthermore, they remained a significant issue in the Śvetāmbara community well into the second half of the seventeenth century. While I do not intend to pursue Dharma-sāgara's arguments here, their existence should not be disguised by those who would wish to present Jainism in exclusively irenic terms and as promoting a general intellectual tolerance based on the principle of *anekantavada*. Instead, I would turn here to an opponent of Dharma-sāgara's ideas and one of Jainism's greatest intellectuals, Yasovijaya (1624-88).

Yasovijaya has become a near talismanic figure for the contemporary Śvetāmbara monastic community and is, in particular, identified with the quality of *madhiyasthya* or neutrality. A commemorative sign which invokes this can be glimpsed today through the dust and fumes in the old city of Ahmedabad at Yasovijaya Chauk at the Relief Road end of Ratan Pol where Yasovijaya lived for many years. Although Yasovijaya's scholarly reach extended over the entire range of Jain literature, his frequent reference to

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<sup>14</sup> Dundas, *The Jains*, op cit , pp 163-64

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Haribhadra suggests that he considered the latter as his real and only intellectual equivalent in earlier Svetāmbara tradition, and he saw himself as Haribhadra's successor. It was Haribhadra's reputation for being influenced only by the logical cogency of doctrines and viewpoints (*anekantavada*) that appears to have shaped Yaśovijaya's irenic but also critical attitude towards other sects and traditions.

Yaśovijaya's broad perspective on the status of members of other religious paths was expressed in the *Dharmaparīkṣa*, "An Examination of the Jain Religion," a lengthy Sanskrit auto-commentary on 104 Prakṛit verses produced in 1669. In this text, in which no serious reference is made to *anekantavada*, Yaśovijaya argues that it is pointless to take a negative stance towards a position found in another soteriological path if it is effectively no different from Jainism. Unquestionably (and Yaśovijaya quotes Haribhadra to this effect) the principled non-Jain derives his positive qualities precisely from his loyal adherence to his own scriptural tradition, this being in itself indicative of a morally upright position. The Jain, however, can take a *madhyastha* position, devoid of partisan passion, because Jainism is universalist in that it combines and encompasses all possible viewpoints. Here, then, at the outset Yaśovijaya's ostensibly irenic approach can also be seen to reflect a view of Jainism as inherently superior to those sectarian and religious paths which do not adopt such a perspective.

Yaśovijaya's initial technique in confronting Dharmaśāgara's position is to assess the various types of false belief which have been traditionally identified in Jainism. These include not merely wrongheaded attachment to

what is incorrect but also an indiscriminate attachment to all views as being true (*anabhugrahika*), effectively a kind of misconceived relativism. Individuals in thrall to such intellectual dysfunctioning should not be accommodated in any way. However, Yasovijaya makes the general point that even those who through the power of delusion subscribe to false intellectual and religious positions may nonetheless have that quiescence or calm characteristic of the Jain path. This positive view of non-Jains is bolstered by reference to Haribhadra who had claimed that Hindus such as Patañjali, the author of the *Yoga Sūtras*, could be incorporated into the lower stages of the Jain path by virtue of possession of yogic insight (*yogadrsti*).

This gives rise to an inevitable question, how non-Jains can be in possession of the necessary moral qualities in the first place without direct participation within the Jain path? Yaśovijaya attempts to address this by discussing Jainism in terms of its inner (*bhāva*) and outer (*dravya*) characteristics. Non-Jains, even though lacking totally correct discrimination, can reach Jainism in the inner, spiritual sense simply through being servants of the *Jinas*. As a purely internal perspective, however, this might be regarded as having the unwelcome result of doing away with the necessary socio-religious distinction between Jain and non-Jain, so Yasovijaya insists that such individuals must be "free of the fault of attachment to what is untrue" (*galitasadgrahadosa*). In other words, acknowledgement of the authority of the *Jinas* is worthless if it still involves promotion and advocacy of views contrary to their teachings (a standpoint which, it must be admitted, is slightly at variance with what Yaśovijaya has stated before). Yasovijaya invokes once again the centrality of

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*madhyasthya* as not so much a neutral quality as the *sine qua non* for Jainism: those whose minds are purified by it are Jains in terms of their internal, spiritual perspective and thus cannot disagree with the teachings of the *Jinas*

A community consisting of genuine Jains and those who are Jains in spirit, non-Jain Jains as it were, linked by a shared faith in the teachings and authority of the *Jinas* might be theoretically possible, but this still fails to address the issue that the latter group do not conform to outward visible Jain practice which, as Yasovijaya points out, is necessarily interrelated with "inner" Jainism. In fact, while it may on the face of it be impossible for non-Jains to conform to the external obligations of Jainism because they follow the behavioral requirements of their own particular path, it is nonetheless sufficient that all these requirements relate to a morally upright person who does no evil and conforms to a morally appropriate mode of behaviour (*akaramanīyānā*). In other words, following the actions prescribed by one's own religious path does not preclude being on the Jain path. For Yaśovijaya the obvious example of such an individual is, once more, Patañjali, the author of the *Yoga Sūtras*, who, as just mentioned, was accepted by Haribhadra as having the necessary neutrality (*madhyasthya*) and absence of delusion and as having experienced the yogic "flash" characteristic of all genuine holy men. Such an individual thus falls into the category of what Jainism has styled since scriptural times as *desaradhaka*, which is to say a "partial adherent," following the Jain path but lacking completely developed knowledge and faith. However, there has to be purity of intention: even acts of compassion are worthless if they are still permeated by intense false belief.

Apparently, Yaśovijaya quite willingly accepts the possibility of the spiritual commitment of members of other religious paths coinciding with the requirements of Jainism and avoiding the cardinal fault of one-pointed perspective (*ekantika*). If this were not the case, then the references in the Jain scriptures to members of other sects who had actually achieved liberation (*anyalingasiddha*) could not be correct. It must therefore be concluded, claims Yaśovijaya, that individuals such as Patañjali follow a code of behaviour approved of both by their own path and that of the Jains. To advance on a religious path, one must have positive qualities and if another path does happen to concur with one's own in that respect, then that merely strengthens it.

According to Yaśovijaya, the Jain teachings are multifarious inasmuch as they instil various qualities in different types of individuals who have differing responses to such teachings. However, at the same time these teachings are founded on the solid unifying basis of watchful moral behaviour (*apramada*). Thus, any statement occurring in another tradition which promotes a genuine spiritual stance and is at the same time in accord with Jain teaching must in actuality be interpreted as deriving from Jainism. What must be regarded as disbarring another view from accommodation within Jainism is not so much the view itself as some sort of passionate attachment towards it. Yaśovijaya, following Haribhadra,<sup>15</sup> refers to the possibility of what seems to be a general category of religion (*samanyadharma*) which transcends sectarian boundaries.

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<sup>15</sup> Haribhadra, *ogabindu*, v 2, in *Haribhadrayogabharati*, op cit



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Those others who [broadly] conform to the [Jain] path cannot be deemed to be heretical simply on the grounds that they do not understand ontological categories such as the soul in the manner approved by the Jains, for their position [does actually] end up in their understanding these categories correctly, provided there is abandonment of partiality towards any disputed part [of the doctrine] his is not just a question of accidental resemblance to the Jain path These individuals are in fact involved in *saṃanyadharmā* <sup>16</sup>

However, perhaps predictably, it is clear that *saṃanyadharmā* in its basics corresponds to Jainism. Buddhism, for example, cannot as an institutionalised and supposedly nonviolent religion, participate in this "general religion" because it claims an independent source of authority which only the *Jinas* can have. Similarly, there can be no question of Jainism, which is the origin of all philosophical standpoints, incorporating morally inappropriate teachings such as Vedic injunctions about sacrificial killing. Jainism can be the source of all intellectual views only in the sense that it makes clear what its own teachings are and what are the teachings of others.

What I have been drawing attention to is a Jain argument: not couched in terms of *anekantavada*, possibly unparalleled in Indian thought up to this time, which concentrates on the qualities and the validity of praising upright individuals, even if they belong to a different and

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<sup>16</sup> Yaśovijaya, *Dharmaparikṣa* (Mumbai: Shri Andheri Gujarati Jain Sangha, 1986), p. 119

manifestly false religious path. As discussed in this paper, there is one side of this argument, as represented by Dharmasagara, which is unwilling to acknowledge the possibility of mitigating qualities in non-Jains and Jain sectarians. Yasovijaya, on the other hand, is more open to the positive qualities of non-Jains, no doubt as befits an individual who himself attempted in practical terms to smooth over sectarian differences within the Svetambara community. Yet, in his inclusivism Yasovijaya never abandons a sense of the superiority of Jainism, and can thus be seen to be applying the same sort of ranking perspective as found in Hinduism. It is Yasovijaya's image of Jainism which has become the dominant one today.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> A full treatment of this subject will appear in my forthcoming study, titled "Sudharman's Heirs: History, Scripture and Controversy in a Medieval Jain Sect."

## Religious Dissonance and Reconciliation: The Haribhadra Story

CHRISTOPHER KEY CHAPPLE

During this visibly strife-ridden period following the destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent war with Iraq, it is interesting and perhaps instructive to review how Jains have grappled with their alterity, their difference, their otherness. From the non-Jain accounts such as found in the early Buddhist records, the Jains appear to be stand-apart people, distinguished by their eating habits, their lay occupations, and the austere lifestyle observed by members of their mendicant orders. Yet, rather than being reviled and suppressed, Jains for the most part have managed to survive with respect to their non-Jain colleagues except for occasional calamitous outbursts of hatred against them for their difference.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> One instance of suppression would come during the eleventh century in Tamil Nadu where Tirujnanasambandar, a Hindu king, reportedly slaughtered many Jains, as depicted at the Minakshi Temple in Madurai. See Bhaskar Anand Salatore, *Medieval Jainism: With Special Reference to the Vijayanagara Empire* (Bombay: Karnatak Publishing House, 1938), pp. 278-279.

In this essay, I will examine how throughout their history the Jains have defined themselves as distinct from competing religious groups, hence avoiding the pitfall of being absorbed into the mainstream, which happened with the Buddhists<sup>2</sup> Then I will turn to a troublesome story about Haribhadra that attributes to him horrendous acts of violence I will examine select writings from the Haribhadra corpus that address the issue of religious plurality in a conciliatory fashion I will also offer some observations regarding the workability of a theory of nonviolence (*alumsa*) as suggested by Haribhadra and pacifism in light of the contemporary situation

Jainism, since at least the fifth century B C E , has existed within a pluralistic context Many of the early converts to Buddhism hailed from the Jain faith, as can be seen in the collection of poems about women, the *Therigatha*, which developed shortly after the Buddha's passing<sup>3</sup> These poems indicate that the majority of Jains

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Another instance is the death of Todar Mal (1719-1766), who, as noted by Paul Dundas, "seems to have been executed as a sectarian leader in the aftermath of what would today be described as a 'communal disturbance'" [for being a] "denouncer of both Hinduism and Islam as false religions" See Paul Dundas, "Jain Perceptions of Islam in the Early Modern Period," *Indo-Iranian Journal*, Vol 42, 1999, pp 35-46, p 42

<sup>2</sup> See Padmanabh S Jaini, "The Disappearance of Buddhism and the Survival of Jainism in India A Study in Contrast" in *Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000)

<sup>3</sup> Susan Murcott, *The First Buddhist Women: Translations and Commentaries on the Therigatha* (Berkeley, California: Parallax Press, 1991)

were prosperous merchants, and their mendicants followed a highly rigorous discipline that continues to characterize the Jain community even today. From their original homeland in northeast India, Jains spread through all parts of India, particularly in the south (Karnataka and Madhyapradesh) and the west (Gujarat and Rajasthan). With the exception of the near-mythical account of the Hindu blood-letting of Jains in medieval Tamil Nadu, Jains seem mostly to have avoided persecution without overly compromising their core religious practices and identity.

One source for understanding the survivability of the Jains can be found in their philosophical approach to pluralism. On the one hand, Jainism contains perhaps the world's most plural and individualistic theology. Numerous souls, present from beginningless time, countlessly reincarnate, taking on new forms depending upon the action or *karma* in their prior births. No god created these souls. No god or person controls these souls. Each individual forges his or her own course and determines one's degree of happiness or sorrow in this life and the lives to come. Jainism is both individualistic and voluntaristic. Ultimately, one can only be concerned with one's own *karma*. Some of the most individualistic Jains state that to interfere with the *karma* of another would be fruitless and inappropriate, and would most likely bring harm to oneself. This philosophy, in addition to emphasizing personal responsibility, also acknowledges that there are many paths pursued by different people, according to their *karma*. Eventually, given the right *karmic* circumstances, a person might eventually be born as a Jain. Consequently, Jainism tended not to seek converts, though

it did actively promulgate its teaching regarding nonviolence (*ahimsa*)

Jains did not espouse relativism. Throughout its long history, Jain identity has been maintained by clearly delineating Jain beliefs as distinct from the views and practices of others. In this regard, Jains have been consistently clear about what distinguishes them from people of other faiths, not just in regard to vegetarianism and occupation, but in terms of theological confession. The *Ājīvaka* faith, which has since disappeared, has been closely associated with Jainism as recorded in the early literature. It promulgated a form of fatalism that the Jains disdained because it de-emphasized the need to practice nonviolence and countered the Jain insistence on personal responsibility. From an early period the Jains criticized the Brahmins, both for their practice of bloody sacrifice and for their belief in a single (*eka*), underlying, immutable (*anitya*) soul. The Jains criticized the Buddhists for their belief in the non-soul (*anātman*). These arguments can all be found in the early literature of the Jains, particularly the writings of Siddhasena Divākara (fifth century), Akalanka (eighth century), and Vidyānanda (ninth century).<sup>4</sup>

In the medieval and modern period, three new traditions came under close scrutiny. The great scholar Haribhadraśūri (700-770 C.E.) developed an elaborate critique of *Tantra* in his *Yogadrstisamuccaya*, claiming that it leads people into delusion and causes harm to them. Various Jain theologians presented critiques of Islam,

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<sup>4</sup> See Padmanabh S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1979), pp. 83-85 and 91-93.

including Devavimāla Gaṇin within the *Hirasaubhagya*, his hagiography of Hīravijaya Sūri (1527-1595), and the *Moksamārgaprakāśaka* of Todar Mal (1719-1766). Both discount the notion of a creator God and condemn the killing of animals allowed within the Islamic tradition.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the early contact of the Jains with the Christians was unfriendly, with Vijayadeva Sūri (1577-1656) suggesting that the Portuguese Catholic "never approves of another religion except his own."<sup>6</sup> Like their objections to Hindu and Muslim theologies, Jains would disagree with Christian notions of God and their derision of dietary restrictions such as vegetarianism.

### Religious Intolerance: Stories Attributed to Haribhadra

Unlike the western world where dissenters from the theological mainstream did not fare so well and heretics were often harassed and even killed,<sup>7</sup> the commitment to *ahiṃsā* allowed the Jains to remain in

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<sup>5</sup> See Paul Dundas, "Jain Perceptions of Islam in the Early Modern Period," *Indo-Iranian Journal*, Vol 42, pp 35-46, 1999

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, p 45

<sup>7</sup> In medieval Europe, Inquisitions were established to search for heretics and punish them. Seven kinds of punishments were used for this purpose. For detailed treatment of the Cathars and the Waldensians - both of whom rejected the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, see Albert C. Shannon, *The Medieval Inquisition*, second edition (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1991), pp 67, 133. Even Protestants in America were not free from persecution within their own ranks. Quakers who had fled to colonial Massachusetts to escape religious persecution in England were killed by hanging in Boston Commons because of their unorthodox beliefs.

relative harmony with others who did not share their theology. Their philosophy of "live and let live" made the Jains unique even within the context of the Indian subcontinent which too had been often plagued by religious intolerance.<sup>8</sup> However, stories in which terrible violence is attributed to a Jain scholar, Haribhadra--noted otherwise for his tolerance and commitment to nonviolence--presents an odd and intriguing case. I will analyze these stories in the rest of this paper.

Haribhadra lived in India during a time of great philosophical diversity. The period following the Guptas and prior to the rule of Delhi Sultanate was characterized by the proliferation of *Purānas*, the flowering of *Saiva* and *Vaisnava* philosophy, the *Bhakti* movement in the south, the dawn of *Tantra* including emphasis on goddess worship, and the ongoing observance of the Vedic sacrificial system.<sup>9</sup> Buddhism and Yoga, both of which

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<sup>8</sup> For example, Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, unlike his more liberal predecessor Akbar, sought to accomplish mass conversions to Islam during his reign. He first made peaceful overtures, then offered money. If people would not convert, he would punish them and sow dissent to divide the non-Muslims. Eventually, he resorted to forcible conversions. His treatment of the Sikhs, in particular, and the killings of three Sikh followers and the beheading of Guru Tegh Bahadur, are examples of grave religious intolerance. For a detailed discussion of this see *Sikh Religion* (Detroit, Michigan Sikh Missionary Center, 1990), pp 174, 178.

<sup>9</sup> Traditionally, the Jains have placed his dates from 459 to 529 C.E., which fits within the post-Gupta, pre-Islamic time frame. However, in 1919 Muni Jinavijayaji, a Jain monk and scholar, published an extensive critique of these dates, noting



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had a strong presence in India at the time, offered the most direct competition to Jainism since all three systems shared an emphasis on self-effort in the quest toward spiritual uplift and liberation. Haribhadra was the son of Śankarabhatta and his wife Gāṅgā, born into the Brahmin caste. He lived either in Brahmapurī or in Citrakūṭa, which is identified with Chittor, the capital of Mewar in Rajasthan.<sup>10</sup> He eventually became a Jain monk of the Vidyādhara Gaccha headed by Jinabhatta, and wandered throughout Western India as a member of the Śvetāmbara order. Several traditional authors recorded legendary tales about the life, adventures, misadventures, and work of this prodigious scholar. Phyllis Granoff has summarized many such primary stories about Haribhadra.<sup>11</sup> In these stories,

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that Haribhadra had quoted prominent authors who flourished after his supposed dates. As a result of this essay, Jain and western scholars alike have accepted later dates for Haribhadra, also known as Haribhadrasūri, from 700 to 770 C. E. However, R. Williams contends that in fact some of the texts attributed to Haribhadra could have been written in the sixth century, and suggests that in fact there were two Haribhadras, with the eighth century Haribhadra, whom he calls Yakini-putra, imitating the style of an earlier master. See R. Williams, "Haribhadra," in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, Vol. XXVIII (1965), pp. 101-111.

<sup>10</sup> R. S. Shukla, *India as Known to Haribhadra Suri* (Meerut: Kusumanjali Prakashan, 1989), p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> She draws from a variety of works that begin to appear in the twelfth century, including Bhadravarṣa's *Kaṇvaḥ*, Sarvaśāstramuni's commentary on Jinadatta's *Gaṇadharardhapāṭaka*, Prabhacandra's *Kaṭhakośa* (1077 C. E.), a collection of stories known as the *Purāṇaprabandhasamgraha*, the *Prabhavakacarita*, also

two primary themes remain constant his conversion to Jainism and his conflict with the Buddhists

The first set of stories reveal a man possessed of both brilliance and arrogance. In his early years, Haribhadra, a member of the Brahmin caste, achieved a great degree of learning. He became quite boastful about his academic accomplishments and tied a golden plate around his belly to prevent it from bursting from the weight of all his knowledge. In another version, he also carries a "twig from the jambu tree to show to all that there was no one his equal in all of Jambudvīpa, that is in all the civilized world. He also carried a spade, a net and a ladder in his desire to seek out creatures living in the earth, in water and in the ether in order to defeat them with his great learning"<sup>12</sup>

Thinking he had learned all that could be known, he proclaimed that if anyone could tell him something new, he would devote his life in its pursuit. It so happened that he overheard a Jain nun called Yākinī reciting a verse he could not understand. Having been humiliated, he turned first to her and then to her teacher, Jinadatta, for instruction in the Jain faith, which he then embraced. After a period of study, he was granted the title Śūri or teacher and began to promulgate Jainism. In several of his treatises, the colophon or final verse

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attributed to a scholar named Prabhacandra, but at a later date (1277 C E), and Rajasekharasūri's *Prabandhakośa* (1349 C E). See Phyllis Granoff, "Jain Lives of Haribhadra: An Inquiry into the Sources and Logic of the Legends," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Vol 17, No 2, 1989, pp 111-112

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, p 113

describes him as Yakini-putra, or Yakini's son, indicating the influence of this Jain nun on his life and thought.

The second set of stories include dramatic and grisly tales of espionage, murder, and revenge. The *Prabhavakacarita* of Prabhadra (1277 CE) and the *Prabandhakośa* of Rajaśekharaśūri (1349 CE), building on earlier accounts, narrate the tragic story of two brothers, Hamsa and Paramahamsa—who were both nephews and students of Haribhadra<sup>13</sup> They go to Mahabodhi to learn about the teachings of the Buddha. The brothers are

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<sup>13</sup> These nephews seem to be styled after two Jain brothers, Akalanka and Niskalaṅka, whose story is told in the *Kathakosa* (1077 CE) two centuries before a variant story about Haribhadra occurs in the *Prabhavakacarita*. In the *Kathakośa*, the two brothers are put to a Buddhist loyalty test, fail, and beat a hasty escape. Niskalanka is captured and put to death. Akalanka is sheltered by a Jain queen and beats the Buddhist goddess Tara in debate (Granoff, 114). The Haribhadra story, which occurs in several accounts, changes the names of the brothers to Hamsa and Paramahamsa. In the *Puratanaprabandhasamgraha*, Haribhadra does not encourage the two students to enter the monastery. In this account, Hamsa dies fighting Buddhist soldiers and Paramahamsa is killed after losing the debate. A bird takes Paramahamsa's bloodied path-clearing broom to Haribhadra, who, in a rage, "makes a cauldron of boiling oil and magically causes the Buddhists to fly through the sky and land in his boiling pot, where they [700 Buddhists] are scalded to death" (Granoff, 117). The mayhem stops when one of Haribhadra's students, sent by the teacher Jinabhadra, interrupts this process. Out of continuing despair (which would not be acceptable within the Jain faith), he then fasts to death. For a complete investigation of these stories, see the excellent and intriguing article by Phyllis Granoff cited above.

exposed as spies after uttering an invocation to the *Jina* when awakened by suspicious Buddhists in the middle of the night. They use the umbrellas to escape from the monastery. Buddhist soldiers catch and kill Hamsa. Paramahamsa takes refuge with King Śūrapāla,<sup>14</sup> who proposes a debate between Paramahamsa and the Buddhists. The goddess Tārā secretly assists the Buddhists. The Jain goddess Ambā advises Paramahamsa about how to trick Tārā by asking her to repeat what she said the prior day, an impossibility for the gods who are unable to keep track of time. Paramahamsa won the debate. However, the Buddhists still intend to kill him. He hides as a laborer who washes clothes and then escapes to rejoin his uncle. As he tells the story to Haribhadra, Paramahamsa dies from the grief that he suffers due to the death of his brother. Haribhadra is outraged. King Śūrapāla arranges a debate between Haribhadra and the Buddhists. One by one, the Buddhists are defeated and sent to their deaths in boiling oil as arranged by the King. Out of great remorse for the killing of so many monks, Haribhadra then composes his many religious treatises, according to Rājāśekhara Śūri, each of the 1440 texts that Haribhadra wrote served as expiation for the 1440 Buddhists who died. However, according to the *Puratanaprabandha sangraha*, this violent outburst occurred after he had written all but his final text.

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<sup>14</sup> No records can be found that confirm the existence of this king.

### Intolerance or Respect for the Views of Others?

These stories of violence are completely at variance with the tremendous body of literature created by Haribhadra himself. Having worked closely with his *Yogadrstisamuccaya* and *Yogabindu*, I find it very odd that these tales of violence came to be associated with Haribhadra. Both texts extol the virtues of good people in all faiths, and are particularly solicitous toward the Buddhists. Phyllis Granoff observes

Even at his most disputatious, in a text like the *Sastravartasamuccaya*, which is written with the sole intent of refuting rival doctrines, Haribhadra makes clear at the very onset of the text that his motives are not to stir up hatred and dissent, but to enlighten his readers and bring them the benefits of ultimate spiritual peace. Haribhadra's respect for the Buddha is unmistakable when he calls him *mahamuni*, "the great sage" and one is left with the general impression that Haribhadra's respect for his Buddhist opponents is unchanged by his philosophical differences with them on specific points.<sup>15</sup>

His *Saddarsanasamuccaya*, a brief text of 87 verses, is used even today in India and the United States as a textbook for summarizing the major strands of Indian thought.<sup>16</sup> His

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<sup>15</sup> Granoff, "Lives of Haribhadra," *op cit*, p 108

<sup>16</sup> For a recent translation of Haribhadra's *Saddarsanasamuccaya* by Olle Qvarnstrom in "Haribhadra and the Beginning of Doxography in India" in N.K. Wagle and Olle Qvarnstrom, editors, *Approaches to Jaina Studies: Philosophy, Logic,*

*Astakprakarana* lists eight qualities that can be universally applied to the faithful of any tradition nonviolence, truth, honesty, chastity, detachment, reverence for a teacher, the act of fasting, and knowledge Paul Dundas observes

The remarkable scholar Sukhalal Sanghvi, who overcame the handicap of blindness contracted very early in life to become one of the most incisive of recent interpreters of Jain philosophy, described Haribhadra in a tribute as a *samadarshu*, 'viewing everything on the same level,' and his eminence derives not just from the breadth of his intellectual command but from his willingness to articulate more clearly than any of his predecessors the full implications of Jainism's main claim to fame among Indian philosophical systems, the many-pointed doctrine <sup>17</sup>

Through his extensive writings, Haribhadra demonstrates his commitment to understand and respect the views of others, while maintaining his commitment to the core Jain beliefs in nonviolence and the need to purify oneself of the influences of *karma*

Haribhadra's concern for respecting the views of all people of good faith can be seen throughout the *Yogadrstisamuccaya* (YDS) First of all, he always refers to good action in the most general terms, recommending that people follow the holy books (*sastras*) but without

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*Rituals and Symbols* (Toronto University of Toronto Centre for South Asian Studies, 1999), pp 169-210

<sup>17</sup> Paul Dundas, *The Jains* (London Routledge, 1992), p 197

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specifying which books ought to be followed. He emphasizes that although one may become omniscient (*sarvajña*), each person will remain different and distinct (YDS 103)<sup>18</sup>. The content of experience is not shared, rather, the contentless purity, which cannot be quantified in any way, is the only common element within the experience of liberation or omniscience. He uses the metaphor of a king's servants: "Just as a king has many dependents, divided according to whether they are near or far, etc., nonetheless all of them are his servants" (YDS 107). He states that even though they may have different names, the core, purified essence of the liberated ones remains constant (YDS 108). Although acknowledging a difference between those who have achieved liberation, nonetheless he regards all of them to be grounded in a common truth. Haribhadra further emphasizes that truth, though expressed differently, is not essentially different. Making references to Śaivites, Vedāntins, Yogins, and Buddhists, he states

Eternal Śiva, Highest Brahman,  
Accomplished Soul, Suchness  
With these words one refers to it,  
though the meaning is one  
in all the various forms (YDS 130)

He goes on to state that this highest truth, by whatever name, frees one from rebirth (YDS 131). Demonstrating his commitment to a plurality of

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<sup>18</sup> These summaries and translations are from a co-translation by myself and John Casey in *Reconciling Yogas: Haribhadra's Collection of Views on Yoga* by Christopher Key Chapple (Albany State University of New York Press, 2003).

perspectives, Haribhadra comments that a variety of teachings are needed because people need to hear things in their own way. Different seeds yield different plants, one cannot expect all things to be the same.

Perhaps the teaching is one  
but there are various people who hear it  
On account of the inconceivable merit it bestows,  
it shines forth in various ways (YDS 136)

Haribhadra makes a plea for tolerance, writing that "various perspectives on conduct" can arise, (YDS 138) but that these should not be criticized, as one cannot be apprised of all the circumstances (YDS 140). He advocates a stance of reconciliation and insists that it would be improper to refute or revile well-intentioned people.

Hence it is not proper to refute  
words of reconciliation  
Refuting or reviling noble people, it seems,  
would be worse than cutting one's own tongue  
(YDS 141)

He advocated that even if one disagrees with another person's ideas, one should always strive to be helpful to the other. He criticizes the notion that logic alone can set one free as can be seen from the following passage:

With effort, even a position inferred  
through the proper establishment of premises  
may certainly be approached in another way,  
being assailed by opponents (YDS 145)

If the meaning of those things beyond the senses  
could be known through a statement of reason,



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then by now it would have been ascertained by the scholars (YDS 146)

In other words, thoughts alone cannot set one free, in contrast, the arrogance associated with logic and scholarship can be a great impediment to one's liberation. He says that liberation requires a loosening of attachment to all things (*dharma*s), including argumentation and logic. Haribhadra concludes this section with an appeal to be kind and generous to all people. For instance, he writes

Even the slightest of pain to others is to be avoided with great effort. Along with this, one should strive to be helpful at all times (YDS 150)

This verse echoes a recurrent theme found in Jain texts. He then takes on a theme akin to the *Bodhisattva* ideal of Mahayana Buddhism.

Even in regard to those with excessive sin who have been cast down by their own actions, one should have compassion for those beings, according to the logic of this highest dharma (YDS 152)

The task of the philosopher of nonviolence and of the Jain is to extend compassion toward other living beings.

### Reconsidering the Stories of Violence

In the light of the above passages from YDS, the stories about Haribhadra's violent acts against Buddhists seem implausible in several regards. First, the stories surfaced five hundred years following his death. Second, by the time these particular Haribhadra stories reached currency, Buddhism was on the wane, if not already largely demolished by the sacking of Buddhist monasteries.

and libraries by Islamic invaders Third, the violent actions attributed to Haribhadra seem quite inconsistent with the Jain nonviolent values he adopted and professed His critiques of Hindu sacrificial violence are well known, found in several of his texts, both in Sanskrit and Prakrit But the Buddhist tradition shares his disdain for violence in the name of religion, and Buddhists make unlikely candidates for Haribhadra's challenge and assault <sup>19</sup>

Hence, if we look at the stories in terms of their historical *sitz-im-leben*, another story might be told The religious challenge in northern India in the 13<sup>th</sup> century came not from the Buddhists but from the Muslims The Jains faced the difficult prospect of becoming an oppressed minority and needed to develop new strategies for being the "other" in a new context In the Hindu-dominated world, their food observances gave them prestige, their marriage patterns formed no threat to and, in fact, largely reflected Hindu family practices, and their success in business as colleagues with other Vaisya merchants allowed the Jains to co-exist in relative peace with their neighbors However, the emergence of Islamic theology required new, more creative responses to ensure survival and self-protection By telling stories of Haribhadra, the exemplar of conversion and the author of several texts that

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<sup>19</sup> Phyllis Granoff suggests that the reason that Haribhadra so wanted to distinguish Jainism from Buddhism lay in the fact that as Jains sought patronage from Hindu kings, it might have been beneficial to clearly separate their own tradition from that of Buddhism, which had waned and become unpopular by the eleventh century See Granoff, "Jain Lives of Haribhadra," *op cit*, p 123

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argue the supremacy of Jain doctrine, a new strategy emerges. Inverting the violence committed by others and attributing it to one's own community might have been a method for strengthening one's own self image, girding for continued confrontation. It would also have brought renewed attention to Haribhadra's work on pluralism, and provided a philosophical ground for remembering Haribhadra's techniques for establishing the value and practice of openness and tolerance which had helped their survival through the centuries.

By examining the actual writings of Haribhadra, no evidence can be found that he harbored or manifested violent tendencies. Because of the late date of the nephew stories and because they seem to be patterned on earlier stories told in the *Kathakośa*, a text unrelated to Haribhadra, I would like to suggest that these tales in fact were a veiled reference to a contemporary situation, reflecting Jain difficulties in the presence of Islam. What lessons can be learned from this suggestion by the thirteenth and fourteenth century story-tellers that people under duress can learn from the life of Haribhadra? What do these stories of Haribhadra convey to us? What can be learned about surviving in a climate of religious hostility from the wisdom of Haribhadra?

Human cruelty to other human beings knows no bounds. Even well intentioned, upright people (in the stories told by Prabhacandra and Rāṣaśekharaśūri, even Haribhadra himself) can be prompted into violent acts of hatred and revenge. A fascinating recent work by John Conroy, *Unspoken Acts: Ordinary People*, tells how Irish, Israelis, and Kosovans were coerced out of their human

heartedness to become torturers<sup>20</sup> Thich Nhat Hanh, in his poem "Call Me By My True Names" reminds his readers and listeners that one can be a victim, such as the defenseless boat girl raped by a pirate that he describes. But one can also become a perpetrator. Thich Nhat Hanh writes, "I am [also] the pirate, my heart not yet capable of seeing and loving"<sup>21</sup>

Haribhadra of lore and Haribhadra the author left two legacies. Though clearly without historical basis, the Haribhadra stories have indicated that he staged espionage, sent his innocent nephews into the camp of the "other," and in his rage when they were discovered and punished, put to death hundreds of Buddhists. Haribhadra the philosopher and theologian promulgated a style of thinking that fosters a quest for self-understanding and respect for the views of others. His gentle message, as we have seen, urges one not to be aggressive in one's views but to teach by example, always striving for greater purity and truth. The first Haribhadra seeks and obtains revenge. The second Haribhadra attempts to work for reconciliation, or at least peaceful co-existence. Martha Minow, in a comprehensive survey of contemporary attempts at conflict resolution, outlines the approaches to overcome the pain of wrongs committed.

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<sup>20</sup> John Conroy, *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2000).

<sup>21</sup> Christopher S. Queen and Sallie B. King (eds.), *Engaged Buddhism: Buddhist Liberation Movements in Asia* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 339.

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Responses to collective violence lurch among rhetorics of history (truth), theology (forgiveness), justice (punishment, compensation , and deterrence), therapy (healing), art (commemoration and disturbance), and education (learning lessons) None is adequate Yet, invoking these rhetorics through collective steps such as prosecutions, truth commissions, memorials, and education, people wager that social responses can alter the emotional experiences of individuals and societies living after mass violence Perhaps rather than seeking revenge, people can come to desire to rebuild <sup>22</sup>

For Haribhadra the philosopher, his desire to be of a friendly mind to people of all faiths most likely stemmed from a process of self-reflection prompted by his atoning for his youthful hubris His approaches to philosophical pluralism mirror, at least, two of the ideas put forth by Martha Minow he attempts to truthfully present rival views and he works to educate One might also find therapeutic aspects of his way of thinking and find art and beauty in his elegant use of language The violent Haribhadra of lore does not fulfill any of these qualities, even his attempt at justice falls short of adequate or ethical

The Jain tradition does allow its lay adherents to protect themselves and perhaps use violence as a last resort However, the best of self-protection entails

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<sup>22</sup> Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston Beacon Press, 1998), p 147

advance thinking, alertness, and an unwillingness to place oneself in a potentially harmful situation. Furthermore, *karma* theory prompts any person committed to nonviolence to first engage in an honest process of self-reflection. What cause underlies any occasion for violence? Does the fault lie within oneself? What further disturbances will be caused by a violent response? By understanding the complex net of *karmic* repercussions, the thoughtful Jain, rather than acting from a place of anger, will attempt to apply an analysis that takes into account some form of introspection, forgiveness, and reconciliation. A cultural expression of this can be found in the ritual of asking forgiveness for even an unintended wrong that characterizes Jain ritual life.

In the context of an increasing occurrence of violence in our world, the Haribhadra story of violence and the Haribhadra philosophy of tolerance offer two distinct types of solutions. One could respond in kind, as in the US bombing in Afghanistan and in the alleged description of Haribhadra luring Buddhists to their death. Conversely, one could examine the root sources of discontent, examine if one finds oneself totally free of guilt, and explore one of the many avenues suggested recently by Martha Minow, and earlier by Haribhadra, the medieval philosopher through his writings, such as forgiveness, healing, and education.

How can one guard against the infinite varieties of human cruelty and violence including assent to "retributive justice"? What practice can serve as an antidote for a human being's descent into inhumanity? I would like to suggest that remembrance and mindfulness of one's own humanity and the humanity of the other even

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in times of difficulty must be maintained. In his grief and rage, Haribhadra is, in the telling of his story, said to have tortured 700 or even 1440 Buddhists to the point of death. The scale of Haribhadra's mythic revenge reminds us that, even with the best of intentions, human beings are capable of violence because of firmly held religious convictions. Vigilance is needed to keep to the precept put forth by Haribhadra, the philosopher and author, that "one must maintain compassion even toward those with excessive sin." Only by adhering to this most difficult measure of forgiveness can one break the cycle of violence.

### **III**

## **Jainism in History Textbooks and in Art and Epigraphy**



## **Jainism and Mahāvira in Indian History Textbooks**

TARA SETHIA

**T**extbooks for college courses play a critical role in the process of learning. In many courses they serve as "authentic" sources of knowledge for students, who may know little about the subject matter. This is particularly true in case of survey courses such as History of India taught in the United States. One of the topics students are most interested in learning about India is the Indic religions. Of the major Indian religions, Jainism is the least discussed in the history textbooks. In this paper, I focus on the representation of Jainism and Mahāvira in Indian History textbooks.

Jainism, as we know today, is primarily rooted in the teachings of Mahāvira, and is India's ancient most *Śramana* tradition. The Jain canonical literature, the *Āgamas*, not only serve a significant role within the tradition but are also regarded as primary sources for historians and social scientists, especially in writing about early periods of Indian history. Jainism has a rich history of art and architecture as seen in the temples, *derasars*, *sthanakas*, etc; and is also vital to the understanding of India's spiritual and philosophical traditions. Its fundamental principle of

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The eight textbooks examined in this paper are written by internationally known scholars of India from Britain, Germany, India, and the United States, and are published by reputable publishers. Some of these books have been reprinted more than once. However, references to these textbooks in this paper are from the editions listed below.

John Keay, *India* (New York: Grove, 2000)

Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India* (London: Routledge, third edition, 1998)

David Ludden, *India and South Asia: A Short History* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002)

Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of India* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

Peter Robb, *A History of India* (New York: Palgrave, 2002)

Burton Stein, *History of India* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, third edition, 2000)

Romila Thapar, *A History of India* (New York: Penguin, reprinted in 1990)

Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India* (New York: Oxford University Press, sixth edition, 2000)

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*Jainism and New Spirituality* (Peace Publications, 2002). P. S. Jaini's essays on Jainism over the years have been reprinted recently as *Collected Papers on Jaina Studies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000).

*ahimsa* is highly relevant to contemporary inquiries in ecology, peace studies, and bioethics. Therefore, the study of this religion, like that of Hinduism and Buddhism, is important not only to the understanding of continuity and change in Indian history, but is important also for appreciating the place of our past in our future.

In reviewing several leading college textbooks of Indian History, however, I find a very different message. In these textbooks the coverage of Jainism is less than adequate and its representation in the historical narrative is often superficial, warped and, in some instances, even diversionary and reminiscent of orientalism. This is particularly puzzling given the growing scholarship pertaining to Indian religions. Even Jainism, which is not quite as established a field of study as Hinduism or Buddhism, has elicited a great deal of scholarly interest in the recent years.<sup>1</sup> Yet, the majority of textbooks on Indian History do not appear to draw upon such scholarship.

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<sup>1</sup> Beginning with the publication of Padmanabh S. Jaini's *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), which is regarded like a primary source among Jain scholars, several key works have appeared recently. Of particular merit are the following: Paul Dundas, *The Jains* (London: Routledge, 1992, revised edition, 2002), Kendall W. Folkert, *Scripture and Community: Collected Essays on the Jains*, ed. by John E. Cort (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), Nathmal Tatia (ed. and trans.), *Umasvati's Tattvartha Sutra That Which Is* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1994), Lawrence Babb, *The Absent Lord* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), John E. Cort, *Jains in the World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), Christopher Key Chapple (ed.), *Jainism and Ecology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), Vastupal Parikh,

Based on my review of these eight textbooks, it appears that for the most part the authors' portrayal of Jainism in the context of Indian History is dictated by the assumption that religion is a matter of antiquity and, therefore, does not deserve any discussion in the historical narrative of subsequent time periods. Within the context of the ancient period, coverage of Jainism in most of these textbooks appears to lack depth, and at times also in accuracy. That is, in their discussion, the majority of authors are more occupied with the description of physical appearances rather than principles, more concerned with the seemingly exotic and strange customs without regard to the understanding of key concepts and values they embody. There is also a tendency to present religions as uniform systems disregarding the diversity that characterizes each of the Indic religions. In *what* is said about Jainism and Mahāvira in these textbooks, and also *how* it is said there, I see a variety of problems that can broadly be categorized as follows: i) inadequate coverage, ii) misconception, iii) flawed comparison, iv) misrepresentation, and v) neo-orientalism.

### **I Inadequate Coverage**

I fully recognize that given the longevity and complexity of Indian History, a textbook can only provide limited space to the discussion of various topics. Given such limitation, however, it is even more important that whatever information is provided on any topic is truly germane to the understanding of the topic, is balanced and historically supported. To assess the adequacy of coverage of Jainism in these texts, I have asked the following questions: Is the coverage of this topic

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substantive for a college textbook? Is the information provided germane to the proper understanding of Jainism? Is the interpretation balanced and fact-based?

Response to these questions may differ from one reviewer to the other, but it is possible to arrive at some consensus on what might be covered for a proper understanding of Jainism in the context of Indian History. For instance, it will be reasonable to expect to learn about Jainism from an Indian History textbook in terms of the following: What was the larger historical context and milieu in which Jainism emerged and subsequently evolved? How is Mahavira represented in Indian History? What do we learn about his world-view, key concepts, and fundamental teachings or lessons? What do we learn about the followers, patrons, and persecutors of Jainism? What has been the larger significance of Jainism in terms of the historical change and impact within and outside India? Equally important is the question of how this information about Jain tradition is integrated in the larger scheme of historical narrative about India.

My analysis suggests that the extent and quality of coverage about Jainism varies a great deal in the textbooks under review. However, by and large, the coverage of Jainism is less than adequate partly because political history appears as a predominant focus in many of these textbooks. I will briefly discuss each of these books in terms of its approach and coverage of this topic.

*A Concise History of India* by Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf, in spite of what the title might suggest, is about history of India since the Mughals. This textbook has no discussion of Jainism at all. The term "Jains" and

the name Mahavira appear in the Glossary, but are not discussed in the body of the book <sup>2</sup>

*A History of India* by Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund devotes just a couple of sentences mentioning Mahavira. This brevity of coverage by itself is not the only problem. The larger problem arises from the nature of the content and the historical context in which these few sentences appear. Consider the following paragraph:

The new Gangetic civilisation found its spiritual expression in a reform movement which was a reaction to the Brahmin-Kshatriya alliance of Late Vedic age. This reform movement is mainly identified with the teachings of Gautama Buddha who is regarded as the first historic figure in Indian history. The Buddha, however, was not the only great reformer of the age. There was also Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, who is supposed to have been a younger contemporary of Buddha. It could be said that Mahavira's teachings reappeared in the rigorous ethics of Mahatma Gandhi, who was influenced by Jainism as he grew up in Gujarati Bania family, the Banias being a dominant traders' caste. <sup>3</sup>

The passage has problems ranging from a lack of focus to inaccurate historical facts, from problems of

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<sup>2</sup> See Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of India* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. ix-xx.

<sup>3</sup> Hermann Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund, *A History of India* (London: Routledge 1986, 1990, 1998), pp. 51-52.

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definition to the problems of interpretation<sup>4</sup> Jainism as it has survived today is largely based on Mahāvira's teachings. However, within the Jain tradition, Mahāvira is regarded as the last *Tirthankara* or spiritual teacher in the current cycle of twenty-four *Tirthankaras*—none of whom is designated as the "founder." Each of these spiritual teachers revives Jainism which is believed to have existed from beginningless time. There is, however, some historical evidence corroborating to the presence of Jainism at least in the ninth century B.C.E., and Pārśvanātha, the twenty-third *Tirthankara*, is regarded as an historical figure<sup>5</sup>.

*India and South Asia: A Short History* by David Ludden begins with a recognition that South Asian history "is not a singular history." Yet, we find that Jainism and Mahāvira are merely mentioned in the context of

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<sup>4</sup> To my knowledge, there is no credible historical account which has traced Indian history from a single individual. However, there is significant history of India, by all accounts, prior to the times of Buddha. Even though the dates surrounding Buddha and Mahāvira are not absolutely certain, most historical accounts place Mahāvira as the senior contemporary of Buddha.

While Gandhi was undoubtedly influenced, to an extent, by Jainism. However, such influence was primarily because of his ten-years of close association with Shrimad Rajchandra, a dedicated Jain scholar, as noted by Gandhi himself in his autobiography. For further discussion of Jainism and Gandhi, see Stephen Hay, "Jain Influence on Gandhi's Early Thought," in Sivanarayan Ray (ed.), *Gandhi, India and the World* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1970), pp. 29-38.

<sup>5</sup> For more details, see Padmanabh S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path to Purification*, op. cit., pp. 1-2, 10 and footnotes 2, 16-19.

Brahmanism and Buddhism in early India According to him the three had "much in common including their vast cosmology and complex ideas about reincarnation"<sup>6</sup> While Brahmanism, and to an extent even Buddhism, is discussed in some detail, it is not clear, in what ways Jainism was different from other religious traditions in India, or what its contributions were in the larger context of Indian civilization

*A History of India* by Peter Robb devotes a short paragraph to Jainism in early India, and revisits it marginally and only in the context of medieval kings such as Kharavela and Kumarapala who were influenced by it Mahavira is represented as an organizer and instructor to his disciples for the preservation of his teachings<sup>7</sup> One does not, however, get any understanding of what these teachings were

*India A History* by John Keay is, according to the author, "not a cultural history of India, let alone history of Indian cults"<sup>8</sup> There is merely a mention of Mahavira during the time of Buddha, and reference to Jains and Jainism appear in several places but in ways diminishing the essence of this tradition

*A New History of India* by Stanley Wolpert does touch upon a variety of the issues pertaining to Jainism such as the larger historical context and Mahavira's milieu,

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<sup>6</sup> David Ludden, *India and South Asia A Short History* (Oxford Oneworld Publications, 2002), pp 5, 25

<sup>7</sup> Peter Robb, *A History of India* (New York Palgrave, 2002), p 14

<sup>8</sup> John Keay, *India* (New York Grove, 2000), p xix



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and discusses some of its doctrines<sup>9</sup> However, the discussion of Jainism is located mainly in the context of ancient India, and the representation of Mahavira and his teachings, at times, is misleading in nature

*History of India* by Burton Stein attempts to trace the religious developments beyond the ancient period, but is repetitive<sup>10</sup> Moreover, Stein is concerned more with the extraneous, the seemingly strange and the alien aspects of Indic traditions, including Jainism, than their key concepts and principles Often, his statements about Jainism are contradictory and confusing

Unlike other textbooks reviewed here, *A History of India* by Romila Thapar effectively weaves the discussion of Jainism along with her discussion of Buddhism throughout the narrative of her book<sup>11</sup> The role of the Jains and the Buddhists in making India and Indian sciences known to the West is discussed Also discussed in the narrative is Jain and Buddhist art and sculpture We learn about the presence of Jain tradition prior to Mahavira We are also informed that Mahavira's teachings were at first confined to eastern India and were preserved as oral tradition However, the discussion of these teachings—the most significant aspect of Jainism—is somewhat lacking in clarity and substance

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<sup>9</sup> Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp 52-54

<sup>10</sup> Burton Stein, *History of India* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2000)

<sup>11</sup> Romila Thapar, *A History of India* (New York: Penguin, 1991)

While more specific aspects of these books are discussed in the sections that follow, I do want to underscore that the coverage of Mahāvīra and Jainism in majority of these books is far from adequate. Discussion of Jainism is marginalized and is primarily anchored in ancient India. From majority of these books we neither gain a proper understanding of the key principles of Jainism nor do we learn about the significance of Jainism and its role in Indian history. The discussion of its core principle, *ahimsa*, which has variously influenced social, political, peace and environmental movements,<sup>12</sup> is, at best, superficial in nature.

## **II. Misconceptions**

Misconceptions about Jainism abound, and range from the meaning of simple names and terms to the understanding of its nature and key concepts. A few examples will illustrate the points I wish to make.

### *Nature of Jainism*

There is great amount of misconception about the nature of Jainism. In the textbooks under review, Jainism is sometimes described as an “atheistic” religion<sup>13</sup>. But in another view Jainism appears to be polytheistic when *Tīrthankaras* are portrayed as “the Jain equivalents of

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<sup>12</sup> For a discussion of Jain worldview and its significance for an enduring ecological vision to address global ecological crises, see Chapple (ed.) *Jainism and Ecology*, *op cit*

<sup>13</sup> Robb, p 14; Stein, pp 64-65; Thapar, pp 64, 66. Thapar does avoid the use of the word “atheistic” in her discussion of Jainism in the recently published, *Early India* (London: Penguin, 2002).

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gods”<sup>14</sup> Though these are quite contradictory views, they both result from the use of a western framework for “mapping” the nature of Jainism. Neither interpretation provides a proper understanding of the nature of Jainism. A more meaningful, and a more accurate, analysis could emerge by focusing on the worldview of the Jains. Essential to the Jain worldview is the fact that the existents in the cosmos have neither a beginning nor an end, and hence the concept of creator God is irrelevant here. The Jains do venerate *Tirthankaras*. Many Jains even worship *Tirthankaras* and dedicate temples to them. And yet, *Tirthankaras* are not regarded as “gods” of a polytheistic tradition. In the polytheistic traditions the gods and goddesses possess varying levels of power, making some more powerful than others, and they are regarded as capable of doing personal good when pleased or harm when displeased. In contrast, *Tirthankaras* are omniscient human teachers—all equally venerable sources of inspiration for the Jains seeking their ultimate goal of *moksa*, the release from the cycle of rebirth. The *Tirthankaras* have the most vital roles as “fordmakers.” As builders of the ford that lead across the ocean of suffering, it is they who preach the path to *moksa*.<sup>15</sup>

### *Mahavira and the Jains*

While students recognize that the term “Buddhist” comes from the Buddha, they usually do not know the

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<sup>14</sup> Wolpert, p. 53

<sup>15</sup> For an insightful discussion of the Jain world view and the role of ffordmakers, see P. S. Jaini, *Jaina Path, op cit*, pp. 29-34, and Paul Dundas, *The Jains* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 19-22.

origin of the word, "Jain" In one of the books, Mahavira's name appears as "Mahavira Jain," and therefore, Jains are followers of Mahavira <sup>16</sup> "Jain" was not Mahavira's family name It derives from the Sanskrit term *Jina*, literally meaning the "conqueror" It does not refer to "spiritual conflict" as assumed by Burton Stein <sup>17</sup> The Jains use the word *Jina* as an epithet to describe those human teachers who became spiritual conquerors after completely overcoming anger and attachment, attained omniscience, and preached the path to *moksa* (liberation from the cycle of rebirth) The *Jina* are also referred to as *Tirthankaras* who preach and propagate the truth Jains are, therefore, followers of the *Jina* <sup>18</sup>

#### *Key Concepts and Teachings*

What did Mahavira teach? These books offer us a range of interpretations of his teachings, but not any substantive discussion of what these were We are told, Mahavira, like Buddha, "taught an ascetic world-denying philosophical and ethical system" <sup>19</sup> But, we never learn about the nature of this ethical system or even its principal precepts The Jains believe, according to one author, "everything in the universe, material or otherwise, has a soul Purification of soul is the purpose of living purification is not achieved through knowledge, knowledge being a relative quality" <sup>20</sup> Such statements

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<sup>16</sup> Metcalf and Metcalf, pp xix, xx

<sup>17</sup> Stein, p 69

<sup>18</sup> P S Jaini, *The Jaina Path to Purification*, op cit, pp 1-3

<sup>19</sup> Metcalf and Metcalf, p xx

<sup>20</sup> Thapar, p 65 This is also maintained in her recently published book, *Early India*, pp 166-167

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result from misunderstandings of the Jain worldview. First, Jainism maintains that there are two major categories of existents: *jīva* (soul or living) and *ajīva* (matter or non-living).<sup>21</sup> Hence not everything in the universe has life. Secondly, knowledge in its highest form, which in Jainism is known as *kevalajñāna*, is a precondition for liberation. Also, the significance that knowledge occupies within this tradition is underscored in the dictum from the *Dāsavaikalika Sūtra*, “*padhamam nānam tvaṃ dayā*,” that is, first knowledge, then compassion.<sup>22</sup>

### *Jains in India and Abroad*

Some of the common impression given in these texts can be illustrated by the statements such as the following: Jains are prominent in Gujarat and Bombay.<sup>23</sup> And, unlike Buddhism, Jainism “never spread beyond India.”<sup>24</sup> These statements suggest that Jainism has been a localized or regional religion and raise questions in the minds of the textbook readers: Are there any Jains in other parts of India? Did Jainism ever spread outside of India?

According to the 1991 Census of India, Jains are spread all over in India, with major concentrations in Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Delhi—the largest concentration being in Rajasthan.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, Jainism in the modern times,

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<sup>21</sup> See Chapple, *Nonviolence to Animals*, op cit, p 11

<sup>22</sup> For a discussion of the primacy of knowledge in Jain world-view, see Dundas, *The Jains*, pp 160-163

<sup>23</sup> See Wolpert, p 54, Metcalf and Metcalf, p 1xx

<sup>24</sup> Stein, p 70

<sup>25</sup> 1991 Census of India Table C-9, Part VB (u) - Religion

especially in the twentieth century, has spread to many different parts of the world via Jain diasporas

### **III. Flawed Comparisons**

Comparative analysis is a good way of learning and teaching as it allows us to understand similarities and distinctiveness about things we compare. A precondition to an effective comparative analysis, however, is that we first understand on their own terms and within their own contexts the people, principles, concepts or whatever we wish to compare. When comparisons occur as a way of simply "mapping religions" without clarifying the individual categories of discussion, there is the risk of distortion and misunderstanding. One of the tendencies in the books under review is to often "map" Jainism through comparisons with Buddhism, and/or with Vedic and Upanisadic thought, without first discussing within each tradition the categories and concepts being compared.

#### *Comparisons with Brahmanism and Buddhism*

According to one textbook, "Brahmanism, Buddhism and Jainism represented three solutions to fundamental problems of human existence and political order"<sup>26</sup>. However, what were these problems and solutions are not specified. According to another textbook, the problem of beginningless cycle of rebirth for the Jains may be brought to an end by "complete self-abnegation and profound contemplation"<sup>27</sup>. Here the problem and solution are identified, but what exactly such a solution entails and how is this different from the Buddhist path to

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<sup>26</sup> Ludden, p. 25

<sup>27</sup> Robb, p. 14

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salvation is not discussed. Comparing Jainism and Buddhism, one author notes,

Jainism was even more essentially moralistic in its outlook than Buddhism, with an even greater emphasis on austerity and mendicant monasticism as the sole route to salvation.<sup>28</sup>

The unclear relationship between morality and mendicant monasticism in the above statement does not allow us to understand how Jainism was more moralistic than Buddhism. Therefore, such comparisons fail to provide any meaningful insight into the nature or extent of Jain or Buddhist morality. The categories for making comparisons could have been, for example, the notions of nonviolence and compassion in the two traditions.

### *Ātman versus jīva*

The comparisons made in some of these textbooks confuse categories and concepts being compared. Take for instance the following statement:

Like *ātman*, all *jīva* are eternal, but in contrast to Upanishadic idealism, there is no Jain equivalent to the infinite cosmic *ātman*, only a finite number (millions of billions) of various degrees of *jīva*, some much more powerful than others.<sup>29</sup>

Here the focus on contrasting the “infinite number” with the “finite number” of the souls is flawed, as the comparison is made on the basis of incorrect information. The number of *jīva* conceived within the Jain

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<sup>28</sup> Stein, p. 69

<sup>29</sup> Wolpert, p. 53

world view are not finite but *ananta*, or infinite<sup>30</sup> The contrast between the very nature of *atman* and *jiva* can, however, help illuminate a different worldview within each tradition In the *Upanisads* all *atman* are part of the cosmic *atman*, while under Jainism, each *jiva* is an independent, autonomous entity, fully responsible for its own acts (*karma*) and destiny<sup>31</sup>

### *Concept of Karma*

The following passage compares the concept of *karma* among the Brahmanical, Jain and Buddhist traditions

Karma means work or act, and in formulation of Vedic ritual manuals, 'action' referred to ritual and ceremonial performances so meticulously executed as to compel the gods to act in obedience to them For Buddhists and Jainas, however, karma referred to the acts of ordinary men and women, the sums of whose lifetime behavior determined the body in which the soul (*atman*) would be reborn in the process of transmigration (*samsara*) Upon death, that is, souls were thought to pass from one to another body and associated social condition The idea that every good action brought a measure of happiness and each bad action sorrow tended to suggest a mechanical moral process leading to fatalism<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Nagin J Shah (trans) *Jaina Philosophy and Religion* by Muni Shri Nyayavijayaji (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000), p 8

<sup>31</sup> Nathmal Tatia (trans) *Tattvartha Sutra*, op cit, 5 21, pp xx and 131

<sup>32</sup> Stein, p 66



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The above comparison ignores the fact that the role of *karma* is defined differently in Buddhism and Jainism-- which are lumped together in comparing the concept of *karma* in these two traditions with that of *karma* in Brahmanism<sup>33</sup> While all Indian traditions accept the idea of *karma*, there are significant differences among them in the ways in which they develop this concept as a coherent doctrine. In this context, the Jain tradition, in the words of P S Jaini, "stands clearly apart" from all other Indian traditions. This is attested by the large number of texts within Jain scriptures which deal with the complex sets of issues related to the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth. The Jains regard *karma* as matter in contrast to the *samskara* of the Hindus and *biya* of the Buddhists<sup>34</sup>. Jain concept of *karma* is highly developed to include variety of *karmic forms* -- all of which result not just from actions of individuals, but also from the intensity of emotions (*bhava*). Moreover, such comparison assumes a logical connection between *karma* and fatalism which is misleading. Fatalism disregards the role of human agency, while *karma* in Jainism recognizes the role of human agency in shaping one's fate.

The examples above illustrate the flawed nature of comparisons made in many of the textbooks under review.

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<sup>33</sup> Similar comparison is made by Ludden. See p. 25.

<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of doctrine of *karma* in Jainism and how it differs from *karma* in other Indic traditions, see P S Jaini, "Karma and the Problem of Rebirth in Jainism," in Jaini (ed.), *Collected Papers on Jain Studies* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000), pp. 121-145 and note 2 on p. 139.

Such comparisons not only fail to provide a substantive understanding of Jainism, and for that matter, of Buddhism and Brahmanism to which it is being compared, but also fail to recognize the uniqueness of these traditions and their specific contributions to the growth of religious and philosophical thought in India

#### **IV Misrepresentation**

Most problematic for the proper understanding of Jainism and its distinctive contributions to Indian philosophical and religious thought is the serious misrepresentations made about Mahavira and his teachings. The following passages not only distort Mahavira's *sadhana* and its significance but also factually misrepresent Mahavira

like the Buddha, he [Mahavira] abandoned his hedonistic life to become a wandering ascetic. He not only went naked, but also advocated and practiced self-torture and death by starvation. Though it took him thirteen years from the time he resolved to starve himself to death before he finally succeeded in doing so.<sup>35</sup>

After thirteen years, often as a naked ascetic, he attained enlightenment and thereafter taught his doctrine in the kingdom of the Ganges region before succumbing to a ritual of slow starvation near the Magadhan capital of Rajagriha around 400 BCE.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Wolpert, pp 52-53

<sup>36</sup> Stein, p 70

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The thirteen years referred to in both passages above represent the most significant phase in Mahāvira's life as a *Tirthankara*. His *sadhana* as detailed in the *Ācaranga-sūtra*, during which he frequently fasted, sometimes for a very long period of time, and often without water (total days when he took food during the period of almost thirteen years is said to be 349), practiced austerities (misportrayed as "self-torture") and renounced all attachment, including the attachment to his body. Following his *sadhana*, Mahāvira attained *kevalajñāna* (infinite knowledge), and became omniscient. At the end of this period of *sadhana*, Mahāvira did not die, as the first passage above informs us, but he lived as a teacher for nearly thirty years, before he became a *siddha* (liberated soul) after his *nirvāṇa* in Pavapuri, near modern city of Patna.<sup>37</sup> One wonders, then, what are the sources for such distortions, and inaccurate historical detail? The significance of Mahāvira, arguably the greatest apostle of nonviolence, and his *sadhana* has been missed in both these accounts. Since the principles inspiring Mahāvira's renunciation in pursuit of *mokṣa* are not part of the "mapping" strategies used by Wolpert and Stein, their representations are simply of the extraneous, and thus fail to provide any insight into the wisdom and essence of such principles.

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<sup>37</sup> The information in this paragraph has been compiled from Padmanabh S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification*, *op cit*, pp. 25-37, including footnotes. Mahāvira's *nirvāṇa* is usually placed by many scholars in 527 B.C.E.

*Jain Principle of Ahimsa*

Another misrepresentation centers on the principle of *ahimsa* (nonviolence), the core principle of Jainism. One author represents nonviolence as "an obsession" for the Jains.<sup>38</sup> Another author after recognizing the complete dedication in Jainism to the principle of *ahimsa*, states, 'the only living being a devout Jain was encouraged to "kill" was himself, through starvation, though such a death would be viewed as liberated "birth" of one's hitherto entrapped *jiva*. More than two thousand years after Mahāvira's suicide, Gandhi was to revive the fast-unto-death as a political weapon.'<sup>39</sup> Such interpretations of Jain commitment to nonviolence distort the very centrality of *ahimsa* to Jain worldview, and the way it is interpreted within the Jain tradition. *Ahimsa* is regarded as the supreme virtue (*ahimsa paramo dharmah*). Under Jainism violence or injury to any living beings is considered violence to self and is a major impediment for one's liberation.<sup>40</sup> There is no evidence to suggest that any Jain was encouraged to commit suicide. And, as pointed out earlier, Mahāvira certainly did no such thing. *Sallekhana* is practiced among the Jains and is regarded as the "most

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<sup>38</sup> Thapar, p. 65

<sup>39</sup> Wolpert, p. 54

<sup>40</sup> For an insightful discussion of nonviolence in Jainism, see P. S. Jaini, "Ahimsa: A Jain Way of Spiritual Discipline," in Jaini (ed.) *Collected Papers*, *op cit*, pp. 3-19, and Christopher Key Chapple, *Nonviolence to Animals, Earth, and Self in Asian Traditions*, *op cit*, pp. 9-15.

auspicious way that life can end.”<sup>41</sup> The practice of *sallekhana* results from a heightened sense of consciousness internalizing the separateness of one’s body (the transient) from one’s soul (the eternal) which helps one to give up any sense of attachment even to one’s body, a great commitment to the principle of *aparigraha*

#### V. Neo-Orientalism?

Nineteenth century Indological discourse was characterized either by the Romantic notions of India which represented the mystical and the exotic in things Indian or by the Positivist and Utilitarian views of India which expressed a sense of contempt and disdain about India. Neo-orientalist discourse is simultaneously mystical and disdainful. Representing people, culture or even ideas in this fashion makes it easier for one to dismiss what might be actually significant about them. The following description of the historical milieu of Buddha and Mahāvira is a case in point

Rival holy men swarm across the countryside performing feats of endurance, disputing one another’s spiritual credentials and vying with one another for followers and patronage. Saints or charlatans, they evidently mirrored a society to which the paranormal, the supernatural and metaphysical had a strong appeal. Many of them went naked or unwashed and they cheerfully flouted the taboos of caste system. Defying social convention, they yet enjoyed society’s indulgence. Renunciation had become

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<sup>41</sup> Chapple, *Nonviolence, op cit*, pp 99-109, Also see Jain, *The Jaina Path, op cit*, pp 227-233

an accepted way of life in which asceticism was seen as a prerequisite to spiritual enlightenment. The philosophies on offer from this rag-tag army of reformers ranged from the mind boggling mysticism to defiant nihilism and blank agnosticism, from the outright materialism of the Lokayats to the heavy determinism of the Ajivikas, from the rationalism of the Buddha to the esotericism of Mahavira.<sup>42</sup>

The above description about the sixth century BCE India appears to employ what Richard Inden calls "the curious metaphors"<sup>43</sup>. In the above passage the author simultaneously uses mystical and scornful expressions which paint certain images in the minds of the reader. The reader is burdened with philosophical terms without a clue to their meaning.

Keay's preoccupation with the trivial and sensational remains a hallmark of such analysis. Without digressing, let me give one more example of this characteristic in the context of the topic of this paper. While no significant space is provided to the discussion of key concepts and teachings of Mahavira, one is struck by the way the reference to Jain tradition is made in the book. In the context of Alexander the Great's campaign, Keay introduces and discusses at length a person named 'Calanus' whom he considers "a figure worth

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<sup>42</sup> Keay, pp 63-64

<sup>43</sup> Richard Inden, *Imagining India* (Cambridge Basil Blackwell, 1990), *op cit*, p 1. Inden questions the orientalist discourse in the study of India, following the seminal work of Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York Pantheon, 1978).

remembering" as he was the first Indian expatriate. Preoccupied with chronology and dates, Keay is able to assign Calanus a date as he accompanied Alexander to Persia and died shortly before the latter did, without making any impact on the Greeks. However, unable to assign him to a particular philosophical school, he tells us the following

Calanus and his friends went naked, a condition, in which no Greek could be persuaded to join them, they may have been *miganthia* or Jains. Jain nudity was dictated by that sect's meticulous respect for life in all its forms. Clothes were taboos because the wearer might inadvertently crush any insect concealed in them, similarly death had to be so managed that only the dying would actually die. Jains bent on ending their life, therefore, usually starved themselves to death. Yet Calanus, a man of advanced years, chose to immolate himself on his own funeral pyre. Though an extraordinarily stoical sacrifice in Greek eyes, this was a decidedly careless move for one dedicated to avoiding casual insecticide. Evidently the Persian winter had induced a chill, if not pneumonia, and Calanus had decided it was better to die than be an encumbrance. No one, not even Alexander can dissuade him from his purpose. He strode to his cremation at the head of an enormous procession and reclined upon the pyre with complete indifference. This composure he maintained even as the flames frazzled his flesh.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Keay, pp 76-77

This out-of-context association with Jainism (for which no evidence is provided) with the appeal of an eyewitness account creates a new genre of orientalism. It denigrates and distorts Jainism at the same time, especially for those who are unfamiliar with the tradition. Even a basic familiarity with the core tenets of Jainism would show that nudity—which is only practiced by the Digambaras—is not related to the vow of nonviolence (*ahimsa*), but to the vow of non-attachment (*aparigraha*). Furthermore, fire (*agni kaya*) under Jainism is considered as one of the six forms in which the Jiva reside. Therefore, self-immolation by fire will be unacceptable to a Jain as it violates the cardinal principle of nonviolence.

Stein too is more concerned with what might appear as strange and exotic in Jainism rather than with the discussion of its core principles. Nearly three pages are devoted to the issues pertaining to female salvation, where the discussion of female biology and sexual orientations become a preoccupation with the author.<sup>45</sup> This concern for the extraneous and strange is apparent from the following:

Both sides [referring to Śvetāmbara and Digāmbara] recognized that in addition to the three bodily sexual forms, male, female and hermaphrodite, each form could have sexual feelings more usual in one of the other forms. Thus, they acknowledged the existence of not only homosexuality, but lesbianism and bisexuality, and did so without the usual anathematizing of traditional religions. In fact,

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<sup>45</sup> Stein, pp 70-73



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the Digambara argued that scriptural evidence that might be taken to mean that women were eligible for nirvana without having first been reborn as male really referred to men with female sexual orientation, i.e. to homosexual men <sup>46</sup>

The above is not supported by any evidence or footnote and is a serious misrepresentation of a tradition that emphasized *brahmacarya* or celibacy as one of the five key principles <sup>47</sup>

These passages from Keay and Stein not only exemplify their preoccupation with extraneous elements in a tradition, but, more importantly, raise a larger issue for the integrity of the discipline of history. By focusing on issues not central to the topic, such interpretations become diversionary in nature and at best serve to provide a superficial and distorted understanding of the topic devoid of its essence. Moreover, students reading such analysis may be tempted to follow an example of "doing history" without proper evidence and supporting citations

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<sup>46</sup> Stein, p. 72

<sup>47</sup> This is not an isolated example of Stein's selective emphasis on extraneous aspects while missing the essence of things. In discussing India's one of the most revered leaders, Mahatma Gandhi, Stein is more concerned to point out Gandhi's "idiosyncratic authoritarianism," his "largely malign influence on women," and his preoccupation with sex and untouchability," and is less concerned by his power of *satyagraha* and his sacrifice for the cause of the nation and his people. See Stein, *History of India*, op. cit., pp. 299-302

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion I would like to underscore that my critique in this paper is by no means a reflection on the overall quality and value of these textbooks. Nor is the critique meant to question the expertise of the authors within their fields. The analysis does, however, point to a greater need, using the case of Jainism, for historical accuracy, for a reflection of recent scholarship and research in the writing of textbooks, for inclusion of those aspects of a topic which are germane to its proper understanding, for a balanced interpretation of key concepts and ideas which make up a religious and philosophical tradition, and their significance in the larger context of Indian history and culture.

## Exemplars of Anekānta and Ahimsā: The Case of the Early Jains of Mathura in Art and Epigraphy

SONYA R QUINTANILLA

The earliest surviving representations of the Jain monks in art are found in the stone sculptures produced as early as the second century B C E at Mathura, a city located about one hundred miles southeast of Delhi. The Jain monks depicted in these early works belonged to a special sect, whose members can be identified by the broad piece of pleated cloth draped over the left forearms of the otherwise nude monks (See especially Figures 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, and 14).<sup>\*</sup> In inscriptions carved on works of art in which these monks appear, they called themselves *Nirgranthas*,<sup>1</sup> a term found in early Buddhist texts to refer

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<sup>\*</sup> All figures referred to in the text appear at the end of this article, beginning with page 207

<sup>1</sup> An example of an inscription in which the term *Nirgrantha* occurs is on a stone plaque carved with two flying *Ardhaphalaka* monks venerating a *stapa* (Figures 5 and 6). It reads as follows

*namo arahato vardhamanasa adaye ganika-  
ye lonasobhikāye dhātu śramanasavikāye*

to their Jain rivals, and literally meaning "those who are free from bonds" Several Jain and Buddhist texts, mostly of much later dates, refer to groups of Jain mendicants who were in one way or another associated with a piece of cloth These texts call them *ekasataka*, *ardhakarpata*, *ardhaphalaka*, *yāpantiya*, or *gopya*<sup>2</sup> In this paper I shall follow the precedent of the few scholars who have discussed these early Jain monks of Mathura and use the

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*nādāye ṣaṇikāye vasuṣṭe arahato devik[u]la ayāgasabha  
prapa sil[a]pato patisth[ā]pito nigathanā(m)  
arahlatayatane sah[a] matare bhaginiye dhitaro putrena  
sarvena ca pariṇanena arahlata pūjaye*

(Translation "Adoration to the arhat Vardhamana! A shrine of the arhat (*arahato devikula*), an assembly hall for an object of worship (*ayāgasabha*), a cistern (*prapa*), and a stone slab (*silapata*) were established in the sanctuary of the Nirgrantha arhats by Vasu, a junior (?) courtesan, [who is] the daughter of Lonaśobhika, the matron (?) courtesan, and the female disciple of the ascetics (*śramanasavika*), with her mother, sister, daughter, son and her whole household, for the sake of honoring of the arhats")

<sup>2</sup> The term *ekasataka* appears in the Pali Buddhist *Samyuttanikaya*. The term *Ardhakarpata* is used by Ramacandra Mumukṣu in the twelfth century in his Sanskrit version of the *Bhadrabāhucarita*. The terms *ardhaphalaka* and *yapana* appear in the *Bhadrabāhukathanaka*, a section of Harisena's *Bṛhatkathakosa* of the tenth century. And, the term, *gopya* is found in a fifteenth-century commentary by Gunaratna on Haribhadra's *Saddarsanasamuccaya*. See Padmanabh S. Jaini, "Jaina Monks from Mathura: Literary Evidence for their Identification on Kusana Sculptures," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (Vol. LVIII, Part 3, 1995), pp. 488, 479 (fn 2), 480, 487.

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term "Ardhaphalaka" to refer to them, though it probably was not the name these monks used for themselves "Ardhaphalaka" is a descriptive epithet which means "those with a partial piece of cloth "

No texts have been found that can be specifically associated with the Ardhaphalakas. Nor are there any texts that clearly identify them and explain their practices. Padmanabh S. Jaini has published a thorough study of passages in literature that might refer to the monks of this sect,<sup>3</sup> but almost all of them were composed many centuries after their demise. "Given the variety of possibilities presented in various sources," concludes Jaini, "a conclusive identification of the sect of these *ardhaphalaka* images on the Mathura sculptures cannot be made from the available literary evidence"<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the contemporaneous art historical and epigraphical records are the most reliable documents for understanding the tenets and mores of the Ardhaphalaka monks of Mathura. Upon examining their depictions in art along with their inscriptions, it becomes evident that the Ardhaphalaka monks of early Mathura were exemplars of *ahimsa* and *anekanta*, and their vigorous adherence to these principles apparently resulted in their being exceptionally prosperous, popular, and influential. Their practices significantly shaped the future of Jainism and Jain art, and, as a dominant religious group at Mathura, they were instrumental in creating a cosmopolitan cultural center where followers of diverse religions peacefully coexisted.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid* , pp 479-494

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid* , p 492

This paper begins with a brief history of the Ardhaphalakas in sculptural representations, followed by a discussion of how we know that they embraced the tenets of *ahimsa* and *anekanta*, despite the lack of Ardhaphalaka Jain treatises. Finally, the paper will also identify some of the benefits resulting from the Ardhaphalakas' practice of *ahimsa* and *anekanta*.

Archaeological evidence suggests that the Ardhaphalaka sect of Jain monks was localized in Mathura, for no trace of them has been found elsewhere. They were active from at least the second century B C E until the end of the Kushan Period in the late third century C E, after which time they were no longer represented in art.<sup>5</sup> They are ubiquitous on pedestals of Jain *Tirthankara* images of the Kushan Period at Mathura (second and third centuries C E), such as the image of Parsva in Figure 1.<sup>6</sup> In the detail of Parsva's pedestal in Figure 2, the Ardhaphalaka monks are shown standing to the left of the central *cakrastambha*. As in all Kushan depictions, the Ardhaphalaka monks are shown holding their distinctive piece of cloth in front of their bodies so as to cover their

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<sup>5</sup> These statements are contingent upon evidence that has been discovered to date and of which the author is aware. They can be modified if conclusive evidence for the existence of monks belonging to the Ardhaphalaka sect is found in a region other than Mathura, at a time earlier than the second century B C E or later than the fourth century C E.

<sup>6</sup> This sculpture of seated *Parśvanatha* in the State Museum, Lucknow (J 113/J 25) is inscribed as having been made in the Year 58 during the reign of the Kushan emperor Huvishka by a donor named Nagasena.

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genitals Such a practice was reviled as heretical by the orthodox Digambaras.

The Ardhapalakas seem to have particularly favored image worship, for more *Jina* icons have been discovered at Mathura than any other region in India during the pre-Kushan and Kushan Periods when the Ardhapalakas were active. Because the monks are so frequently depicted on the pedestals of *Jina* images during the Kushan period, scholars such as N P Joshi, Padmanabh S Jaini, and U P Shah, who have studied the representation of the Ardhapalakas in art, have primarily dealt with sculptures such as these<sup>7</sup> Not previously studied, however, is their presence on Mathura sculptures that significantly predate the Kushan period. Possibly even as early as the second century B C E, in a narrative scene from Mathura depicting the renunciation of the first *Jina* Rsabha, two Ardhapalaka monks may be identified (Figure 3)<sup>8</sup> Though partially obscured by an unfortunate

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<sup>7</sup> U P Shah, *Jaina Rapa Mandana*, New Delhi, 1987, especially pp 5-8, N P Joshi, "Early Jaina Icons from Mathura," in *Mathura The Cultural Heritage*, New Dehli, 1989, pp 332-367, and Padmanabh S Jaini, "Jaina Monks from Mathura Literary Evidence for their Identification on Kusana Sculptures," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol LVIII, part 3, 1995, pp 479-494

<sup>8</sup> The seated figure in the lower right of the group carved in the central portion of the architrave, with the large turban and grasping a pillar of the pavilion, is identifiable as Rsabha prior to his renunciation. At this point in his life Rsabha was a king, witnessing the impending death of the dancing nymph, Nilañjana, under the pavilion. Her death propelled him to renounce the kingly life and become a wandering ascetic. For the

intrusive mortise cut when this architrave was reused as a railing pillar at some later date, portions of two monks are still visible. They are shown nude, with a piece of cloth, and they have been carved next to the earliest identifiable images of *Jinas* in human form. These two nude ascetics are possibly identifiable as Rsabha himself after his renunciation. The smaller of the two holds an alms bowl in his left hand, and a small cloth in his right hand. The larger of the two originally may have held the cloth in his left hand or draped over his left forearm, the damaged condition of the stone makes it impossible to know for certain. At the left end of the frieze are two depictions of the *Jina* Rsabha, seated in meditation, with his distinctive single lock of hair depicted like a pigtail. Following parallel representations in later Jain manuscripts, the one on the right may depict Rsabha in *dhyana*, or meditation, while the second figure may depict him in *kevala samadhi*, or the state of eternal meditative bliss.<sup>9</sup> While this remarkable early relief sculpture of the second century B.C.E. does not depict Ardhaphalaka monks in the usual fashion as seen in later sculptures, it is noteworthy that the representations of nude Jain ascetics on this architrave are both associated with a piece of cloth. This sculpture may represent an early phase in the formation of the

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story of the life of Rsabha, see Champat Rai Jain, *Risabha Deva The Founder of Jainism*, Allahabad, 1929.

<sup>9</sup> An unpublished folio from a manuscript of the life of Rsabha in the San Diego Museum of Art (1990.214), dating to the seventeenth century, depicts two images of Rsabha seated in meditation on block-like pedestals. One is labeled *dhana*, while the other is labeled *kavalasamaya*.



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Ardhaphalaka *sangha*, before the manner of donning the small piece of cloth was clearly codified.

Between the first century B C E and first century C E, the representation of Ardhaphalaka monks in Mathura sculptures appears to have assumed a consistent pattern. The identifying piece of cloth, which we can call a *colapatta*, is invariably draped over the left forearm, as we see in Figures 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, and 14. One of the most common ways in which they are depicted in pre-Kushan art is in flight through the air. The fragment in Figure 4 is from a sculpted relief probably not unlike the one in Figure 5, though it is about one hundred years older. The umbrella in Figure 4 originally would have surmounted a sacred site or object, such as a *stapa*, like the one on the complete relief in Figure 5. The Ardhaphalaka monks in Figures 4 and 5 are shown in a flying posture, hovering in the air at a higher level than the celestial *kinnaras*, who bring garlands or flowers as pious offerings to the site. It is clear that the Ardhaphalakas were considered to be of a higher status than the celestial beings.<sup>10</sup> Their ability to fly through the air as *vidya carana munis*, is indicative of their advanced achievements in meditative practice. In the detail in Figure 6, the Ardhaphalaka monk is shown flying through the air, visibly nude, the *colapatta* draped over his left forearm does not shield his genitals at all. In his left hand he carries a small pot, and his right hand touches his forehead in a gesture of homage and veneration.

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<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of the exalted status of Ardhaphalaka monks see my article "Closer to Heaven than the Gods: Jain Monks in the Art of Pre-Kushan Mathura," *Marg*, March 2001, pp 57-68.

The high status of a flying Ardhaphalaka monk is also to be seen in the carvings on a large tympanum, which may have, when it was intact, formed the top of an imposing arched doorway leading into an Ardhaphalaka precinct of the early first century C E (Figure 7). Only a fraction of the flying nude Ardhaphalaka monk remains on the broken edge in the central register of this tympanum. His leg, bent in the posture of flying, is seen in the detail in Figure 8, as is his arm with the salient *colapatta* draped over the left forearm. The object held over the monk's right shoulder is the *rajoharana*, or whisk broom used by Jain monks to sweep the path before them as they walk. In the original center of this tympanum (now lost) would have been an object of worship, probably a seated *Jina* image, if it is analogous to other similar tympana that survive intact from the Kushan Period (Figure 9). Note that on the broken early tympanum (Figures 7 and 8) the Ardhaphalaka monk is placed closer to the holy object in the center of the tympanum than the flying gods who bear offerings of lotus flowers behind him.

The remains of another architrave from Mathura dating to the pre-Kushan period of the early first century C E depict three Ardhaphalaka monks (Figure 10). The scene on the left portion seems to be in a monastic setting with a tank. One Ardhaphalaka monk, who is nude with the *colapatta* over his left forearm and a small pot in his left hand, approaches the tank with his right hand outstretched. In the center of the surviving fragment is what appears to be an Ardhaphalaka monk of particularly high status, as he is seated on a cushion or platform under a

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tree<sup>11</sup> He has the water pot in his left hand and *colapatta* over his left forearm, while his right hand is raised to his shoulder holding the handle of a *rajoharana*, whose bristles drape over his shoulder He is being venerated by a layman, standing before him, clothed and bejeweled, with his hands in *nājalīmudra*

A more enigmatic depiction of an Ardhapalaka monk is represented in Figure 10, where only the lower halves of three figures are visible on the back of a mythical serpentine creature riding through a rocky sylvan setting The foremost figure is an Ardhapalaka monk with his pot and *colapatta*, while seated behind him are a lay man and woman, who faces backwards

Ardhapalaka monks are also found in more iconic settings, in the central circles of sacred plaques called *ayāgapatas*<sup>12</sup> The one in Figures 11 and 12 dates to the early first century C E, and it depicts the *Jina* Paśva seated in meditative bliss while being venerated by two Ardhapalaka monks The monks are completely nude

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<sup>11</sup> This presentation of the monk seated under a tree echoes the placement of divinities and sacred altars under trees The Ardhapalaka Jains of Mathura seem to have adopted the universally recognized idea of locating a holy being under a tree on a platform, as did the Buddhists in the placement of Siddhartha's enlightenment under the Bodhi tree Here, however, a mere monk is depicted in such an exalted state, and his sanctity is further emphasized by his being worshipped by a lay person

<sup>12</sup> For a full discussion of *ayāgapatas*, see my "Ayāgapatas Characteristics, Symbolism, and Chronology," in *Artibus Asiae*, LX, 1990, pp 79-137

with the *colapatta* draped over each of their left forearms (Figure 12) Their hands are pressed together in a gesture of adoration As in all pre-Kushan depictions, the *colapatta* is not used to cover nudity, but is nevertheless constantly present

By the Kushan Period of the second and third centuries C E, however, the *colapatta* invariably covers the frontal nudity of Ardhaphalaka monks, as seen in the plaque dated to the early third century C E (Figure 13),<sup>13</sup> and on the lion pedestal of the late second century C E (Figure 2) The monks themselves are still highly revered as seen in Figure 13 where the Ardhaphalaka cleric is being venerated by serpent deities, and lay followers

How can we tell from the sculptural representations that members of the Ardhaphalaka sect in early Mathura, whom the Digambaras deemed heretical, practiced *ahimsa*? One clear piece of evidence is their use of the *rajoharana*, which they frequently hold, both in pre-

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<sup>13</sup> The somewhat damaged inscription on this plaque reads as follows

1 s[1]ddha[m] sam 90 9 grī 2 dī 10 6 kolyat[o] ganato  
thaniyato kulato vai[ra]to [vo]to aryyasura[po] 2 śiśini  
dhamasriye navartina grahadatasya dhi[tu]  
dhanahathi A a gha[?]sthivijī

B kana sramana

(Translation "Hail! In the year 99 in the second month of summer, on the sixteenth day the daughter of Grahadata, [the wife of ?] Dhanahathi at the request Dhamaśiri, the female pupil of Aryyasurapo-- of the Koliya gana, the Thaniya (Sthaniya) kula, and the Vaira [ vo] "

A "Ānagha--sthavijī "

B "The ascetic Kana ")

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Kushan and Kushan sculptures (Figures 10, 8, and 13) This whisk broom was used to sweep tiny creatures from their path to prevent any injury to them while the mendicants walked. Even the distinctive emblem of the sect, the *colapatta*, may have been used for preventing injury to living beings. A fifth-century Buddhist source, the *Dhammapada-Atthakatha*, states that the Nirgranthas wore the cloth not to cover their frontal nudity, but to prevent one-sense beings found in dust and dirt from entering the alms bowl and being eaten or harmed accidentally.<sup>14</sup> It is interesting to note that the bowl is held in combination with the *colapatta* in early representations, though it does not actually cover the bowl itself (Figures 6 and 10).

Another piece of evidence for the practice of *ahimsa* by the Ardhaphalaka monks can be found in their holding of the *mukhapatika*, which is a small cloth used to cover the

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<sup>14</sup> "For one day the monks, seeing naked ascetics of the Jain order, began the following discussion 'Brethren, these Niganthas are to be preferred to the Acelakas, who go entirely naked, for these ascetics at least wear a covering in front. These ascetics evidently possess some sense of modesty.' Overhearing the discussion, the Niganthas said, 'It is not for this reason at all that we wear a covering. On the contrary, even dust and dirt are actual individuals, endowed with the principle of life, and so, for fear they may fall into our alms-dishes, for this reason we wear a covering.' Arguments and counter-arguments followed between both parties of monks, and there was a long discussion." See *Dhammapada Atthakatha*, Book XXII, Story 8 *Niganthanamvatthu*, in Eugene Watson Burlingame (trans.), *Buddhist Legends*, Part 3. Harvard Oriental Series, Volume 30 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), p. 196.

mouth during speech to prevent any tiny beings from accidentally entering the mouth and being injured or killed (Figure 14) The *mukhapatika* is also grasped in the left hands of the Ardhapalaka monks on the detail of a *Jina* pedestal (Figure 15), where they are also shown holding their *rajoharanas* up in their right hands

It is interesting to note in connection with the image in Figure 15, that a fully clothed Svetambara monk is depicted together with the Ardhapalakas, at the left This suggests that by the mid to late Kushan Period, the Ardhapalakas of Mathura began to integrate with the canonical Svetambaras, and were eventually subsumed into the Svetambara sect of Jainism, thereby explaining their disappearance in art after the third century C E This gradual integration into the Svetambara sect may also explain the shift towards covering their frontal nudity with the *colapatta* in the later images

Now we shall turn to the question of how the Ardhapalaka monks of early Mathura exemplify the ideals of *anekanta* The Ardhapalakas were very open to the ideas and practices of other religions they came across Their adoption of practices and accouterments from other religious groups, such as Brahmanism, cults of popular *yaksas* and *yaksis*, and Buddhism, testifies to their attitudes of tolerance and acceptance They also did not hesitate to include among their followers women, foreigners, and members of any classes or occupations This attitude made them more familiar and more easily acceptable to the local population In turn, such attitude facilitated the conversion to Jainism of lay people, many of whom were very wealthy and prominent, especially in pre-Kushan Mathura One feature they seem to have adopted from

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Brahmanical Hinduism was the idea of the *vidya carana muni* and the holding of the pot in the left hand, which is a standard attribute of Brahmins. In figure 16 is a second century B C E depiction of Brahmins holding a pot in their left hands, who are able to fly through the air as a result of their high-level austerities. This depiction is very similar to the flying Ardhapthalaka monks on the plaque in Figures 5 and 6, only the Jain monk is nude and tonsured.

Even the *colapatta* itself may have been adopted from the practice of Brahmins who, in the pre-Kushan periods, draped the skin of a black antelope over their left forearms, rather than over the left shoulder as was the practice during the Kushan period and later. In Figures 17 and 18 are relief carvings of Brahmins. The former depicts a scene from a Jataka story in which the Buddha was a Brahmin in a previous life, and he wears the black antelope skin in the same way that the Ardhapthalakas wore the *colapatta*. The relief in Figure 18 is a detail from the story of the Brahmin ascetic boy Rasyaśṛṅga, who is similarly depicted with the antelope skin over his left forearm. This may have been a practice of revered Brahmin ascetics that was adopted by the Ardhapthalaka Jains, but adapted to cohere with the non-violent tenets of Jainism. Thus the black antelope skin was converted to a strip of cloth, though it still functioned as the emblem of an ascetic.

A distinctive aspect of the Ardhapthalaka Jains of Mathura is their focus on *stapa* worship, but without any evidence of the *stapas'* association with a relic<sup>15</sup>. Two

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<sup>15</sup> The archaeological remains of the prominent Jain *stapa* at Kankali-Tila in Mathura were published by Vincent Smith in *The*

examples of bas relief depictions of a *stūpa* under worship by Jains are on the stone plaque in Figure 5 and in the spandrel of the tympanum in Figure 19. It is possible that the Ardhamāhāyāna Jains adopted the centrality of *stūpa* worship from their Buddhist neighbors, though this point bears further investigation. The monument of the *stūpa* could have served as a focal point of veneration for the Jain spiritual community, as it did for the Buddhists. Nowhere else in Jain art or at other Jain archaeological site does the *stūpa* play such a prominent role as it did in early Mathura. The donative inscription on the bas relief depiction of the *stūpa* in Figure 5 states that a female courtesan, who was a lay disciple, along with members of her family gave a shrine, an assembly hall, a cistern and a stone slab to the Jain sanctuary,<sup>16</sup> thus expanding a monastic complex that included a *stūpa*. The *stūpas* were dedicated to a *Jina*, such as Mahāvīra, the one in the slab in Figure 5 appears to be a bas relief representation of a *stūpa* that was dedicated to Mahāvīra, for the inscription opens with an invocation to him, and his cognizance of the lion is found atop one of the flanking pillars. It was a large *stūpa*, built upon a high platform, the entrance stairway of which is flanked by a *yakṣa* on the left and a *yakṣi* on the right.

*Yakṣas* and *yakṣis* were remarkably prominent and especially important to the local population of Mathura during this early period,<sup>17</sup> and the Ardhamāhāyāna Jains

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*Jain Stupa and Other Antiquities at Mathura*, Archaeological Survey of India, New Imperial Series, vol XX, North-Western Provinces and Oudh, vol V. Muttra Antiquities, 1900

<sup>16</sup> See note 1, above

<sup>17</sup> More iconic statues of *yakṣas* and *yakṣis* have been found from the environs of Mathura dating from the second century



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were tolerant of and receptive to this proclivity. Their early art includes many *yaksas* and *yaksīs* in their pantheon of Jain deities. A famous Jain relief invoking Mahavira, which was dedicated by a female lay disciple in the Year 72 during the reign of the Mahāksatrapa Śodasa (ca. CE 15), features a figure that is best identified as a *yaksī* who has been subsumed within Jainism (Figure 20). Similarly, at the broken edge of the lowest register of the tympanum we discussed above (Figure 7), is a representation of a

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BCE to the first century CE than from any other single region on the Indian subcontinent. This statistic holds despite the fact that most sites at Mathura have yet to be systematically excavated. The prominence of *yaksa* cults at Mathura are also attested in early Buddhist literature. The Pali *Anguttara Nikaya*, relates that in Mathura, "[the ground] is uneven, there is much dust, there are fierce dogs, bestial *yakkhas*, and alms are got with difficulty" (F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hare, trans., *The Book of the Gradual Sayings (Anguttara Nikaya)*, 5 vols., Pali Text Society Translation Series, nos. 22, 24-27, London, Pali Text Society, 1932-36, vol. 3, p. 188. Cf. John Strong, *The Legend of King Asoka*, p. 29). One such fierce *yaksa* of Mathura, named Gardabha, is said to have been converted by the Buddha in Asvaghosa's *Buddhacarita* (*Buddhacarita*, xxi.25. *The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha*, E. H. Johnston, trans., Delhi, 1984, first published in Lahore, 1936), Part III, p. 59). The prominence of *yaksas* in Mathura is also reflected in the Buddhist *Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya*, wherein Brahmins entreat the Buddha to quell *yaksas* and *yaksīs* who ravage the city. The Buddha subsequently converts these beings to Buddhism, and the citizens of Mathura are enjoined to build Buddhist *viharas* in their honor. See John Strong, *The Legend and Cult of Upagupta*, p. 6, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, 9 vols., edited by Nalinaksha Dutt, Calcutta, 1939-59, vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 16-17.

seated goddess being venerated by female devotees. In this way the Ardhaphalakas exhibited an inclusivist attitude towards local divinities, embracing them within their own religion. This was apparently attractive to women who were not obliged to abandon their traditional divinities associated with childbirth and prosperity when they embraced Jainism. Consequently, women made up a large segment of the lay Jain population of early Mathura, and they were some of the most generous donors and patrons of Jain sites.

One special *yaksa* deity incorporated into the Jain pantheon by the Ardhaphalakas, like other *yaksas*, *yaksis*, and *nāgas* was the goat-headed *yaksa* associated with childbirth, called Naigamesin. A damaged image of Naigamesin stands guard at the entrance of an Ardhaphalaka Jain *stūpa* (Figure 5), while another is found on a gateway architrave (Figure 21). Both the images, which date to the first century C.E., may represent early incorporation of Naigamesin into Jainism, possibly even before the rise of the tradition regarding the transfer of the embryo of Mahavira found in the Śvetāmbara canons. Fertility goddesses are also carved on the Jain architrave with Naigamesin (Figure 21). The Ardhaphalaka incorporation of the *yaksa* cult into their open and tolerant form of Jainism also included the worship of trees, as seen in a detail from a Jain *ayagapata*.

The art historical evidence suggests that not only did the Ardhaphalakas include divinities and practices from other religious groups, they also encouraged foreigners to become followers of their religion. In the lower register of a tympanum dating to the Kushan Period (Figure 9) Scythians in non-Indian dress consisting of

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tunics, trousers and boots worship a seated Jain goddess, who is flanked by Nāgamesin and another male divinity. In the topmost register of the same tympanum Ardhaphalaka monks venerate a *stapa* with their female disciples, while lay men honor the image of a seated *Tirthankara* in the middle register. The inclusion of foreigners, women, *stapas*, *yaksas*, *yaksis* and anthropomorphic images into Ardhaphalaka Jainism as seen on this one tympanum bespeaks the adherence of these unique early Jains of Mathura to the ideals of *anekanta* <sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> In the pre-Kushan Jain tympanum from Mathura of the first century C.E. there are no examples of figures in Scythian dress. There are, however, a significant number of figures wearing an Iranian type of headgear, consisting in horizontally wrapped turbans secured to one's head by means of a broad strap worn under the chin (Figures 7 and 19). J. C. Harle and Domenico Faccenna have demonstrated that this type of headgear is generally worn by grooms, horsemen, warriors or hunters (J. C. Harle, "The significance of wrapped heads in Indian sculpture," *South Asian Archaeology* 1979, ed. H. Härtel, Berlin, 1981, pp. 401-11; D. Faccenna, "The turban in the figural frieze from the Main Stupa of the Buddhist Sacred Area of Saidu Sharif I (Swat, Pakistan) and the Corpus of Gandhara sculpture," *Silk Road Art and Archaeology*, vol. 6, 1999/2000, pp. 45-9, esp. figs. 2, 7, and 8). Whether those who wear them are necessarily foreigners in Mathura is uncertain. This sort of headdress is found in regions that were particularly in close contact with the West, namely, Bhoja in Western India, Amaravati and Nagarjunakonda in Andhra Pradesh, and Gandhara and Swat. In any event, this kind of headgear is foreign to Mathura and is not regularly seen in art from India-proper. It appears to be an Iranian type of hat that was worn frequently either by Iranians

The Ardhaphalaka Jains also adopted the Mathuran propensity for iconic image worship. The earliest identifiable depictions of *Tirthankaras* in human form, the seated figures of Rsabha (Figure 3), are from Mathura, datable to around the second century B C E. They apparently were based on the prototype of the Brahmanical ascetic (*tapasvin*), with feet crossed, seated on a platform.<sup>19</sup> The form was adapted to suit Jain ideals, for the images of Rsabha are in the posture of meditation, instead of active instruction, and no antelope skin covers their pedestals, thus showing their adherence to *ahimsa*. Shortly thereafter, full-scale *Jinas* carved in the round were being produced at Mathura, presumably by the impetus of the Ardhaphalaka Jains, like the standing Parśva of the early first century B C E (Figure 23). Images of *Jinas* subsequently are found frequently in the Jain art of Mathura throughout the first century C E. Thus, the strong tradition of making images of *Jinas* as objects of worship in human form seems to have been started under the auspices of the open-minded Ardhaphalakas at Mathura. The veneration of *Tirthankara* images continues to be central to the Jain faith to this day.

The Jains of Mathura, who, before the mid-second century C E, belonged to the Ardhaphalaka sect, as far as

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in India employed as groomsmen or local people who adopted the Iranian item of dress. Be they foreigners or low-class groomsmen, hunters, or soldiers, men with this type of headgear were embraced by the Ardhaphalakas, which serves as further evidence for their attitudes of *anekanta*.

<sup>19</sup> For an example of a seated Brahmanical *tapasvin* dating to the mid- to late second century B C E see A. K. Coomaraswamy, *La Sculpture de Bharhut*, Paris, 1956, pl. XLIV, fig. 172.

## Exemplars of Anekanta and Ahimsa

the currently available evidence indicates, had been making human images of *Jinas* since the second century B C E. They created a climate of openness and tolerance, by inviting members of other religions, various ethnicities, and people from all walks of life into their fold. They adopted monuments, images and practices associated with contemporaneous religions that were familiar and popular among the residents of Mathura. Consequently, they successfully attracted a large, wealthy, and diverse following, and they became instrumental for the production of a great deal of art for their grand monastic complexes. As far as the archaeological evidence attests, they became a dominant religious group in Mathura.

The other religions of the area then responded and seemed to follow the Ardhaphalaka model in ways such as the making of human images for worship. The earliest surviving representation of the Buddha in human form was found in Mathura and is datable to the early first century C E (Figure 24). It bears close resemblance to images of *Jinas* produced for their Ardhaphalaka neighbors, such as the seated Pārśva from the center of an *ayagapata* (Figure 12). After this time the image cult among the Buddhists gradually gained momentum, such that by the early second century C E, colossal stone Buddhas were being exported to other cities in northern India. Similarly, Hindu imagery took root and diversified during the period when the Ardhaphalakas were flourishing.

The art historical, epigraphical and archaeological evidence shows that the Ardhaphalaka sect of Jains in Mathura, who evidently embraced the ideals of *ahimsa* and *anekanta*, were instrumental in creating a tolerant, diverse environment in a cosmopolitan cultural center where the

arts were copiously patronized, and different religions flourished alongside one another. Scholars have often wondered why Mathura was the seat of so many key religious movements and iconographic developments that significantly affected the course of history. The answer may lie in the influence exerted by the Ardhamphalaka Jain monks and their followers, who comprised a large segment of the population, and the atmosphere of inclusiveness, peace, and tolerance that they helped to create and uphold.



Figure 1 Seated Pārśva  
Mathura, second century C E,  
State Museum, Lucknow  
J 113/J 25 (Photo Sonya Rhie  
Quintanilla, courtesy State  
Museum, Lucknow)

Figure 2 Detail  
of the pedestal in  
Figure 1 (Photo  
Sonya Rhie  
Quintanilla,  
courtesy State  
Museum,  
Lucknow)



## Exemplars of Anekānta and Ahimsā



Figure 3 Architrave with Renunciation of Rśabha Mathura, late second century B C E , State Museum, Lucknow J 354/609 (Photo AIIS)



Figure 4 Fragment of a panel with flying Ardhaphālaka monk and *kinnara* Mathura, c early to mid first century B C E , State Museum, Lucknow J 105 (Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy State Museum, Lucknow)

Figure 5 Stone plaque depicting the veneration of a Jain *stūpa* Mathura c mid to late first century C E Government Museum, Mathura Q 2 (Photo After Ludwig Bachhofer, *Early Indian Sculpture*, New York, 1929, p 91)








Figure 6 Detail of flying Ardhaphālaka monk from Figure 5  
(Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy Government Museum,  
Mathura )



Figure 7 Jain  
tympanum  
Mathura, c early  
first century C E ,  
National Museum,  
New Delhi J 555  
(Photo After L  
Bachhofer, *Early  
Indian Sculpture*,  
New York, 1929, pl  
102 )

## Exemplars of Anekānta and Ahimsā



Figure 8 Detail of Figure 7 (Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy National Museum, New Delhi )

Figure 9 Jain tympanum Mathura, second century C E , State Museum, Lucknow B 207 (Photo S R Quintanilla courtesy State Museum, Lucknow )




Figure 10 Jain architrave with Ardhapālaka monks Mathura, c early first century C E , Brooklyn Museum of Art 87 188 5, Gift of Michael and Georgia de Havenon (Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy Brooklyn Museum of Art )




Figure 11 Āyagapata with veneration of Pārśva by two Ardhapāhāḷaka monks Mathura, c early first century C E, State Museum, Lucknow J 253 (Photo John M Rosenfield )



Figure 12 Detail of Figure 11 (Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy State Museum, Lucknow )

## Exemplars of Anekānta and Ahimsā



Figure 13 Kana Plaque,  
Mathura, c. early third  
century C.E., State Museum,  
Lucknow J 623 (Photo  
John M. Rosenfield)



Figure 14 Detail of a Jain  
pedestal with an  
Ardhaphālaka monk  
Mathura, second century C.E.,  
State Museum, Lucknow J 20  
(Photo S. R. Quintanilla  
courtesy State Museum,  
Lucknow)



Figure 15 Detail of a Jain Pedestal with Ardhaphālaka monks and a Svetāmbara monk Mathura, second century C E, State Museum, Lucknow (Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy State Museum, Lucknow )

Figure 16 Brahmin ascetics flying through the air Detail from the coping stone, Bharhut, Madhya Pradesh, c mid-second century B C E , Indian Museum, Calcutta (Photo After A K Coomaraswamy, *La Sculpture de Bharhut*, Paris, 1956, fig 251 )



## Exemplars of Anekānta and Ahimsā




Figure 17 *Mahāvodhi Jātaka* Detail from the coping stone, Bharhut, Madhya Pradesh, c mid-second century B C E , Indian Museum, Calcutta (Photo After A K Coomaraswamy, *La Sculpture de Bharhut*, Paris, 1956, fig 137 )

Figure 18 *Rsyasringa*, the Brahmin ascetic and the Princess Shanta Detail from a rail post, Mathura, c early first century B C E , Government Museum, Mathura 76 40 (Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy Government Museum, Mathura )





Figure 19 Worship of a Jain *stūpa* Detail from a Jain tympanum Mathura, c early first century C E, National Museum, New Delhi (Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy National Museum, New Delhi )



Figure 20 Jain stone plaque dedicated by Amohini Mathura, early first century C E, State Museum, Lucknow J 1 (Photo After Ludwig Bachhofer, *Early Indian Sculpture*, New York, 1929, pl 74 )



Figure 21 Detail from an architrave depicting Naigamesin Mathura, c late first century C E, State Museum, Lucknow, J 626 (Photo S R Quintanilla, courtesy State Museum, Lucknow )

## Exemplars of Anekānta and Ahimsā



Figure 22 Standing Parsva with attendant Mathura, c early first century B C F , State Museum, Lucknow J 82 (Photo S R Quintanilla courtesy State Museum, Lucknow )

Figure 23 Buddha and *lokapālas* Mathura, c early first century C F , Government Museum, Mathura H 12 (Photo Government Museum, Mathura )





## Glossary

<i>advaita</i>	non-dual system of <i>Vedānta</i>
<i>ahimsa</i>	non-harming physically, verbally or mentally, nonviolence
<i>ajīva</i>	non-living
<i>anekantavāda</i>	many-pointed reality, non-one-sided perspective of reality, non-absolutism
<i>anuvrata</i>	minor vows for lay Jains
<i>aparigraha</i>	non-possession, non-attachment
<i>apramāda</i>	watchful moral behavior
<i>arambhaja himsa</i>	occupational or accidental violence
<i>ardhaphalaka</i>	Jain monks nude for the most part except for wearing partial piece of cloth over their left forearm
<i>asātavedantiya karma</i>	certain variety of <i>karmic</i> matter that produces unpleasant feelings
<i>āsrava</i>	influx of <i>karma</i> .
<i>ayāgapata</i>	a sacred stone or object carved with images of <i>Tirthankaras</i> or other saints
<i>bandha</i>	bondage of <i>karma</i>
<i>bhavana</i>	contemplation or meditation
<i>cakrastambha</i>	free-standing pillar surmounted by a wheel, which refers to the teaching or the law.
<i>darśana</i>	"seeing," intuition

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<i>dhyana</i>	meditation
<i>dvesa</i>	aversion
<i>ekantika</i>	epistemological error of one-sidedness
<i>gaccha</i>	lineage of monks and nuns within a sect
<i>ganadhara</i>	first mendicant disciples of a <i>tirthankara</i> , for example 12 Ganadharas of Mahavira
<i>gunasthana</i>	a stage of spiritual development (fourteen stages in Jainism)
<i>himsa</i>	harming physically, verbally or mentally
<i>Jina</i>	"the conqueror" or one who overcomes aversion and attachment
<i>jiva</i>	living being (soul)
<i>karma</i>	action, form of matter
<i>karuna</i>	compassion
<i>kevala samadhi</i>	an eternal state of meditative bliss
<i>kevalajñana</i>	infinite knowledge, omniscience
<i>kinnara</i>	winged celestial being whose upper half is human and lower half is that of a bird
<i>madhyastha</i>	standing in the middle
<i>madhyasthya</i>	neutrality
<i>mahavrata</i>	major vows (five great vows for Jain mendicants)
<i>maitri</i>	universal friendliness
<i>mithyadarśana</i>	deluded view of reality
<i>mithyadr̥ṣṭi</i>	incorrect view of reality, the first <i>gunasthana</i>
<i>moksa</i>	liberation from the cycle of rebirth.

## Glossary

<i>mukhapatika</i>	a small cloth covering the mouth to prevent killing of tiny beings.
<i>muni</i>	one who keeps silence, monk
<i>naya</i>	logically distinct standpoint(s)
<i>nayavāda</i>	epistemological theory of standpoints
<i>nirgrantha</i>	"free from bonds," term used for Jain ascetics who had renounced the world and become mendicants
<i>nirjara</i>	removal of <i>karma</i> from soul
<i>parigraha parimāna</i>	choosing to set limits to one's possessions
<i>pākhandika</i>	heretic, imposter
<i>pāpa</i>	harmful <i>karmas</i> associated with soul.
<i>pratitya samutpada</i>	Buddhist theory of interdependent arising
<i>rajoharana</i>	a whisk broom used by Jain monks and nuns to sweep the ground free of small living beings before them as they walk
<i>rāga</i>	attachment
<i>samkalpaja himsa</i>	intentional violence
<i>samanī</i>	stage before initiation into <i>sādhu</i> or mendicant order
<i>samavasarana</i>	preaching assembly of the <i>Jina</i>
<i>samsāra</i>	cycle of rebirth
<i>samvara</i>	stopping of <i>karmic</i> influx
<i>samayika</i>	attainment of equanimity
<i>sangha</i>	spiritual community
<i>saptabhaṅgi</i>	seven-fold system of qualified predication
<i>sarvajña</i>	omniscient
<i>sādhana</i>	ascetic activities.

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<i>sata vedantiya karma</i>	certain variety of <i>karmic</i> matter that produces pleasant feelings
<i>satyagraha</i>	the truth force or the soul force, a term coined by Mahatma Gandhi
<i>śramana</i>	of non-Vedic tradition, usually refers to Jains or Buddhists
<i>śrāvaka</i>	lay Jain followers (male), <i>śravika</i> (female)
<i>stūpa</i>	a sacred monument in the shape of hemispherical dome surmounted by an umbrella ( in Jainism <i>stūpa</i> is dedicated to <i>Tirthankara</i> or other holy beings)
<i>syādvāda</i>	doctrine of qualified assertion
<i>tapas</i>	austerities
<i>tirthankara</i>	"fordmakers," omniscient human teachers who preach the path to <i>mokṣa</i>
<i>vidya carana muni</i>	a holy man with such high state of meditative accomplishment that he is able to fly through the power of his austerities
<i>virodhi himsa</i>	violence in opposition to the enemy
<i>yaksa</i>	a male nature divinity associated with the productivity of the earth, wealth and prosperity
<i>yakṣi</i>	a female nature divinity associated with life giving forces, especially vegetation
<i>yoga</i>	vibration, meditation

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## **APPENDIX**

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Anekanta for Contemporary Life  
Pomona, January 19-20, 2002**

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## *Ahimsa, Anekanta and Jainism*

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- Samani Charitrapragya, Jain Vishva Bharti, India
- Christopher Key Chapple, Loyola Marymount University
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- Kristi Wiley, University of California at Berkeley

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- Maria Heim, California State University, Long Beach
- Phyllis Herman, California State University, Northridge
- Sukh Sampat Mehta, Loma Linda University Medical Center
- Joseph Prabhu, California State University, Los Angeles
- Amar Salgia, Boeing Sattelite Systems
- Fujinaga Sin, Miyokonoji National College of Technology, Japan

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